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Introduction 
 
Daniel Riha 
 
The papers in this volume reflect the debates that progressed during 
the 3rd Global Conference on Visions of Humanity in Cyberculture, 
Cyberspace and Science Fiction, held at Mansfield College, Oxford, United 
Kingdom in July 2008. The edited draft papers make up a snapshot output for 
actual publishing. 
 This multi-disciplinary conference project is a successful rebirth of 
the 2003-2004 conferences held previously in Prague in the frame of the 
ID.net Critical Issues research project. 
The focus of these papers addresses the changing role of humans 
and the concepts of humanity in the present and envisioned cybernetic 
environment. The massive adoption of ever-emergent ICT technologies 
changes human cultural activity. The uprise of new forms of communication 
such as online social networking, internet video-casting, massive online 
multiplayer gaming and alternative living in the virtual worlds, call for 
academic exploration. These issues raise increasing attention of academics 
from a wide range of disciplines, including philosophy, sociology, 
anthropology, literature studies, new media studies and many others. 
The various topics covered by this volume range from the merger of 
body and technology, new forms of humanity, gender issues in cyberspace, 
online social networking, analysis of literary cyberpunk concepts in literature 
and movies, online historical representation, interactivity analysis and serious 
gaming simulation development to legal issues in avatar worlds. 
 This book consists of 23 chapters organised into nine parts: 
 
PART I:  Technology-Governance-Gender & Distance;  
PART II:  Time & Place; 
PART III:  Avatars-Bodies & Identity; 
PART IV:  Merger & Embodiment; 
PART V:  Critical Philosophies; 
PART VI:  The Literature of Cyberspace; 
PART VII:  Robots-Cyborgs & Replicants; 
PART VIII:  Education-Science & Game Design; 
PART IX:  Character-Community & Anthropology. 
 
The first part comprises 2 chapters on loosely corresponding topics:  
Kristin Veel’s ‘Surveillance Narratives: From Lack to Overload’ 
describes the ways of approaching the cultural and aesthetic implications of 
surveillance. She proposes the application of narrative structures as an 
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approach to the analytical works on surveillance and explores how 
surveillance is reflected in the narrative structures of Edgar Allan Poe’s Man 
of the Crowd and Michael Haneke’s Caché. 
Oksana Cheypesh’s ‘Technology, Environment, the Masculine, and 
the Feminine in Distance Cultures’ is concerned with the characteristics of 
various perspectives of technology, environment and gender in different 
cultures as evident in the films ‘Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within’ and 
Metropolis’ as well as the videogame ‘S.T.A.L.K.E.R’. 
The second part of this book presents an article focused on the 
representation of the past on the internet. Martin Pogačar’s ‘Memonautica: 
Online Representations of the Yugoslav Past’ deals with the influence of 
presentations on perception of  historical internet events and seeks out ways 
in which narratives affect understanding of the past with regard to the online 
representations of the former Yugoslavia. 
The book’s third part considers selected theoretical issues on identity 
in cyberspace. Mark Grover’s ‘Practical Identity in Cyberspace’ examines to 
what extent the Christine Korsgaard´s The Sources of Normativity might be 
applied in the case of online identity and in particular, enquires the 
composition of online practical identity. 
Ewan Kirkland’s paper, ‘The Interpolated Cyborg: Theorising the 
Avatar in Haunting Ground’, discusses the avatar/player relationship with 
regard to the videogame agency, textuality and interactivity issues. The 
author seeks the links between intertextuality and the concept of the avatar in 
the survival horror videogame Haunting Ground. 
Kristi N. Scott and M. Heather Dragoo’s ‘The Baroque Body: A 
Social Commentary on the Role of Body Modification in Scott Westerfeld’s 
Uglies Trilogy’ discusses the possibilities of the science fiction genre as a 
medium where the defining characteristics of personhood might be explored.  
The fourth part of this book presents papers concerned with merger 
of body and technology in arts. Elizabeth Borst ‘Cyborg Art as a Critical 
Sphere of Inquiry into Increasing Corporeal Human-technology Merger’ 
examines the visual representations of corporeal human-technology 
integration in the fine arts. She further argues the need to introduce the 
original cyborg-art genre as a newly recognised area of research in relation to 
body-technology amalgamation. 
Zeynep Gündüz’ ‘Interactive Dance: The Merger of Media 
Technologies and the Dancing Body’ offers an interesting view on the 
relationship between the human body and interactive ICT in the context of  
cultural practices of contemporary dance.  She uses the stage performances 
and the case study in Apparition to demonstrate her findings. 
Daniel Riha 
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The fifth part considers Nietzsche’s value for cybernetics and 
selected aspects of technoscience that may support the transformation of 
organizational principles in society. 
Daniel White’s ‘Consciousness, Embodiment, and Communication: 
Nietzsche’s Bioinformatics’ proposes Nietzsche’s relevance to the 
communication theory. He submits the hypothesis that Nietzsche’s work 
offers a solution to the ‘frame problem’ in information theory and has a 
relevance to the posthuman identity in science fiction and cyberspace. 
Tamar Sharon’s ‘Techno-scientific Schizophrenia vs. Techno-
scientific Paranoia: Subsumption in the Schizoid Double Pull’ uses Deleuze 
and Guattari’s analysis of paranoia and schizophrenia as the effects of the 
fundamental organising principles of capitalist society. It identifies a 
contradiction between emancipating pull of new technologies that might 
move the human society towards a posthuman organisation and ‘modernist’ 
tendencies that seem to realise the ‘subversive’ potential. 
Part six examines a selection of cyberpunk literature. Katherine 
Harrison’s ‘Gender Resistance: Interrogating the Punk in Cyberpunk’ 
analyses cyber-literary texts Candas Jane Dorsey’s short story Learning 
About and Machine Sex’ and Neal Stephenson’s novel Snow Crash with the 
intention to identify and evaluate the extent of resistance to mainstream 
society including resistance to gender stereotypes. 
Juan Ignacio Munoz’ ‘Cyber-Shamanism as a Theory of Simulacra 
in Ygdrasil, a Novel by Jorge Baradit’ presents a study of the representation 
of virtuality and trauma. He inquires as to the definition of principles of the 
Chilean cyberpunk.  
Maria Poulaki’s ‘When Differences become Unimportant: Casshern 
and the True Social of Cyberpunk’ investigates the actual meanings of the 
cyberpunk movement as she presents her findings on a case study of the film 
Casshern. 
Part seven continues with two chapters devoted to science fiction 
and one paper focusing on virtual law. Michael J. Klein’s chapter ‘Beholding 
the Uncanny: Replicants, Cyborgs and Clones in Science Fiction’ deals with 
the role of artificially produced organism entities in the science fiction genre 
and the stance of the readers to this cyber-race. 
David Lindsay, Melissa de Zwart and Francesca Collins present ‘My 
Self, My Avatar, My Rights: Rights of Avatar Identity and Integrity in 
Virtual Worlds’.  Here they analyse the relationship between the user in a 
virtual world and his/her avatar. They open an interesting issue of the legal 
treatment of avatar rights. 
Laura Schuster’s ‘What does a Scanner See? Techno-Fascination 
and Unreliability in the Mind-Game Film’ is interested in paranoia and 
conspiracy incorporation in the plot of the movie A Scanner Darkly and 
shows its relationship to the issues of technological innovation. She presents 
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her findings on the case of the film and recognises the title as emphasising its 
own function as a mediated and synthetic presentation of a story. 
The eighth part presents papers that argue the state and development 
of virtual communities and the application of multimedia and videogames 
beyond entertainment. Alex DiGiacinto’s ‘Creating the Digital Sandbox? 
Implications of Spatial Construction in Cyberspace’ uses the analogy of ant 
colonies for examination of the traditional bulletin board organization. 
Peter Ludes’ ‘Social Sciences as Multimedia Games’ discusses the 
use of alternative media to the written word for extending the scope of social 
scientific modes of theory-formation beyond traditional uni-linear texts to 
networked social-science-as-arts games. 
Daniel Riha’s ‘Game Design Technology as a Tool for Research and 
Education in Cultural History’ investigates the potential of an interactive 3-D 
medium for the documentary work in the context of cultural studies. He 
summarises a methodology from the game studies that supports the use of a 
3-D game space as dispositive for knowledge representation. 
The ninth part of this book presents papers concerned with online 
social networking. Jordan J. Copeland’s ‘Shared Space: Seeking Real 
Insights from Virtual Friendships’ draws on Aristotle’s classical theory of 
friendship and compares contemporary philosophical reflections on 
preferential relationships to investigate the nature and significance of virtual 
friendships.  
Leighton Evans’ ‘A Phenomenological Analysis of Social 
Networking’ reflects the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. This chapter 
identifies social networking as the technology designed to organise persons 
and their relationships with others.  Furthermore, it shows that the essence of 
this technology, called Enframing, affects the human relationships in a way 
in which other modern technologies do not simply because of the usage of 
the technology by humans. 
Anna Maj and Michał Derda-Nowakowski’s ‘Cyber-Communities 
in Their Quest for Free Culture: User-generated Content Portals in the 
Anthropological Perspective’ uncovers the boundaries of cyber-freedom and 
cyber-democracy and analyses the most important ideas of cyber-
communities. They exhibit the elements of wiki-identity and folksonomic 
order of knowledge. Their paper further explores some new areas of 
anthropological research such as cyber-ritual analysis and research on online 
communities and their cyber mythologies. 
Lynda Williams in her chapter ‘Character as Virtual Reality 
Experiment in Identity’, presents her science fiction novel The Courtesan 
Prince as an enactment of the author’s struggle to understand identity as it 
relates to gender, human nature and medically-induced changes in 
personality.
  
  
 
 
PART I 
 
Technology-Governance-Gender & Distance
  
  
 
 
Surveillance Narratives: From Lack to Overload 
 
Kristin Veel 
 
Abstract 
This paper points out ways of approaching the cultural and aesthetic 
implications of ubiquitous surveillance. It does so by juxtaposing two nodal 
points in history, both characterized by new modes of the gathering and 
systematizing of information about citizens: the emergence of the modern 
metropolis in the 19th century, and the pervasive dissemination of information 
and communication technology in the early 21st century. The issue is thus not 
first and foremost surveillance as a technique of war, but surveillance in its 
more basic sense, referring to the collection and processing of information. 
The method of approach is to look at how surveillance is reflected in the 
narrative structures of fiction in respectively Edgar Allan Poe’s ‘Man of the 
Crowd’ (1840) and Michael Haneke’s Caché (2005). The findings of this 
comparison indicate a shift in the connotations of the surveillance figure from 
surveillance as linked to obtaining information to the importance of selection 
of information in order to render the collected information useful. 
 
Key Words: Surveillance, Narration, Fiction, Information Structures. 
 
***** 
 
1. Poe’s ‘The Man of the Crowd’: Surveillance in the 19th Century 
A. Surveillance Practices and the Modern Metropolis 
Although it can be argued that surveillance is basic to human society 
in so far as in its most basic sense it involves one person overseeing another, 
it is a practice whose pervasiveness is linked to urban modernity and the rise 
of the nation state. Our contemporary understanding of private space and 
surveillance can be traced to some of the historical changes accelerated by 
the Industrial Revolution, particularly the migration of rural populations into 
urban centres. Whereas identities were previously established through family 
and community networks, the masses of the modern metropolis meant that 
anonymity became a new condition of life.1 Transformations in living 
arrangements, architectural forms and cultural sensibilities all participated in 
a new notion of privacy, which in turn raised the need for new forms of 
authorisation for instance in relation to the state administration in order to be 
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able to vote or to have access to a defence in court.2 This entails a registration 
of personal information, such as names, addresses, and next of kin. 
The most direct form of surveillance has to do with policing, whose 
emergence in its modern sense is likewise connected to urbanization and the 
emergence of the modern state.3 Jeremy Bentham’s infamous panopticon 
prison (1791), which according to Foucault marked a shift from punishment 
and spectacle to self-discipline,4 is an example of initiatives, which aim to 
manage the new forms of social organisation. 
However, it is important to note that although surveillance increases 
in this period, we are not dealing with a clearly defined negative movement 
towards more control. Surveillance mechanisms develop as tools in the 
attempt to manage the conditions of life in the modern metropolis paralleling 
other measures and tendencies in society. The period from the middle of the 
19th century until World War I is thus for instance characterised as a liberal 
period, marked by more permissive passport rules. 
 
B. Poe’s ‘The Man of the Crowd’ 
Edgar Allan Poe’s short story ‘The Man of the Crowd’ from 1840 in 
many ways epitomizes the experience of the modern metropolis in the 19th 
century and the effect it has on the humans inhabiting it. It features a 
convalescent man as our narrator and his observations of the turmoil of the 
city which he observes at first from the safe distance behind the window of a 
London coffee house; later, however, as one particular man raises his 
curiosity, he hurls himself into the moving masses giving us an unsettling 
close-up of the stalking conscience. 
The pivotal point of the narrative structure is his inclination to 
observe. It is his inability to let one particular man out of his sight, which 
drives the text forward. A scrutinization of how his surveying capabilities and 
the narrative structure are intermingled is thus of interest: We first encounter 
him sitting behind the ‘large bow window’5 of a coffee house. The view he 
gets of the street is restricted; his mode of vision is described as ‘peering 
through the smoky panes into the street.’6 Nonetheless, what goes on in the 
street compels him so much that he quickly looses interest in his newspaper 
and the other people in the coffee shop and turns his full attention towards the 
street. 
The process of watching and its different stages are carefully 
described. At first he keeps a distanced view and observes the crowd in 
general and abstract terms; deducing the class, occupation, and weaknesses of 
the people in the street, grouping them into neat categories from their 
appearance. From his distanced point of view it is possible for him to rise 
above the crowd and transform the bustling mass into a social pattern. Their 
eyes, hands and movements are not the properties of individuals, but form a 
mass ornamentation. 
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It is this kind of anonymity and lack of knowledge about the 
neighbour which fuels his imagination once his attention focuses on one 
particular man. This occurs about halfway into the text and causes the 
position of the narrator to shift from clear overview to embedded confusion. 
His categorising overview of the masses is replaced by a curiosity towards 
the individual. This changes his mode of surveillance and his method of 
obtaining information: 
 
I felt singularly aroused, startled, fascinated. ‘How wild a 
story,’ I said to myself, ‘is written within that bosom!’ 
Then came a craving desire to keep the man in view - to 
know more of him. Hurriedly putting on an overcoat, and 
seizing my hat and cane, I made my way into the street, and 
pushed through the crowd in the direction which I had seen 
him take; for he had already disappeared. With some little 
difficulty I at length came within sight of him, approached, 
and followed him closely, yet cautiously, so as not to attract 
his attention.7 
 
Here we get an insight into the curiosity which this man generates, and of the 
narrators wish to get to know him, not by encountering him and talking to 
him, but by observing his actions without his knowledge and consent. This 
way of relating to the stranger seems to be a response to the simultaneity of 
fear and attraction, which the anonymity of the modern city stimulates in 
him. A narrative impetus is also fostered and he starts to fantasize about the 
man he is following, believing to see him carry both a diamond and a dagger 
under his coat. However, the pursuit itself and its labyrinthine, circuitous 
route quickly begin to carry as much weight in the text as the characteristics 
of the man himself. The narrator is taken through many districts of the foggy 
city and its outskirts, in which the stranger display no other goal with his 
wanderings than seeking out crowds and immersing himself in these. The 
surveyor eventually tires: 
 
And, as the shades of the second evening came on, I grew 
wearied unto death, and stopping fully in front of the 
wanderer, gazed at him steadfastly in the face. He noticed 
me not, but resumed his solemn walk, while I, ceasing to 
follow, remained absorbed in contemplation. ‘This old 
man,’ I said at length, ‘is the type and the genius of deep 
crime. He refuses to be alone. He is the man of the crowd. 
It will be in vain to follow; for I shall learn no more of him, 
nor of his deeds. The worst heart of the world is a grosser 
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book than the ‘Hortulus Animæ’ and perhaps is but one of 
the great mercies of God that ‘er lasst sich nicht lesen.’’8 
 
The surveillance practise of our narrator thus ends in a confrontation in which 
he discovers the indifference of the person he has pursued. Since his goal is 
to seek out the crowds - ‘he refuses to be alone’ - being followed is no 
particular frightening experience for him. The power-relation between 
surveyor and surveyed is thus reversed: the narrator is the pursuer, but he is 
also a man who has not had any control over his urge to follow and survey, 
whereas the man of the crowd does not reveal any unease about being 
monitored; as an inevitable part of managing the urban crowds, he might 
even expect it. 
The search for information and knowledge, which drives the 
narrator’s pursuit as well as the reader’s continued reading, thus both ends in 
the encounter with something that cannot be understood. The question of 
what it is possible to know about the man of the crowd, the human dweller of 
the modern metropolis, is left unanswered. Lack of information thus seems to 
be an inevitable condition whether the object of scrutiny is followed from 
afar or faced directly and this can be identified concretely in the construction 
of the narrative structure of the text. 
 
2.  Haneke’s Caché and Surveillance in the 21st Century 
A. Pervasive Surveillance in the 21st Century 
Now, let us make a leap forward to more contemporary times: 
whereas Foucault in his conceptualisation of Bentham’s panopticon focussed 
on the exercise of discipline and control of the few over the many, Thomas 
Mathiesen has with his notion of ‘synopticon’ highlighted the importance of 
the many that watch the few facilitated by media such as television and 
internet.9 Gilles Deleuze extends the analysis of the contemporary conditions 
of surveillance by describing a shift from a discipline society to ‘societies of 
control.’10 In societies of control, surveillance is no longer confined to 
specific fixed spaces, because digital technology allows for constant and 
mobile surveillance that spans most areas of life. This vision of surveillance 
structures resembles Haggerty and Ericson’s description of the combination 
of military, administrative, policing, and marketing surveillance practices as a 
‘surveillant assemblage.’11 
Although most Western societies have strict legislation on sharing 
personal information,12 digital technology has made information much more 
easily accessible to the average person with the result that the amount of 
information we encounter - as well as leave behind - has increased 
dramatically.  
If we look at the use of the figure of surveillance in contemporary 
fiction it is often not connected to a lack of information, but to an overload of 
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information. An illustrative example is Michael Haneke’s film Caché from 
2005, in which both the main characters of the film and the viewers are 
confronted with long sequences of surveillance footage in which we are not 
able to distinguish relevant from irrelevant information. As I shall attempt to 
show the connotations of the figure of surveillance are not primarily 
concentrated on obtaining information, but display an acute consciousness of 
the necessity of selection in order to be able to make use of the surveillance 
material. 
 
B. Haneke’s Caché 
Whereas ‘The Man of the Crowd’ gave us an insight into the mind 
of the surveyor, Caché pivots around the surveyed, their frustration and 
bewilderment. Caché tells the story of a couple who suddenly find 
themselves under surveillance when they start receiving videotapes with 
recordings of their house and the comings and goings of the family. The main 
protagonist, Georges, quickly comes to suspect that it is related to his past 
and a guilt with which he has never dealt. When he was six years old his 
parents wanted to adopt an orphaned Algerian child by the name of Majid, 
but Georges in childish selfishness tells lies about the boy and thereby causes 
him to be sent away to an orphanage. The film in this way raises a multitude 
of political class and race issues lurking behind the pleasant bourgeois 
surface. 
It is never finally determined in the film who is involved in the 
fabrication and distribution of the surveillance tapes. The film thus centres on 
Georges’ repressed guilt and how childish malice may have grave 
repercussions for the people involved far beyond the ones envisaged at the 
time. What is of interest for us in this context is the way in which the mode of 
surveillance that is practised comes to influence the narrative structure of the 
film.13  
Already in the practise of surveillance and its function within the 
narrative can we note a shift from ‘The Man of the Crowd’. In Poe’s text the 
form of surveillance in question was based on one person following another - 
a one-on-one interaction that only exists until the surveyor gets tired. In 
Caché the surveillance is recorded and the tapes can be distributed widely. 
The form of surveillance with which we are operating here is thus part of a 
media and image system which situates us in a world dominated by 
information and communication technology that lays out different rules for 
the conditions and reception of surveillance than was the case in the streets of 
Poe’s 19th century London. In ‘The Man of the Crowd’ it was the pursuit, 
which drove forward the narrative. In Caché we are searching for the 
narrative in the mass of information with which we are presented in the form 
of dreams, memory, TVnews, and clips from the literary talk show that 
Georges hosts. 
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Caché is to a large degree built as a classic who-dunnit drama 
following the protagonist Georges in his quest for the person pursuing his 
family, revealing small portions of the story piece by piece. But rather than 
signifying a lack of information the atmosphere of the film is permeated by a 
feeling of having too much information at hand and not knowing what to do 
with it. Georges is suddenly send hour-long tapes of his own front door, his 
childhood home, and eventually a conversation he has with the grown-up 
Majid in his worn-down apartment, also capturing the reaction of Majid after 
Georges has left. All these are scenes, which Georges would not have had 
access to were it not for the hidden camera. It is information, which he has 
not asked for, and which he has no real wish to access that drives the story 
forward. 
Another concrete example of the way in which this sense of 
overload and too much material dominate the atmosphere of the film is seen 
in the setting that surrounds Georges. All of the shots from his environment 
(be it his home or his TV studio) show interior lined with books, tapes or 
other forms of clutter, so as to shelter from the outside world or the repressed 
parts of the past. This sense of overload of information, in which Georges is 
embedded, is thus transposed to the viewer who often finds herself 
confronted with settings with a plethora of visual impressions in which it is 
difficult to distinguish what is important and what is not. 
The title Caché, ‘Hidden’, may in this context be read as pointing to 
the way in which the surveillance taking place in the film uncovers Georges’ 
guilt and forces him to confront a repressed part of his childhood. It may also 
refer to the way in which the surveillance allows for lots of ambiguities to 
remain in the film. In fact there are very few things of which we can be 
absolutely sure. It thus remains unresolved whether or not Anne, the wife, is 
having an affair, who produces the tapes, and whether or not Georges’ own 
son, Pierrot, had any role to play in the production of the tapes or not.  
The last scene gives a powerful example of the consequence of 
overload for the comprehension of what takes place before our eyes. It shows 
the broad stairs to Pierrot’s school swarming with children. There is no point 
of focus, which makes it possible to watch the scene in two significantly 
different but equally likely ways. Either it remains a scene viewed from a 
distance with lots of children in which no one stands out, because we do not 
know on what we should focus. In another viewing you may notice Majid’s 
son engaged in conversation with Pierrot. This significant encounter, which 
opens for an interpretation that incriminates Pierrot, is likely to go unnoticed 
by many viewers. There is nothing to point it out as significant and for all we 
know it might not be - we cannot even hear what they are talking about. The 
film does not give definite answers. However, it points to the way in which 
surveillance cameras are of not much use, if we do not know what we are 
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looking for, and how narratives such as these do not point to one truth, but 
many.  
 
3. Conclusion 
Surveillance studies have become an academic field in its own right 
within the last fifteen years. Although the majority of publications approach 
the issue from a perspective within the social sciences,14 film studies 
especially have since their infancy articulated an ongoing fascination with 
voyeurism, touching on many of the core issues of surveillance.15 However, it 
is only within recent years when visual art exhibitions16 and reality TV-
programmes began responding on a larger scale to the increasing 
pervasiveness of surveillance technology in our everyday lives in Western 
societies that cultural studies has taken a serious interest in issues of 
surveillance.17 
Nonetheless, there is still a significant need for inquiry into the 
cultural and aesthetic implications of the increased dominance of surveillance 
in a larger historical perspective. It is this need that my present research 
project (of which I have tried to give a brief glimpse in this paper) aims to 
address by focussing on the imprints which surveillance leaves on cultural 
imagination. The pivotal point is an examination of the way in which fiction 
(filmic and literary) relates to surveillance, not only as a theme, but as an 
element of the narrative structure.  
Looking at the portrayal of surveillance in fictional narratives such 
as Caché and ‘The Man of the Crowd’ provides valuable insights into the 
notions of surveillance at work in these two particular periods, which are both 
characterised by significant changes in surveillance practises and the 
mechanisms of handling information. Although the historical period covered 
in this paper is broad and the conclusions consequently rather general, the 
aim has been to point to the movement from lack to overload as a significant 
tendency which cannot be overlooked and which deserves further scrutiny. 
There is no doubt that the increasing pervasiveness of information and 
communication technology leads to the accessibility of more information. 
Today, the problem facing those who need to transform information into 
knowledge is thus rarely that of having too little information and more often 
the fact that too much information is accessible. Reading the present 
condition of ubiquitous surveillance in comparison with that of the advent of 
the modern metropolis in the 19th century allows for a more in depth 
understanding of this condition. 
Narratives represent particularly useful source material, because 
they in their very nature as narratives are engaged in the process of turning 
incongruent information into consistent stories. Their renditions of 
surveillance practises thus manifest themselves on two levels in the narratives 
at which I have looked in this paper: firstly, as concrete references to 
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surveillance as a topoi in the narrative, and secondly in the way in which 
surveillance comes to be a determining factor in the progression and 
composition of the narrative structures of the stories told. Surveillance thus 
comes to stand forth as a cultural figure which - when unfolded in a narrative 
- display valuable insights into our relation to and interaction with 
information. It may thus be used to further the understanding of the 
mechanisms, which has brought us to our present condition of close 
interrelation between surveillance and the technologies of information and 
communication technology. 
 
Notes
 
1 See, for instance, G Simmel, ‘Die Großstädte und das Geistesleben’, in 
Soziologische Ästhetik, Philo, Bodenheim, 1998, pp. 119-33. 
2 See, for instance, N Abercrombie, S Hill and B S Turner, Sovereign 
Individuals of Capitalism, Allen & Unwin, London, 1986. 
3 See, for instance, V Bailey (ed), Policing and Punishment in Nineteenth-
Century Britain, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J, 1981. 
4 M Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1979. 
5 E A Poe, The Man of the Crowd, BookSurge, Charleston, S.C., 2004, p. 1. 
6 Ibid, p. 2. 
7 Ibid, p. 8. 
8 Ibid, p. 13. 
9 T Mathiesen, ‘The Viewer Society: Michel Foucault's Panopticon revisited’. 
Theoretical Criminology, vol. 1, 1997, pp. 215-34. 
10 G Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, October, vol. 59, 1992. 
11 K D Haggerty and R V Ericson, ‘The Surveillant Assemblage’, British 
Journal of Sociology, vol. 51, 2000, pp. 605-22. 
12 See, for instance, D J Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy 
in the Information Age, New York University Press, New York, 2004. 
13 When looking at this in comparison with Poe’s short story it is important to 
take into account that we are looking at narrative renditions in different 
media. Nonetheless, the comparison is illuminating for our present purpose. 
14 See, for instance, J Baudrillard, ‘Telemorphosis’, in CTRL [SPACE], T Y 
Levin, U Frohne and P Weibel (eds), MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2002, 
pp. 480-86. G Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, Zone Books, New York, 
1995. Foucault. A Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1985. K D Haggerty and R V Ericson, The New Politics of 
Surveillance and Visibility, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006. D 
Lyon, The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1996. Mathiesen. Solove. 
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15 N K Denzin looks at films and voyeurism in The Cinematic Society: The 
Voyeur's Gaze, Sage Publications, 1995, and in ‘Rhetoric of the Temporal 
Index: Surveillant Narration and the Cinema of ‘Real Time’’, in CTRL 
[SPACE], T Y Levin, U Frohne and P Weibel (eds), MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 2002 pp. 578-94 Levin argues that surveillance functions as a 
narrative condition and structure in films from the 1990s. 
16 See, for instance, the 2001 exhibition CTRL[Space], Echelon: Who is 
watching you? from 2007 or Goodbye Privacy 2007. 
17 See, for instance, J E McGrath, Loving Big Brother: Performance, Privacy 
and Surveillance Space, Routledge, London and New York, 2004. 
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Technology, Environment, the Masculine and the Feminine 
in Distance Cultures 
 
Oksana Cheypesh 
 
Abstract 
Science fiction and computer games from distant cultures propose 
unexpected specifics in their visions of the human technology within the 
same genres. These characteristics unveil different perspectives of 
technology, environment, and gender in different cultures. This paper 
explores representations of technology and environment; the masculine and 
the feminine in the North American animated film Final Fantasy: The Spirits 
Within (2001), directed by Hironobu Sakaguchi and Moto Sakakibara (co-
director); in the Japanese anime, Metropolis (2002), directed by Rintaro, 
based on the comic by Osamu Tezuka (1947–1949), and in the Ukrainian 
computer games S.T.A.L.K.E.R.: Shadow of Chernobyl (2007) and 
S.T.A.L.K.E.R.: Clear Sky (2008) by GSC Game World. I will show three 
tendencies in relationships: among technology, the endless space, and its 
masculine explorers (North American); among technology, urban 
environment, and the masculine (Japanese); and among technology, nature, 
and the feminine (Ukrainian). The paper will analyse historical and cultural 
backgrounds that influence interpretations of these specifics. Also, I will 
formulate a schema of dynamic global vision of the concept of gender in 
relation to technology and environment. 
 
Key Words: Science Fiction, Technology, Environment, The Masculine, The 
Feminine. 
 
***** 
 
The perceptions and interpretation of the world are different in 
different countries; they frame outlook, serve as markers of their cultures, and 
accent specifics of their informational domains. Cultural exchange and global 
circulation of artistic phenomena are theoretically able to diminish cultural 
differences; however, in practice cultural elements are livelier. To illustrate, I 
choose contemporary artistic works from three distance cultures, North 
American, Japanese, and Ukrainian. The works have gained popularity 
internationally; they interpret the same phenomena within science fictional 
discourse. 
This paper will show that contemporary science fictional 
representations of environment, technology, and gender vary in different 
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cultures; moreover, the representations spontaneously unveil traditional 
cultural perspectives. 
Also, I will show that traditional world perception and interpretation 
remain visible in cross-cultural dynamics, where a culture-recipient interprets 
a foreign element stereotypically, sometimes archaically, within its own 
cultural apparatus. This discussion will enable a better understanding of the 
cultural framing of perception and will illustrate the degree of vitality and 
influence of traditional views, sometimes with archaic elements, in portraying 
universal themes of environment, technology, and gender. Such discussion 
can contribute to the understanding of global cultural dynamics as locally 
determined cultural interpretation of the other1, not as mere cultural 
borrowing of foreign elements. 
Colonizers of North America rooted traditional cultural views on 
this continent. Hundreds of years later, North American cultural phenomena 
represent an outlook that, even transformed, preserve fundamental 
characteristics of old world perception and interpretation. The first settlers 
perceived threat, severity, and unfriendliness of nature because of difficulties 
in adapting to the new environment - extended landscapes, an unfamiliar 
climate - and to exhausting physical labour: development of virgin lands. 
From the times of the colonizers, North Americans have preserved the vision 
of dangers of the wild. The American animated film Final Fantasy: The 
Spirits Within (2001), by Hironobu Sakaguchi and Moto Sakakibara, reflects 
this tendency. Aki Ross, one of the main characters of the film, sees 
repetitive dreams of an alien planet with an unwelcoming environment, sharp 
rocks, red sands, sky, and a sun in the desert. 
Dependence upon technology is one more North American specific. 
From the time of colonization, machines significantly eased development of 
lands and protected humans from sometimes-exaggerated dangers of the 
wilderness. Technology helped to change the environment toward human 
safety and convenience. Humans on this continent ideologically chose to 
develop technology at the expense of nature. In this context, Final Fantasy 
visually opposes monotony of natural backgrounds and beauty of structurally 
organised pieces of technology. For instance, Aki’s dream locates an alien 
spaceship in the centre of the frame, among vanishing lines and colours of the 
planet’s landscape. After structuring nature, the human experienced harmony 
with the improved environment. To illustrate this, the film employs one of 
the most popular cinematographic findings for depicting attractions of urban 
environment: sunset among skyscrapers. The frame perfectly balances the 
walls of buildings with this natural phenomenon, and shows harmony 
between these images, implying significance of both. Therefore, technology 
fuses into the North American outlook to the point where it becomes an 
ideological absolute, a condition of the world’s existence. One of the 
episodes of Final Fantasy shows streets of New York after a catastrophe that 
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happened a hundred years before. For these years, nature did not spread in the 
urban kingdom, forces and elements did not leave marks on buildings, cars, 
and streets, covered with grey dust and frozen among memories of the 
breakdown. 
American Masculinities. A Historical Encyclopedia argues that in 
North America ‘concepts and experiences of masculinity have been at the 
heart of […] life’2. Donna Haraway in ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’ attributed 
exhausting resources to initially masculine behaviour. These statements help 
us to conclude that masculinity determined both the colonization of 
wilderness on this continent and the cultural representations of technologic 
supremacy over nature. 
Overall, North American traditional world perception and 
interpretation originate from the outlook of colonizers of this continent who 
saw threats and dangers in nature with its severity of climate, unwelcoming 
landscapes, and visual monotony extended to the horizon. Technology 
became a decisive factor in optimising nature and approximating it to the 
needs and desires of the human; in parallel, humans developed ideological 
dependence on technology, as found in North American science fiction, 
including Final Fantasy. Visual artistic works propose images of symbiosis 
between technologically transformed environments and natural phenomena. 
Finally, technology ideologically evolves from a force of progress to the 
absolute, a breakdown of which will preserve current time and space for a 
long period. Ideology of the masculine power and dominance determined 
cultural perceptions and representations of technology and nature in North 
America. 
Japanese society had a historical relationship with technology 
different from Americans. Thus cultural perceptions and interpretations of 
this phenomenon and its relationships with nature and gender are much 
different for the Japanese. As Takayuki Tatsumi points out in Full Metal 
Apache, from the 1860s Japan has persistently ‘westernized, modernized, and 
especially ‘Americanised’ itself3, mostly to gain military power and to 
influence international politics. These processes included application of 
Western technologic findings and resulted in transforming nature and 
destroying authentic culture.4 The author reads these Japanese processes in 
the context of postcolonial theory and states that ‘Japan became a colonial 
power itself;’5 that resulted in disempowering the Japanese identity. Tatsumi 
outlines this hybrid identity in terms of the philosophy of ‘dependence’6, 
‘creative masochism’ and cyborg.7 The author applies a metaphor of 
chimerical cyborg to a Japanese emperor, who changed his appearance from 
powerful to vulnerable: from a military uniform to a civilian suit.8 Therefore, 
an initially masculine impulse to modernise military potential and to gain 
power by advances of contemporary technology resulted in feminisation of 
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the masculine. Such transformation in outlook painfully changed traditional 
Japanese world perception, which caused protest in artistic works. 
Some blamed technology for the radical metamorphosis of Japanese 
identity. Osamu Tesuka’s technophobic manga Metropolis (1947-1949) 
exemplifies such a tendency. Tesuka never saw the European film Metropolis 
(1927), but the poster of this film inspired his manga. Through the Japanese 
anime Metropolis (2002), Rintaro explores some themes of the film; 
however, neither manga, nor anime consistently emphasize the crisis between 
working and upper classes as depicted in the film. The anime reconstructed 
Tesuka’s technophobic ideology and connected to it tendentious 
representation of technology; however the amine emphasises a retro aesthetic 
rather than ideological perspective of technology, environment, and gender. 
In other words, if the manga implies that technology and urban environments 
are basic obstacles to human communication with nature, the anime ironically 
shows how artists in the middle of the 20th century exaggerated societal fear 
of technology. Importantly, the anime emphasizes that Metropolis, a 
technologically advanced city, is foreign to Japan with completely different 
politics and traditions. Therefore, the cultural rejection of technology here 
takes the form of transferring an undesirable element to an unnamed country. 
Also, two Japanese citizens, a detective and his assistant, aim to arrest and 
bring to Japan a criminal, a professor who constructs advanced pieces of 
technology. Revolutionaries in the anime fight against technology (robots) 
rather than for social change. 
In the manga, the artificial human, Michi, is a boy, while in the 
anime, a female robot, Tima, is the future governor of humanity. Tima is a 
copy of the late daughter of one of the character; this motif is reminiscent of 
the android David from Artificial Intelligence: AI who was a replica of an 
engineer’s dead son. However, the two characters have fundamental 
differences: David has a superhuman intensity of feelings and emotions and a 
mythic world perception that helps him to become the last human being on 
Earth; Tima decides to eliminate humanity after gaining power over it. The 
anime constructs an alliance between technology and gender that threatens 
humans; Tima appears as an apotheosis and a quintessence of technology that 
aims to enslave and destroy the human part of Metropolis. Possibly the 
author’s rejection of Japanese feminised identity determined Tima’s gender. 
The anime does not represent natural landscapes; it visually reduces 
to fragments elements of nature like sky, clouds, snow, and birds. Such an 
absence of nature implies its idealization: a perceiver has a desire to leave 
Metropolis for a more harmonious environment. Frames with extended 
skyscrapers and industrial objects that completely hide the sky from the 
viewer are usual for the anime. The idealized nature and technophobic 
depiction of the urban environment in Japanese anime are opposite to 
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representations of threatening wilderness and of urban beauty and perfection 
found in the North American animated film Final Fantasy. 
The authors of the anime visually misbalance lines and dissolve 
points of reference in pictures of the urban environment and pieces of 
technology; a perceiver finds such representations disturbing and 
unwelcoming. Such portrayal is an alternative to the North American 
depiction of urban environments perfectly balanced with elements of nature.   
In Metropolis, viewers witness collapse of the urban environment 
and objects of technology. The anime posits this catastrophe as a happy end 
and attributes catharsis to it. Falling walls and pipes reveal sky, clouds, and 
flying white pigeons; the picture is optimistic because of its dynamics and 
light colours. The authors imply that the city will have a better future without 
technology. This concept is an alternative to the North American 
interpretation of technology breakdown as a tragedy that excludes any future 
progress, stops time, and preserves space unchanged. 
Overall, Japanese outlook represents a hundred year-old dynamics 
between traditional views and changes, determined by modernization. 
Archaic world perception includes active role of the masculine, building 
balanced relationships with nature without significant application of 
technology to it. Americanisation of Japan resulted in fundamental changing 
of nature by technology; authentic culture and artists reacted with metaphoric 
depiction of overwhelming technology, visually misbalanced urban 
environments, vanishing or absent nature, and the feminised masculine that 
threatens humans. 
Concept of videogames S.T.A.L.K.E.R.: Shadow of Chernobyl 
(2007) and S.T.A.L.K.E.R.: Clear Sky (2008) by GSC Game World 
originates from science fictional novel Roadside Picnic (1971) by Strugatsky 
brothers. In the novel, aliens visited a small area on Earth and left soon after. 
Since the visit, this Zone contained physical anomalies, dangerous for human 
health and life. Such frame of the plot helped the authors to show 
relationships among criminals and to implicate Roadside Picnic as critical 
metaphor for Soviet regime. In the videogame, anomalies resulted from 
nuclear plant catastrophe in Chernobyl in 1986. Also, the game invented 
mutated animals and humans who live in the Zone. 
For the scope of this article, relationships between nature and 
technology in S.T.A.L.K.E.R. are of the primary interest. The authors of the 
videogame used digital photographs, taken around real Chernobyl nuclear 
plant. It is an abandoned thirteen-kilometer territory with cars, buildings, and 
other pieces of technology. Radiation enlarged size of grass, fruits, and 
mushrooms; ironically, this phenomenon resonates with Ukrainian traditional 
interpretation of natural powers. 
Archaeological findings report five thousand-year-old agricultural 
societies on territories of contemporary Ukraine. Until the beginning of the 
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20th century, 80 % of the population of Ukraine was rural; before 1917, this 
country, with its soils and agricultural production was an influential player on 
the Western European agricultural markets. Therefore, throughout the 
history, all ethnic groups who lived on the territory of contemporary Ukraine 
depended on its nature. In the ancient times, this dependence attributed 
omnipotence to the nature and formed mythological understanding of natural 
powers. Ancient agricultural cults had strong matriarchal tendencies and 
beliefs in Mother Nature, including cultural attributing of anthropomorphic 
characteristics to natural environments. The beliefs construct parallels 
between fertility of women and earth; infant dependence on the mother and 
human dependence on uncanny nature, and resulted from this similarity belief 
in mythic omnipotence, primacy, and prevalence of nature over other 
phenomena, including technology. 
The videogame unveils the remnants of Ukrainian mythic beliefs. In 
many shots from Chernobyl area nature dominates, changes and utilizes 
pieces of technology while transforming them into insignificant parts of its 
own landscape. A stand for high-tension power lines, lost among three pine 
trees, is a typical image in the game. Lines are not ‘live’ after the breakdown, 
which makes natural objects more powerful. Such strength differs from North 
American dangers and Japanese idealization of nature. One more 
characteristic image in the game is assimilated by natural landscape car. The 
game depicts such a process as usual, not as a catastrophe, like the North 
American film, or as a catharsis, like Japanese anime. Forests, meadows, 
sunrise, and other elements of nature visually balance or dominate artificial 
constructions in the game. Unlike North American harmony between the 
urban and an element of nature, or Japanese dissonant urban environment, 
nature in the game is equal to technology or prevalent, implying that nature 
will last longer than pieces of technology. This is an alternative to North 
American image of frozen time after the breakdown of technology. Prevalent 
nature forms another group of typical depictions in the game.  For instance, 
an image of an abandoned excavator near the abyss, and visually high line of 
horizon show vulnerability of technology, and power of nature; overall, 
Ukrainian traditional perception of nature and of the feminine subordinates 
technology. 
The three cultures formed their historically determined 
interpretations of and connections among technology, environment, and 
gender. These specifics of world perception contribute to global dynamics of 
cultural exchange, where each culture interprets universal themes within its 
traditional views. Globally, North American and Japanese attention to the 
masculine balance Ukrainian traditional emphasizing the feminine; visions of 
technology range from North American ideological cornerstone of human 
empowering, through Japanese factor of human vulnerability, to Ukrainian 
insignificance of technology on the background of nature. Global perspective 
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of human environment circulate among North American positive imaging of 
symbiosis between urban city and nature, Japanese seeing of urban 
environment as negative substitute for nature, and Ukrainian emphasizing 
nature as ultimate human environment. 
 
Notes 
 
1O Cheypesh, ‘Contemporary Tendencies of Globalisation’, The Inter- 
national Journal of the Humanities, vol. 5, 9, 2007, pp. 235-242. 
2 B E Carroll, ‘Masculinity and U.S. History’, in B E Carroll (ed), American 
Masculinities, A Historical Encyclopaedia, Thousand Oaks, Sage 
Publications, 2003, p. 2. 
3 T Tatsumi, Full Metal Apache, Transactions between Cyberpunk Japan and 
Avant-Pop America, Durham, Duke University Press, 2006, p. 9. 
4 Ibid, p. 78. 
5 Ibid, p. 9. 
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PART II 
 
Time and Place
  
  
Memonautica: 
Online Representations of the Yugoslav Past 
 
Martin Pogačar 
 
Abstract 
The author presents the influence of the internet on how we think about the 
past, and how the past is remembered and re-presented. The paper discusses 
the main considerations regarding the narrative potential of the internet. Its 
specifics, both in terms of technology and of content, necessarily influence 
the ways reality (past and present) is represented, conveyed and understood - 
the processes of making sense of the world(s) around us are fundamentally 
defined by it. Although the new medium is to a significant extent 
revolutionary, it in many ways also presents a continuation with the old 
media, their rhetorical and discursive devices - it uses image, sound and text 
in order to convey/construct the message. Yet, in the cyberworld, these 
processes and messages are uniquely combined and fused, rather than 
multiplied. More importantly, this fusion of various elements and contents 
(sound-image-text) in different contexts results in detemporalisation and 
deterritorialisation of places, times, events and people. The question is how 
this new narratives affect our understanding of the past and what are the 
implication for national and global histories? In particular, the author is 
interested in online representations of the former Yugoslavia, its past and 
history of popular culture in new media environments. 
 
Key Words: Memory, History, Internet, Representations of the Past, Visual 
Culture. 
 
***** 
 
Life is irreversible. 
It will be staged in a new theatre. 
In a different way, with different actors. 
But the ultimate happiness. 
Is to fold its magic carpet. 
And make the ornament of the present. 
Match the pattern of the past…1 
 
New media in general and the internet in particular figure as media of 
unprecedented significance in the quotidian. Their specifics, in terms of 
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technology and content, necessarily influence the ways reality (past and 
present) is represented, conveyed and understood - they fundamentally define 
the processes of making sense of the world(s) around us. And, as Lev 
Manovich puts it, the principles of ‘operation’ of new media translate into 
social and cultural patterns.2 
Although new media are certainly revolutionary, they in many 
respects and to a significant extent also present a continuation with the old 
media, their rhetorical and discursive devices - they use image, sound and 
text in order to convey/construct the message and often emulate old media, 
mostly in design of the interface and organisation of content (e.g. online 
newspapers). Yet, in the cyberworld, the processes and messages are 
uniquely combined and fused. More importantly, this fusion of various 
elements and contents (sound-image-text) in different contexts results in 
detemporalisation and deterritorialisation of places, times, and events. I 
use/adjust Arjun Appadurai’s concept of deterritorialisation to denote 
uprooting of representations of the past from ‘original’ environment via 
media appropriation into different spatial settings; analogically, 
detemporalisation is used to refer to representations/images of events, places, 
taken out of the original contexts and repositioned in new/different temporal 
settings. The fragmented bits are arbitrarily or intentionally juxtaposed thus 
providing a set of possible paths for new narratives about the past to emerge. 
How the new media affect our ways of understanding reality? How 
new media ‘infect’ our representing and remembering the past? What kind of 
interpretations and narrativizations of the past emerge? How the newly 
emerging narratives affect our understanding of the past? What are the 
implications for national and transnational histories? These are some of the 
questions that fuel this discussion in search of an invariably incomplete 
answer. 
Only accessible through traces, the past can be deciphered only 
fragmentarily and incompletely. On the level of socio-cultural effect it does 
not really matter if it is dealt with scientifically or non-scientifically. As 
much as scientific accounts (archaeology and historiography) are credible for 
their consistency in methodology, conduct of research and reliance on 
‘factual data,’ they are, in the end, ‘still mere’ fictionalisations of the past in 
that they interpret sources to provide a narrative/story. This, however, makes 
them no less important for our understanding of the past and present. On the 
contrary, these accounts figure as important providers of collective, national, 
group identity bases that secure a commonly recognisable socio-cultural-
historical environment within which a collectivity can function. Non-
scientific accounts (literature, theatre, painting, architecture, cinema, music), 
on the other hand, through the use of various literary representational devices 
often employ historical sources and combine them into new narratives, which 
may be factually inaccurate yet convincing in re-creating the Zeitgeist of an 
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era (think, for instance, of the ancient Greek mythology). Moreover, these 
non-historical accounts are often highly infused with mobilisational potential 
and tend to agitate the masses much more radically. This does not, of course, 
imply that scientific accounts are taken any less seriously; rather it 
encourages the non-scientific ones to be taken more seriously. 
The representing of information and contents in various formats 
made possible by the new media result in rather different principles of 
mediatising reality, encoding it, transmitting it, yielding access to it and so 
on. True, the computer screen may offer a fixed frame and a familiar 
interface (rewind/forward buttons, mute etc.), but within it one can have 
many ‘windows’ (and windows within windows) opened (think of Aby 
Warburg’s Mnemosyne), multiple applications running simultaneously in the 
background, and what is most important for the purposes of this paper, one 
can simultaneously watch a video-clip, listen to a song and read a text. 
Additionally, the presupposition of interactivity - the ‘collaboration between 
the reader [the user] and the text in the production of meaning’3 - and the 
very principles of interactivity in internet operation (affecting the ‘original,’ 
influencing the creation/development of a narrative by clicking through 
various predetermined options, download, copy and paste, navigation) allow 
these content-elements to be merged by the viewer into a new file or a 
(micro) narrative. The copy-pasted bits can be merged into entirely new 
compositions, essentially altering the ‘original’ material during the process 
and consequentially affecting the interpretation. Thus, as Manovich states for 
digital images, ‘an image is something we expect to enter rather than to stay 
on its surface.’4 It is from this constellation that stems the fragmentation-
detemporalisation-deterritorialisation triangle regarding the representations of 
the past online. 
The representations of the (in this case Yugoslav) past online can be 
roughly divided into three groups: official (state-sponsored, such as online 
museums, memorials, databases of historical texts; the Museum of History of 
Yugoslavia,5 Slovenian Museum of Contemporary History;6 Historical 
Museum of Bosnia-Herzegovina.7 Unofficial online representations (private 
initiative or semi-sponsored websites), such as Jugomuzej,8 Post-Yu Info9 or 
Lexicon of Yu-Mythology.10 And the third group is what I call ‘guerrilla 
history,’ i.e. personal, ‘underground,’ online historical statements, found on 
sites such as Youtube and/or embedded on various websites,11 online 
communities (groups on Facebook) or various forums. 
I will only briefly discuss the first two and devote some more 
attention to the third one, which I also find the most intriguing. In the official 
group fits for instance a virtual exhibition hosted by the Slovenian Museum 
of Contemporary History, The Hitler’s Long Shadow.12 The virtual exhibition 
at the Slovenian museum exclusively uses photography and text and takes no 
recourse to moving images or sound. The site is divided into horizontal (main 
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topics) and vertical (sub-topics) menus; each ‘click’ leads to a concise 
description of a topic and a couple of photos. Despite the very interesting 
topic and the potential of the medium, this virtual exhibition fails to 
incorporate sound and movement and is still very much confined to the laws 
of classic museum constellations.13 Usually, the state sponsored sites in the 
former Yugoslavia are much less advanced than comparable websites in the 
west; they are generally not too well designed and do not offer much 
interactivity and multimedia, as opposed to the non-sponsored, private 
initiative websites. 
Unofficial enterprises, such as Post-Yu Info, offer experience that is 
more interesting. This site is conceived as an upgrade to the online Lexicon 
of Yu-Mythology and is at the same time a condensation of the printed 
edition of the Lexicon, a project initiated by a Croatian writer, Dubravka 
Ugrešić. As befits a proper lexicon, it features alphabetically arranged entries 
of various popular cultural items. Letters of the alphabet are designed to 
resemble logo design of certain popular Yugoslav products and brands etc. 
Thus for letter O stands the logo for the 1984 Sarajevo Olympics and for V 
the logo of cooking additive, Vegeta. Lexicon entries are written in an ironic 
tone comprising entries from all over Yugoslav popular culture, ranging from 
famous musicians, newly composed folk music, the fizzy drink Cockta, the 
popular Yugoslav-made car etc. Each description is accompanied by a photo. 
The site, however, still leaves aside film and music as means to construct and 
convey the story. 
Fugitive pieces of reality are sometimes quite randomly reassembled 
and at that taken from their original temporal (detemporalisation - displaced 
temporally) and spatial (deterritorialisation - displaced spatially) 
environment,14 but organised according to a new logic. In the above examples 
this is quite obvious. As opposed to personal initiative of guerrilla history the 
above representations of the past do not tend to manipulate their sources (be 
it textual, audio or visual) in terms of modifying their content, although on 
the level of interpretive effect of a particular juxtaposition and the emerging 
narrative, the ideological potential cannot be easily disguised. Guerrilla 
history, on the other hand, a statement on the level of a particular internet 
user is quite different: for instance, one can find a photo on the web, 
download it, edit it (change hue, saturation, ad words etc.) along with some 
other photos (or film inserts) into a photo-film to the sound of music and post 
it online. 
Youtube offers some nice examples that qualify as guerrilla history. 
Search term ‘Jugoslavija,’ for instance, yields 2110 results, and following the 
link of ‘Tatu - Jugoslavija’ to Related Items section, I came upon a four and 
something minutes long text-audio-visual statement hosted by dugmicMala. 
To the song ‘Jugoslavijo’ by Bojan Rajović, numerous photos are added 
interspersed with silent-film-like captions. The video opens with: 
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Yugoslavia… What happened? …It disintegrated. In this first ‘chapter,’ 
opening with a map of Yugoslavia, a series of photos of Josip Broz Tito are 
arranged (Tito’s wartime photo; with famous world politicians and 
celebrities, addressing the people, Tito on the cover of Life magazine etc.), 
introduced by the caption, Magnificent President, a fighter, communist, 
fisherman, and creator of freedom. The next chapter is titled After Tito 
followed by a section about 1980, the year of Tito’s death. It includes photos 
of his last farewell in Yugoslav republics capitals. The chapter on the 1991 
disintegration of the country presents full-size images of newly-established 
countries’ flags, interspersed with the caption, Independence, no warrant for 
peace. Pictures of war in Bosnia, concentration camps, cemeteries… Did we 
really need this? Photographic answer (cemeteries, ruins) to the textual 
question. In the end, Only memories remain [...] of the magnificent country. 
A photo of a 1 Dinar coin from 1985, a photo of Tito’s statue, a digitalised 
image containing Tito’s profile along with digitally edited/stylised Yugoslav 
flag. The video ends with the lines: In memory of our Yuga, we could have 
achieved so much with brotherhood and unity. Comrade Tito, now that 
you’re gone, nothing is as it used to be. We all live in exile… Ex-Yu. 
This guerrilla history statement features text, still photos and sound, 
and provides an overtly nostalgic account. The elements of text, sound and 
vision work as a whole and each carries its own messages. The text (captions) 
plays the role of providing temporal structure of Yugoslav past: clearly 
situated in the present, the ‘guerrilla historian’ departs to present her vision of 
Yugoslav past, by stating at the beginning the collapse of the state, presenting 
its life-long leader, the country’s collapse and emergence of new states and 
nostalgia for the past and the future that never were to be. The text itself is 
extremely emotional and especially the last line (exile…Ex-Yu) figures as a 
very strong personal statement.15 It extrapolates the idea of geographical 
emigration to include emigration in time, which for a nostalgic mind may be 
just as painful. On the level of visual, the photos are arranged rather 
arbitrarily disregarding the chronological aspect of history (linearity of time), 
juxtaposing wartime photos with the post-WWII ones. Although following a 
rough chronological order, fragments from different historical times and 
places are put together quite randomly (although with a possible agenda), 
which necessitates seeing the presented historical period as uprooted form the 
historical context and largely existing in its own symbolic universe. Music 
figures as an important feeling-enhancer. Although not a hugely popular hit 
in the lands of the former Yugoslavia, it works in a way to merge/glue the 
images into a new whole. Within the songscapes, an entire history of the 
country is depicted. 
There are many other similar examples that use once popular 
Yugoslav songs and photos found on the internet in great numbers.16 Despite 
the internet being a boundless resource, it nevertheless has its limits: certain 
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Yugoslavia related images are used on different websites and in different 
statements time and again; it may be because people find them appealing, or 
because they were popularised by the internet use or often used in history 
textbooks and hence see their own story behind them. The main reason 
probably lies in the ‘jukebox metaphor,’17 i.e. there is only that many photos 
(or other images, songs) available and some of them gain popularity and 
recognisability through repetitive publishing/viewing. 
Speaking about the past today it seems that it is not a foreign country 
where one can cruise the memorial landscape and re-visit relics at a later 
time, knowing they will still ‘inhabit’ certain coordinates. Rather, it is a fairly 
rough sea that washes ashore pictures, videos, sounds, bits of texts, which are 
in the next instance washed away and submerged again. Navigating the sea of 
bygones, chunks of past surface from the billowing waters, submerge again, 
and re-surface at a distant place and a distant time; repositioned, remorphed. 
And the one who encounters these bits of past places and passed times seems 
very much akin to a wave rider, net surfer if you will, navigating their way 
through the floating ‘debris’ of the past and present. 
Navigating the internet is, as implied in the above paragraph, 
characterised by essential changeability - it is next to impossible to return to 
the same place. Either a webpage is updated (as in online newspapers) and 
the older version no longer available, not available (Error 404 - File not 
found), its URL lost and forgotten in masses of daily emerging sites. The 
sheer number and size of information poses problems regarding storing and 
archiving information, and of course retrieving it. The archive, as Arjun 
Appadurai notes, ‘is usually sacralised as the site of the past of some sort of 
cultural collectivity (often the nation), which is seen as sacred by 
definition.’18 Yet, as the (digital) archive becomes elusive and inherently 
unstable, the effects this has on representing and imagining the past are not 
easily discernible. The uncertainty regarding the withering access to the 
relatively fixed accounts and narratives is at this stage surely unsettling. 
Moreover, much of what is recorded and preserved may also be lost to 
inefficient (or poor command of) retrieval procedures. Additionally, ‘the 
archive is gradually freed of the orbit of the state and its official networks 
[…] [and it] returns to its more general status of being a deliberate site for the 
production of anticipated memories by intentional communities.19 In 
combination with the uprooting effects of globalisation the change of archive 
status and access, and its influence on ‘master narratives’ may be one of the 
reasons contributing to the growing ethno-insecurity and nationalisms in 
Europe.  
What the new media do with/to the representations of the past is, as 
already mentioned, that they administer utter detemporalisation and 
deterritorialisation. The past-bits, remnants or traces of the past, the 
fragmented pieces uprooted from its ‘original’ spatio-temporal environment 
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are remediatised20 and reassembled, resorted, juxtaposed and fused into new 
constellations. These constellations often tend to obstruct the linearity of 
time/narrative/representation and rather conflate it. Thus the past attains the 
hue of everlasting presence/present. And, despite the seeming unimportance 
of the past in the era of constant change, the ghosts of the past nevertheless 
tenaciously persist, they inhabit, invade and significantly redefine the 
mediascapes of the present: on the internet, in cinema, music, references in 
advertising, retro-chic etc. The past on the internet, much like the present, 
however, is present in such abundance that is becoming increasingly difficult 
to navigate. 
This results in, on the one hand, decreasing recognisability and 
significance of ‘master narratives,’ in their weakened fixity and 
problematized unquestionabilty and ever-greater difficulties in finding 
compliant audiences. On the other hand, increasing publishability of people’s 
highly personal, intimate experiences and opinions on the internet is reaching 
significant numbers of people beyond borders, age limits and confines of 
socially determined roles. Collectivities may be formed based on shared 
interest rather than shared ethnogenesis, i.e. ‘where natural social 
collectivities build connectivity out of memory, these virtual communities 
build memory out of connectivity.’21 In this respect, Chris Anderson’s notion 
Long Tail applies to this situation: in enormous choice, significant number of 
people will find a marginal enough website/topic/belief to make it 
significant/influential enough to exert certain/significant impact on wider 
socio-cultural processes and phenomena,22 significant number of people will 
produce and live by beliefs and memories whose eloquence can not go 
unnoticed. 
In the era of globalisation and digitisation of society, micro 
narratives are gaining importance and audiences. This poses questions that 
concern the very idea and notion of national identity, national history and 
nation, and proposes to critically consider and make informed selection 
among the increasing amount of information flooding the spheres of private 
and public lives. Perhaps Manovich is right in stating that the age of new 
media and the age of the internet are much more about information than 
about narrative and that ‘today we have too much information and too few 
narratives that can tie it all together.’23 But the mythic (or gossiping) 
condition of human existence incessantly produces narratives out of 
seemingly most negligible bits of information. The difference with regard to 
the past is that new narratives may no longer be only territorially based. 
Cultural symbols and their historically changing media matter and 
play an important role in the formation of identities, and the past is always 
reconstructed according to the needs of the present. The question is how to 
fold the magic carpet in order to make the fragmented ornaments of the 
present match the fragmented patterns of the past. 
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Notes
 
1 From Vladimir Nabokov’s ‘Paris Poem’ as quoted in V Pelevin, The Sacred 
Book of the Werewolf, Faber and Faber, London, 2008, p. 49. 
2 Choosing from an array of identities and randomly swapping them 
corresponds to the philosophy of ready-to-use models coming with computer 
programmes, or even better, avatars in online virtual worlds. See L 
Manovich, The Language of New Media, MIT Press, Cambridge, London, 
2001, p. 61. 
3 M L Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore and London, 2001, p. 16. 
4 Manovich, p. 180. 
5 Muzej Istorije Jugoslavije, Link: <www.muzejistorijejugoslavije.org.yu>. 
6 Muzej Novejše Zgodovine, Link: <www.muzej-nz.si>. 
7 Historijski Muzej, Link: <http://historijski.mu.zej.ba>. 
8 Yugomuzej, Link: <www.yugomuzej.com>. 
9 Post-Yu, Link: <www.postyu.info>. 
10 Leksikon Yu Mitologije, Link: <www.leksikon-yu-mitologije.net>. 
11 See for instance: 
<www.jugoslavija24.com/index.php?option= com_seyret&Itemid=26> 
12 Hitlerjeva Dolga Senca, <www.muzej-nz.si/hitlerjeva_dolga_senca.html>. 
13 See, for instance, the German project, The Invisible Shapes of Things, 
Link:<http://www.artcom.de/index.php?Option=com_acprojects&page=6&id
=26&Itemid=115&details=0&lang=de>. 
14 I am deriving the notion ‘detemporalisation’ from Arjun Appadurai’s 
notion ‘deterritorialisation’ (see A Appadurai, Modernity at Large, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996). 
15 See dugmicMala, ‘Jugoslavija’, Link: 
 <www.youtube.com/watch?v=M7SorJzdBtc&feature=related>. She states 
on her Youtube Channel <www.youtube.com/user/dugmicMala>, ‘I’m living 
the dream of Yugoslavia, I’m living in a world where it is not important who 
you are, how you’re called and what religion you belong to. You can take me 
everything, but not my idea of a better world. Fascists will always happen, 
but in my world, they have no access. Stop the silence and speak up. We need 
to be brave in a world full of corruption and hate! Maybe we can’t change the 
world, but we can change our attitude!’ 
16 On Youtube you can find a Star Wars scene dubbed with a very popular 
song by Zdravko Čolić, Comrade Tito We Swear our Oath to You Link: 
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=y-irP4AAcyo>, accompanied by elendil77’s 
comment: ‘It is not a bad analogy - Alliance - Partisans, Fascists - Empire. 
All in all, I believe that’s what Lucas intended! Just look at the uniforms. 
This is another example of disregarding the order of space and time and 
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combining two completely different narratives and establishing analogy 
between them. 
17 With the Jukebox metaphor I imply the situation where one is allowed to 
chose from a predetermined selection of items. The catch is that the available 
selection is often taken as an all-encompassing one, i.e. the subject is quickly 
ready to accept the given set of choices. 
18 A Appadurai, ‘Archive and Aspiration’ in Information is Alive, J Brouwer 
& A Mulder (eds),  V2_Publishing/NAI Publishers, Rotterdam, 2003, p. 15. 
19 Ibid., 17. 
20 See Bolter and Grusin, Remediation. Understanding New Media, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, London, 2000, pp. 45-47. 
21 Appadurai, ‘Archive and Aspiration’, p. 17. 
22 See C Anderson, ‘The Long Tail’, Wired, viewed on 15 June 2008, Link: 
<www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.10/tail.html>.   
23 Manovich, p. 217. 
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Practical Identity in Cyberspace 
 
Mark Grover 
 
Abstract 
Christine Korsgaard in The Sources of Normativity provides an account of 
practical identity that can be applied to cases of online identity. Korsgaard’s 
theory is fundamentally Kantian and places great emphasis on the concept of 
autonomy and understanding ourselves as agents. This paper follows 
Korsgaard’s theory up to the point of moral obligations and sheds light on 
what it means to have an online practical identity. It is argued that all 
instantiations of one’s online practical identities are contingent on a unified 
notion of one’s greater practical identity that resides outside of cyberspace 
because that is where self-consciousness resides. 
 
Key Words: Korsgaard, Identity, MUDs, Kant, Cyberspace. 
 
***** 
 
Christine Korsgaard, following in the Kantian tradition, presents a theory of 
practical identity in an attempt to answer the normative question. The 
normative question concerns what justifies the claims morality makes on us. 
This question is not about explaining moral behavior from a third person 
theoretical perspective but, is rather, a first person account of why moral 
agents must do, for them, what morality dictates. This question she claims 
must not only be answerable from the first person but also must make an 
appeal to our sense of identity.1 
Practical identity, in this theory, arises from self-consciousness. The 
structure of our reflective minds enables us to have deliberated reasons for 
actions. It is by having a thought out reason that we are able to express our 
practical identities, and conversely it is by rejecting that which your practical 
identity forbids that we get obligations. The source of obligation is autonomy 
because we are forced to identify with principles or laws that guide our lives. 
These principles can be found in the intrinsically normative structure of 
maxims for actions. It is this sense of identity that will be explored and 
examined in the context of cyberspace. Korsgaard’s argument is followed up 
to a source of normativity, as found in the structure of maxims for action, but 
stops short of exploring moral obligations. 
This paper explores online practical identity in a MUD environment 
however this theory is applicable to other environments within cyberspace. 
MUD is an acronym for Multi-User Dungeon, Dimension, Domain, and 
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refers primarily to text based virtual worlds. There is simplicity to MUDs, 
based on their close relationship to language, which allows for a great deal of 
freedom with regard to one’s practical identity and the kinds of actions a 
persona can carry out. A specific instantiation of a consensual MUD, set in a 
modern fantasy setting, is assumed for the purpose of examples in this paper. 
Korsgaard’s theory is a first person phenomenological account of 
consciousness, the mind, identity, and obligations. It begins with perceptions 
and desires. In terms of a MUD this is a lot like sitting at the title screen. You 
see the name of the MUD, perhaps its web address, and there may even be 
some information about theme and policy. At this point you are still in RL 
(real life), and this shows the border to cyberspace. 
As mentioned, self-consciousness for humans on this theory is self-
reflective.2 This is to say the mind is not internally luminous or directly 
accessible with any kind of certainty. This reflection does however allow 
oneself to turn their attention toward their perceptions and desires. It is in this 
way that our mental activities are different than those of most other animals 
whose perceptions are their beliefs and desires their will.3 To use the MUD 
analogy this is like creating an account and logging on; you type in your user 
name and password and in that moment you have created a self in 
cyberspace. In creating a self in cyberspace that self can then examine its 
mental activities, however this examination is more like a reflection of a 
reflection of mental activities as there is only one self-consciousness as found 
in the kind of animal with this mind. 
A problem arises from this ability to question our perceptions and 
desires. Korsgaard calls this the ‘problem of the normative’.4 Because we can 
always call into question the content of our perceptions and desires a regress 
occurs whereby we cannot settle on an answer to the question ‘shall I act?’ 
Imagine yourself stuck at the introduction screen continuously questioning 
your perceptions and desires unable to move forward. You examine the area 
thoroughly but keep wondering if your perceptions can be believed and query 
every desire that would commit you to an action. A reason is needed to stop 
the regress and allow you to commit to a course of action and move on. 
‘Reason’, according to Korsgaard means ‘reflective success’.5 To 
have a reason to act is to endorse a desire or impulse upon reflection. At this 
point the regress problem remains, however it has shifted from questioning 
perceptions and desires to questioning reasons for action. In reference to the 
MUD example this would be like having decided that you want to act but not 
knowing what to do. Korsgaard follows Kant with regard to this problem, 
albeit with a slight but important modification, and appeals to his categorical 
imperative. 
Immanuel Kant addresses this problem of continually questioning 
ones reasons in terms of freedom and the idea of a free will. Freewill, for 
Kant, is a rational causality that is effective and not determined by any alien 
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cause including one’s desires and inclinations.6 The problem with freewill is 
that because it is a causality it must have a law but, since it is free it must 
somehow be its own law. The first formulation of the categorical imperative, 
the Formula of Universal Law, solves this problem by stipulating that we act 
only on a maxim that could be willed as a law. This is to say when we decide 
to act upon an impulse we must create a maxim and that process necessarily 
makes it a law. Korsgaard makes a distinction between the categorical 
imperative and the moral law because the Formulation of Universal Law, for 
her, needs to explain how those who do not identify themselves as members 
in the Kingdom of Ends, such as wantons and egoists, can in fact have 
reasons for their actions which yield real obligations. This is a thorny issue 
with regard to moral obligations however in the context of ordinary 
obligations is less contentious. What is important for both Korsgaard and 
Kant is that reasons can be settled on by willing a law that can be understood 
in the form of a maxim. 
The way in which a person identifies with their reasons for action 
determines their practical identity. The reflective structure of the mind forces 
us to have a self-conception because nothing more direct can be obtained. 
From the third person one’s self-conception can be explained by identifying 
desires, giving them weight, and declaring winners and losers. From the 
inside however, as Korsgaard notes, ‘that isn’t the way it is for you when you 
deliberate.’7 When deliberating we feel as though there is something personal 
that is beyond competing desires, something that is you that chooses the 
impulses you act, and do not act, upon. You are a law unto yourself in just 
this way. You make decisions based upon principles you identify as 
expressively your own. 
This is a practical conception of identity because it is understood not 
as a scientific fact but rather a description of how you value yourself.  How 
you value yourself is shown by how you choose among competing desires 
and beliefs to best reflect the life you decide to lead. Korsgaard defines 
practical identity as: 
 
a complex matter and for the average person there will be a 
jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a 
woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a 
member of an ethnic group, a member of a certain 
profession, someone’s lover, and so on. And all of these 
identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your reasons 
express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring 
from what that identity forbids.8 
 
As a result, it can be seen how one’s practical identity is based upon their 
endorsed reasons for action. 
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When choosing your practical identity on MUD, or more generally 
in cyberspace, there is a special sense in which you can choose aspects of 
your identity not available, or perhaps very difficult to achieve, in RL. These 
special characteristics could be such things as life form, gender, age, 
ethnicity, and so on. Considering our MUD example let us say that having 
picked your gender, age, ethnicity, and appearance, you now get to select 
minor supernatural powers from a predetermined list. The introduction of 
supernatural forces here is to show that some actions in cyberspace are 
possible that are impossible in RL. Out of the options you decide on mystical 
charm and the ability to levitate. With these traits in place you can now begin 
to decide what attitude your persona’s practical identity is going to take with 
regard to your environment, yourself, and others. 
You may decide you want to be a cool, calm, and collected type. 
You might also decide to explore the darker side of your nature and opt to be 
callously ambitious. You settle on a world view that sees all other things and 
persons as simply means to your ends. You wonder why this persona is the 
way that it is and develop an elaborate life history that leads to the present 
moment. You now have a persona ready to do things. You know what you 
have reason to do, because those reasons identify with your self-conception, 
but you also know what you cannot do. You cannot do that which your 
practical identity rejects, and these are your obligations. 
Obligation arises from what your practical identity forbids. 
Korsgaard suggests that the relationship between identity and obligation can 
be seen in common phrases such as ‘I couldn’t live with myself if I did that’ 
or ‘just who do you think you are?’9 This relationship, whether self-imposed 
or imposed upon others, is found by asking what you cannot do or what 
others ought not to do. Take the persona from the MUD for example, 
considering the callous nature of this persona it can be seen how there would 
be an obligation not to be kind or compassionate. Suppose you insincerely 
befriend a child persona controlled by another user. If asked why your act of 
purchasing a candy for the child was not compassionate it would be easy to 
answer, ‘Because I would not do that out of compassion. I was simply trying 
to gain confidence in a devious manner.’ In this way it can be seen that when 
one does not violate their obligations they are being true to the reasons they 
have for their practical identity. 
Integrity is important to the relationship between identity and 
obligation. Integrity means oneness or unity, and we use the term for those 
who live up to their own standards.10 To violate an obligation is to lose 
integrity and therefore one’s practical identity. When these obligations are 
violated a person can no longer view themselves, unless they are extremely 
self-deceptive, under the rubric they once did. In some cases a person may 
rather be dead than violate their strongest obligations. Envisage your callous 
persona in the MUD scheming all over the city, setting up plans, and plans 
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within plans. Part of what makes this character an integral whole is a 
commitment to achieving particularly selfish ends by any means possible. If 
you suddenly decide to give all your wealth to charity then that persona’s 
integrity is compromised. The standards which make it callous and selfish 
have been violated. When a person has integrity they commit to their reasons 
for their practical identity as well as the ensuing obligations. 
There are cases however in which this notion of obligation is 
challenged. Korsgaard observes two complexities which arise from this 
relationship between identity and obligation. First, some parts of our 
identities are easily shed, and in some cases when obligations conflict ought 
to be shed. Her example for this complexity is ‘a good soldier obeys orders, 
but a good human being doesn’t massacre the innocent.’11 In the MUD 
example this could be stated as, ‘A callous person does not care what befalls 
others, but a good schemer does not want to lose a potential victim.’ This 
complication is not that troublesome as we are often, throughout our lives, 
forced to balance various aspect of our practical identity. Second, and more 
problematic, is the fact that our practical identities can take a few knocks and 
remain intact.12 Picture the MUD persona in a one time moment of weakness 
caving to the child’s innocence and doing something truly compassionate. 
How can this character continue to be considered callous? What if it happens 
more than once? Korsgaard’s solution to this problem is to invoke a ‘kind of 
second tier integrity’ as a sort of commitment to keeping the times we make 
exceptions of ourselves not get out of hand.13 If a person makes too many 
exceptions they may very well cross a threshold and damage their integrity 
such that they lose their practical identity altogether. Rather than create 
problems these complexities reveal insight into the nature and resilience of 
our practical identities. 
Autonomy plays an important role for Korsgaard as it is the source 
of obligation. Autonomy is the source of obligation because the reflective 
structure of human consciousness necessitates that you identify with laws or 
principles that govern the actions you choose to endorse. By itself the 
reflective structure of consciousness does not have power over us; it only 
shows the relation we have with ourselves by way of self-conception. 
Authority is needed, along with power, to enable autonomous action. It is this 
authority that is the source of obligation. Hence, Korsgaard defines autonomy 
as: ‘commanding yourself to do what you think it would be a good idea to do, 
but that in turn depends on who think you are.’14 The source of obligation can 
be identified in the concept of autonomy because we are forced to act based 
upon reasons that are determined by our sense of who we are. 
What does it mean to be autonomous in a MUD or cyberspace? It 
means doing what you have good reason to do considering your practical 
identity. Put yourself in the shoes of the callous scheming character.  Being 
selfish; you will want to do things for your own self-interest. You may take 
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risks such as infringing on the city’s power broker’s resources in order to 
increase your wealth. As an autonomous character your actions are 
determined by your ability to make laws and act on them so long as it is a 
good idea in relation to your sense of practical identity. 
The form of our maxims is important for determining that we are 
acting on a good idea or law. Furthermore, it is important because it is the 
means by which the thinking self can assure that it is governing well. 
According to Korsgaard a good maxim is an ‘intrinsically normative entity’.15 
Every maxim has two parts: actions and ends. A maxim is good, 
then, when the action and the purpose are related ‘so that the maxim can be 
willed as a law.’16 This is the answer to how we ensure that the laws made by 
the Formula of Universal Law have authority. A maxim is an intrinsically 
normative entity which binds one’s actions to their sense of identity and the 
resulting obligation. 
In the MUD example, suppose your persona’s greed has gotten you 
into trouble with the powers that be. You have been summoned to a trial 
where you will be judged and possibly punished. Given your social graces 
you think your chances of survival would be greater by going to the meeting 
so you form the maxim: I will go to the meeting for the purpose of saving my 
character. When this maxim is inspected in light of your identity you find 
that it can be willed as a law, and furthermore that it is a good idea, therefore 
you act on it. As a result the normativity that allows us to be autonomous is 
constitutively found in our maxims as it enables us to do what we want to do. 
In cyberspace it seems that some maxims may not be willed even 
though they are entirely consistent with their persona’s practical identity. 
These are maxims that an agent’s practical identity, of which the character is 
just an aspect, could not endorse. In the border between cyberspace and RL 
the latter has precedence because that is where the original self-consciousness 
resides. 
 Imagine your MUD persona gets to the trial and you are found 
guilty and sentenced to a near unthinkable punishment, however, once 
performed you will be free to go. You are ordered to perform completely sick 
and perverted acts on the child you insincerely befriended. The child’s user 
has also consented to all and any forthcoming events. Given the callous 
nature of your persona, assuming a case has been made regarding its evilness, 
it is entirely likely that acts of torture and pedophilia could be endorsed, but 
for most people sitting in the chair this would be a problem. It would be a 
problem because their greater practical identity would forbid them from 
endorsing such actions. This reinforces the point that from the first person 
phenomenological account, online practical identity is subordinate to a 
unified notion of identity that encapsulates all the instantiations of one’s 
practical identities. 
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What has yet to be mentioned but is important for understanding 
how it is we come to have a conception of the kind of life we deem worth 
living is value. This normative aspect of one’s practical identity concerns 
beings which find themselves in a position of reflective consciousness 
deliberating on which ends to choose, or in other words deciding on what to 
consider as valuable. 
Value, from this first person perspective is rooted in the reflective 
structure of the mind. The source of value is found in rational nature because 
without a mind capable of reflection, even in a world of things, ends could 
not be chosen as worth acting upon.17 That is why a bee cannot value a 
flower like a human can; it does not have a mind capable of generating value. 
Notice this upshot to a theory of practical identity insofar as it can explain 
how value is generated as opposed to simply what is valued. Notice also that 
similar to how one’s human identity stands behind all aspects of one’s 
practical identity all value can be traced to oneself as the source of value. It is 
this sense of value that Korsgaard uses to argue for moral obligations based 
on the value of humanity.18 Without delving into issues of moral obligations 
it can be seen how Korsgaard’s theory of practical identity can help 
understand how it is we conceive of ourselves in cyberspace and how we 
come to find value within that electronic space. 
In conclusion, Christine Korsgaard’s theory of practical identity 
provides some resources for exploring online identity from the perspective of 
agency. Her theory provides a rich phenomenological description of what it 
feels like to be an agent, or more particularly what it feels like to be an agent 
in cyberspace. The strength of this view is its solution to the problem of the 
normative in which the solution is found in the concept of autonomy. 
 
Notes
 
1 C M Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1994, p. 16-17. 
2 ibid., p. 92. 
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6 ibid., p. 97. 
7 ibid., p. 100. 
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9 ibid., p. 101. 
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Abstract 
This paper explores the ambivalent nature of the avatar, and the avatar/player 
relationship as typifying key issues concerning videogame agency, textuality 
and interactivity. Space, architecture, aesthetics and adversaries are organised 
around the avatar body that frequently constitutes the apex of player activity. 
The locust of player interaction, avatars frequently embody the tension 
between freedom and structure which typifies videogaming. Two ways of 
theorising the avatar are contrasted, both interrogating ways in which the 
avatar represents the player on the screen. Firstly, the player/avatar 
relationship might be considered a cyborgian one. The avatar constitutes a 
virtual extension of the player’s body, suggestive of freedom from physical, 
ideological and bodily restrictions. Conversely, the avatar might represent a 
form of interpolation, hailing the player through the necessity of interactive 
engagement. Player autonomy is subsequently restricted according to the 
bodily limitations of the avatar, the structure of the game interface, and the 
requirements of game rules, objectives, rewards and punishments. This paper 
concludes with a consideration of Capcom’s Haunting Ground, a survival 
horror game which intertextually engages with the nature of the videogame 
avatar. 
 
Key Words: Agency, Avatar, Cyborg, Haunting Ground, Interpolation, 
Player, Survival Horror, Videogame. 
 
***** 
 
This paper explores the ambivalent nature of the avatar, and the 
avatar/player relationship as typifying key issues concerning videogame 
agency, textuality and interactivity. My concern is primarily with third-
person avatars, those which can be seen on the screen, rather than avatars in 
first person videogames, where the game world is viewed from the 
perspective of an otherwise unseen agent. Such avatars are generally 
preferred within the survival horror videogames in which I am most 
interested. 
The avatar is a figure central to the videogame experience. Space, 
architecture, aesthetics and adversaries are organised around the avatar body, 
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which frequently constitutes the apex of player activity. Players form a 
physical as well as virtual bond with the avatar. Sue Morris,1 Martti Lahti,2 
Sheila C. Murphy,3 Jon Dovey and Helen Kennedy4 all note gamers’ 
tendency towards ‘sympathetic movement’ where players shift in response to 
in-game action, the movement of their bodies reflecting the movement or 
desired movement of the avatar on the screen. Indicative of the blurring of 
bodily boundaries entailed in videogame play, when players fail, they 
typically say ‘I died’ or ‘I got killed’, rather than ‘Lara Croft died’ or ‘My 
actions resulted in Lara Croft’s death.’ Game space is organised around the 
figure of the avatar, the virtual camera following its movements, forever 
shifting to keep it centre frame. In this respect, videogames have many 
parallels with Western art: portrait painting, photography, cinema, television. 
All give primacy and centrality to the human figure, a feature which has clear 
associations with ideologies of individualism and selfhood. Compare, for 
example, the position of the avatar in Tomb Raider and Tetris in relation to 
the political systems which produced each game. 
The avatar is also an extremely ambivalent figure. Helen Kennedy 
considers Lara Croft as both character and cultural icon, as visual spectacle 
for heterosexual men, and a source of investment for women gamers seeking 
female agency.5 Henry Jenkins in discussion with Mary Fuller argues that 
videogames are about spaces not character or plot, with avatars functioning 
largely as vehicles through which players move around these spectacular 
landscapes. Just as Jenkins claims videogame characterisation boils down to 
‘capacities for action’,6 James Newman argues playable characters are not 
important in terms of appearance. Instead their significance lies in 
‘gameplay-affecting characteristics’ of speed, fighting skills, game goals, or 
the ability to float.7 Probably the most dismissive assessment of avatars’ 
visual significance comes from Espen Aarseth who asserts that despite the 
critical attention she has received: ‘the dimensions of Lara Croft’s body [...] 
are irrelevant to me as a player, because a different-looking body would not 
make me play differently.’8 
 The avatar may be variously considered a character, actor, star, icon, 
counter and transparent puppet. It is a key figure - in many ways unique to 
the videogame - which can help us understand the specific features of the 
form. Avatars are the locust of player interaction, frequently embodying the 
tension between freedom and structure that typifies videogames and the 
‘regimes of agency and restriction’9 which organise the videogame text. 
Furthermore, the avatar provides an embodied and recognisable figure on 
which to focus analysis, extremely useful in discussing a medium that 
remains a mystifying subcultural form in the eyes of many academics. 
In anticipation of a future ‘avatar theory’, I would like to contrast 
two ways of understanding this figure and its relationship with the player. 
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Firstly, this relationship might be considered a cyborgian one. The 
avatar constitutes a virtual extension of the player’s body. These figures on 
the screen respond to the player’s actions: depressing buttons, moving 
joypads, waving the Wiimote. Engaging with the issue of videogame 
immersion and absorption, Helen Kennedy and John Dovey explore the ways 
players are ‘re-embodied’, given agency and presence in virtual gamespaces 
through the technology of the interface, and the videogame avatar.10 This ‘re-
embodiment’ emerges through the cybernetic circuit between player and 
game, ‘a compelling literalization of the ontology of the cyborg - a 
subjectivity that depends precisely on this collapse of boundary between the 
human and the machine.’11 Such processes are typified by Eye Toy: Play, a 
game which literally puts the player on the screen, and games like Black and 
White, GTA: San Andreas, and Fable where game environments and avatars 
become altered according to player action. The figure of the cyborg suggests 
freedom from physical, ideological and bodily restrictions, and Dovey and 
Kennedy argue this cybernetic process allows the possibility of 
experimenting with different subjectivities, exploring worlds free of 
prejudice, and deepening our understanding of social conflict. 
Yet these arguments, while acknowledging the utopian dimensions 
of the cyborg model, are frequently tempered with less positive metaphors 
suggesting not so much the projection of the player into the screen as the 
fixing of the player by the videogame apparatus. These evoke another, less 
liberating model: that the avatar might represent a form of interpolation, 
hailing and subsequently fixing the player through the requirement of 
interactive engagement. The videogame player’s autonomy is far from free. 
Agency is restricted in accordance with the bodily limitations of the avatar, 
but also the structure of the game interface, and broader demands of game 
rules, objectives, rewards and punishments. 
Drawing on the work of Louis Althusser, King and Krzywinska 
suggest videogame interpellation may be greater than with film, the player’s 
participatory role contrasting with the detached perspective of the cinema 
spectator. The authors make clear they are much more comfortable with the 
application of this framework to the game’s situation of the player as player - 
someone self-consciously playing a game - rather than as the (frequently 
violent) character within the videogame.12 The model of interpolation is also 
explored by Sue Morris in a Baudry/Metz inspired analysis of first person 
shooters. There is greater collapse, Morris argues, between the enunciating 
position of the videogame producer and the player who appears to produce 
the textual experience through manipulation of the interface.13 Bob Rehak 
also applies Christian Metz’ discussion of cinema to videogames, and the 
work of Jacques Lacan to the ‘unstable dialectic’ between player and avatar. 
Rehak discusses the ‘suturing effects of interactive technologies’, describes 
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videogames as ‘powerful interpellative systems with profound implications 
for subjects - and subjectivity - in densely mediated societies.’ 14 
For critics applying psychoanalytic frameworks developed through 
film studies, videogames appear to realise the illusionary mastery and control 
so central to cinema’s interpolation of the spectator. If identification with the 
cinematic processes entails a suturing of the spectator and a subsequent 
internalisation of film’s dominant ideological order; identification with the 
videogame avatar leads to a similar fixing of the player whose actions are 
increasingly synchronised with those demanded by what Dovey and Kennedy 
term the ‘‘preferred performance’’ of the game.15 This appears to emerge 
naturally from players’ engagement with a game environment designed to 
efface its technologies, to appear transparent and ‘real’ according to 
videogame conventions. We feel as if we are inventing the means to reach 
that high ledge, or master that new weapon, or find the safe route through 
Silent Hill’s streets and houses. And yet in achieving these things we are 
simply following the game designer has embedded for us to find. In this 
respect we internalise the ideological dimensions of these actions, be they 
shooting Nazis, or raiding tombs, or ferrying prostitutes from john to john. 
The converging of avatar, game goals and game space is observed 
by Julian Kücklich who argues: ‘It is […] the player’s desire to become the 
model player of the game that enables him or her to identify with the avatar, 
and thus to interact with the game world and make progress in the game.’16 
The avatar is central to this process. It is the focus of identification. It is the 
means by which the player - cyborg-like - engages with the game space and 
performs game objectives. The avatar’s humanoid appearance serves as the 
player’s double. Moreover, the avatar, with its implied physical presence, 
social identity, history and personality, provides a sense of embodiment to the 
player’s performance, giving abstract ludic processes a materiality that makes 
them open to ideological analysis. 
I will now conclude by considering my playing of Capcom’s 
survival horror Haunting Ground17 in relation to these issues. In this game 
the playable figure is Fiona, an avatar with all the visual and audio 
characteristics of a white young British upper class woman. 
The first point to emphasise is that the avatar’s function is multiple 
rather than singular, and varied rather than uniform. At times the avatar is 
simply a method of exploring the game space: a huge castle full of winding 
staircases, twisty passages and mysterious rooms. In such instances my 
cyborgian alignment with the avatar is experienced most strong. I forget my 
distance from the figure on the screen in my desire to explore the castle. 
In other moments of play, the avatar is a vulnerable figure to be 
protected, when perused by one of the many adversaries who reside in the 
castle. At such times the player must find a safe place for Fiona to hide until 
the threat has passed: behind a shower curtain, under a sofa, inside an iron 
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maiden. At such points Fiona’s separation from me becomes more acute. I 
am aware of my role as her protector, helping to evade threats to the avatar’s 
body. Here I am interpolated as a player, not as a character. I am not Fiona, 
but someone looking after Fiona. But this form of interpolation is hardly free 
from ideology. Fiona’s visual narrative status as a white female undoubtedly 
functions to encourage the sense of helplessness and vulnerability I sense in 
the figure on the screen, which I must alleviate through finding an adequate 
hiding spot. I do identify with Fiona’s sense of panic. I am anxious to keep 
her safe, but more because her death would frustrate my progress through the 
game than due to a real fear for her or my own safety. 
Notably, when hiding the game’s visual perspective suddenly shifts 
from third person to first person: players seeing things from Fiona’s eyes as 
the adversary snuffles round the room trying to seek her out. This is a strange 
and arresting moment; one which in film studies is seen as aligning viewers 
with protagonist, but which in this instance disrupts the player’s normal third 
person relationship with game, screen and avatar. Even more disruptive is the 
game’s ‘panic mode’, activated if the avatar gets too close to an adversary. In 
this state the player looses direct control of the avatar, the joypad vibrates and 
the screen becomes blurry. Fiona stumbles wildly around, bumping into walls 
and objects. Both point of view shot and the visual distortion of ‘panic mode’ 
can be understood as encouraging identification with the avatar through 
adopting optical or psychological perspectives. However, both 
simultaneously break the player’s immersion in the game drawing attention 
to its surface texture, its mechanics and technologies. 
Sometimes Fiona exists as a character in cinematic cut-scenes where 
she moves and speaks independent of the player’s participation. Here Fiona 
exists as part of a narrative in which she is the daughter of a clone, murdered 
by his evil brother, who plans to use Fiona’s body to make himself immortal. 
The function of such scenes is to enforce a sense of Fiona as an embodied 
presence within the game, something underlined by other characters’ 
obsession with her body. Such elements structure Fiona according to the 
traditional position of women in mainstream cinema: the object of the ‘male 
gaze,’ also evident in the opening scenes where the avatar is unclothed, 
walking around with only a sheet to cover her nakedness. Again, the 
gendering of the protagonist is fundamental to this process. 
Fiona is an avatar both in and out of control, typifying the oscillating 
structure of the horror videogame as discussed by Tanya Krzywinska.18 A 
cyborgian merging or identification is most acutely felt throughout the more 
mundane exploratory portions of the game. During moments of conflict there 
is a separation of gamer and avatar where the player becomes aware of their 
position outside the text. In other instances Fiona becomes objectified, 
predominantly in non-participatory cut-scenes, where players’ distance from 
the protagonist is most acutely underlined. 
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Exploring the nature of player and avatar relationships reveals much 
about the processes of videogame play, the function of videogames as 
audiovisual texts, and the identity politics of this increasingly sophisticated 
medium. 
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The Baroque Body: A Social Commentary on the Role of 
Body Modification in Scott Westerfeld’s Uglies Trilogy 
 
Kristi N. Scott and M. Heather Dragoo 
 
Abstract 
As a genre, science fiction provides a uniquely fertile medium from which we 
can extrapolate the defining characteristics of personhood, explore our future 
potentials, and project our current selves onto tomorrow. One such example 
is the Uglies trilogy by Scott Westerfeld. The series builds on a socially 
stratified environment, akin to Huxley’s Brave New World, but built around 
the contemporary surge in popularity of cosmetic surgery instead of a 
prenatally-determined class system. The world created by Westerfeld 
suggests that while body modification is for many today an expression of 
individuality or chosen community, it is creating a new and coercive ‘normal 
body.’ The extreme and abnormal becomes the norm. Once extreme body 
modification measures are adapted, new rogues will push the boundaries 
again to stand out as individuals. Beauty standards reflect a cycle of 
rebellion, conformity, and rebellion. Westerfeld’s trifecta of uglies, pretties, 
and specials are subversive political images targeted at the young, the 
potential early-adopters of body modification, highly susceptible to peer 
influence and with considerable disposable income. Through the Uglies lens 
the body is a transformational medium, a social commentary carved with a 
knife in flesh. Thus, this paper will seek to juxtapose the changing nature of 
the body with social dynamics from a humanistic perspective. 
 
Key Words: Science Fiction, Body Modification, Cosmetic Surgery, Youth 
Culture, Beauty Standards. 
 
***** 
 
1.  The Body 
The body serves as the most tangible feature of what it is to be 
human, encapsulating our humanness in form and providing an outlet for 
humanity. While this body signifies a primary commonality, differences in 
appearance fuel the ongoing blight of human interactions. Stave for this 
universal shape, the human body provides an artistic and political canvas for 
intentional manipulation, a malleable vehicle we can use to distinguish 
ourselves from or align ourselves with other members of the species. The 
ability to customize one’s body as a measure of individualistic or collective 
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identity is a practice inherent in human history. With technology at our 
disposal, humans are taking our uniqueness to extremes as the boundaries of 
what constitutes the human body are changing. The desire to adorn, decorate, 
enhance and maul the body modifies its natural composition and creates new 
aesthetics of human form and beauty. Scott Westerfeld’s Uglies trilogy 
fashions a rich venue to explore the role of body modification as it relates to 
today’s youth and society as a whole. 
Body modification covers a broad spectrum of seemingly enhancing 
and/or disfiguring adjustments to the body. The adjustments can range from 
routine medical alterations (such as, male circumcision), bodily adornment 
(such as, tattoos), cosmetic surgery (such as, rhino plasticity), to extreme 
technological advancements (such as, bio-carbonate prosthetics). The 
continuum from minor to extreme body modification is clearly diverse both 
in the degree of alteration and social acceptability. Body modification will be 
loosely defined as permanent or semi-permanent deliberate altering of the 
human body for non-medical reasons, such as spiritual, social, or aesthetic 
motivations. In this commentary, some of the modifications illustrated in the 
science fiction novels Uglies, Pretties and Specials correlate to primitive 
techniques. 
 
2.  Idyllic Beauty 
Scott Westerfeld’s dystrophic future presents a socially stratified 
environment focused on beauty as an indicator of societal position. At 
sixteen, the uglies undergo a transformational operation, an extreme total-
body modification from flawed appearance to a culturally ideal standard of 
beauty. After the operation, they move to communities designated by 
corresponding post-op stage and interact infrequently with others outside that 
status. These total-body modifications are societally dictated in order to 
satisfy and pacify the masses. The ‘pretty-making’ operation was designed to 
alleviate human beings from our problematic nature. Both uglies and pretties 
value the operation because of what they are told it has prevented and 
changed.1 The goal is to avoid the past, illustrated by the rusties, a highly 
economically based and materialistically driven era similar to our 
contemporary world. This flawed generation that almost brought about the 
demise of the human race. 
From the rusty era, the naturals, a rare occurrence of being born 
naturally pretty, were revered as makeshift idols like other cultures would 
gods.2 The new pretties include references to naturals in complimentary 
lingo, such as ‘a milli-Helen is enough beauty to launch exactly one ship,’ 
and their names adorn several buildings in New Pretty Town.3 Like the 
rusties, their concept of ideal beauty is created by the culture. However, the 
city’s Pretty Committee determines the standards of beauty and guidelines for 
the operation.4 While ‘some cities allowed exotic operations […] the 
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authorities here (New Pretty Town) were notoriously conservative,’ but all 
cities considered the global context to ensure that residents of one city would 
not be prettier than others.5 These operational limitations express one method 
of control the society exhibits over its people. 
Since the uglies are taught they are born ‘ugly,’ becoming ‘pretty’ is 
their evolutionary ideal. 
 
Big eyes and full lips like a kid’s; smooth, clear skin; 
symmetrical features; and a thousand other little clues. 
Somewhere in the backs of their minds, people were always 
looking for these markers. No one could help seeing them, 
no matter how they were brought up. A million years of 
evolution had made it part of the human brain.6 
 
The continued social consent of adults is largely based on the values learned 
in childhood.7 These beliefs become fundamental constructs that influence 
their perceptions as confirmatory bias continues to reinforce them. The pretty 
society fosters the innate quality of human beings to conform. Some of which 
are even aware that historically ‘the majority of people have always been 
sheep.’8 Coercion by the social, political, and economic structures 
perpetuates conformity, and people are motivated to go along with the system 
when it is individually advantageous. Censorship of dissent, promotion of the 
status quo and peer influence reinforce this inclination to conform.9 
Nonconformism often begets social hostility as ‘standard behaviour is not 
salient; it is just the opposite with unusual behavior […] salience draws 
scrutiny […] (and) effect.10 Essentially those that stand out are noticed and 
those that blend in are not. 
In society, pockets of rebellion do occur, but the occurrences are 
within the same environments fostering conformity.11 The act of rebellion is 
‘warped’ by these views and over time works ‘to undermine it-thereby 
returning society, repeatedly, to a new conformism […] a recurrent problem, 
a recurrent stifling of rebellion, resistance, dissent.’12 In the texts, the majority 
accepts the beauty ideal and accompanying social structure as normal, and do 
not seek to rebel against it. This cycle plays itself out in the texts as the main 
characters learn the truth about the operations. 
 
3. Cyclical Identity 
In Uglies, we are introduced to our two main characters Tally and 
Shay. Tally’s greatest desire is to become pretty and Shay is not nearly as 
interested.13 Tally believes that the operation does not change who you are, 
just how you are perceived. She alludes to what might happen if she does not 
have the operation. After 20, ‘the operation won’t work as well, you’ll look 
wrong forever.’14 Shay is resistant to peer pressure and societal norms. 
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Big Or maybe when they do the operation - when they 
grind and stretch your bones to the right shape, peel off 
your face and rub all your skin away, and stick in plastic 
cheekbones so you look like everybody else - maybe after 
going through all that you just aren’t very interesting 
anymore. 15 
 
Their relationship suffers from mild resentment because of Shay’s reluctance 
and Tally’s inclination to conform. Shay runs away to the Smoke, a makeshift 
community of people that do not have the operation thus staying ‘ugly’ 
forever, but leaves Tally cryptic clues about how to locate her.16 Tally is 
forced to betray her friend as Special Circumstances, a covert organization 
that keeps order in their society, blackmails Tally with the threat of never 
receiving the operation.17 Rebellion against the operation undermines the city.  
The outcasts in the Smoke provide a glimpse of life in the pre-Rusty 
era and introduce the girls to matured uglies.18 David shows the girls an 
alternative reality and unites them on the idea that there is beauty in nature 
and in remaining ugly. Tally learns the secret behind the operation from 
David’s parents, who tell her that the operation adds lesions to your brain that 
make you ‘easier to manage.’19 David’s father explains their concept of 
evolution is conditioning, a cruel trick, and David claims ‘the worst damage 
is done before they even pick up the knife: You’re all brainwashed into 
believing you’re ugly.’20 After learning the truth, Tally agrees to become 
pretty in order to test the cure in the future. 
Once pretty, the potential for body modification does not stop with 
the operation in the same way that it does not today. The pretties are free to 
engage in a variety of cosmetic enhancements. These extravagant and 
beautiful methods of artifice are not typical forms of rebellion but rather 
extravagant societal norms. It was common for new pretties to ‘surge,’ 
meaning they get radical body modifications for primarily decorative 
purposes. Shay’s eye surge consisted of ‘twelve tiny rubies ringed around 
glowing softly red against emerald irises’ forming a clock that runs counter 
clockwise.21 Tally got a lacework flash tattoo on her face that was in tune 
with her heart rate.22 After a while, other members of her clique get ‘heart 
triggered’ tattoos too referencing their collective group identity. 
However, the transformation from ugly to pretty also alters Tally 
and Shay’s identities and they lose their sense of subjectivity, ‘one’s 
existence as thinking, feeling person […] to loose one’ subjectivity is to lose 
one’s identity entirely.’23 Their altered appearance affects their personalities, 
thus who they are to become is based on how they appear. 
 
Big Almost the entirety of our daily lives is built up on this 
set of unreflective expectations and practices, for which 
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some degree of broad social conformity is clearly 
necessary. Individual nonconformism is almost invariably 
perceived as a threat to that practical identity.24 
 
The threat of nonconformism is what Special Circumstances was designed to 
control. Ironically, those pretties that eventually became specials are the ones 
most likely to rebel against the system. 
Specials are the most extremely modified of all in this society, 
feared for their ‘cruel’ human looks and less than human behaviour. Dr. 
Cable continually tries to persuade Tally that ‘humanity is a disease, a cancer 
on the body of the world […] Special Circumstances […] we are the cure.’25 
The specials represent what happens if body modification is taken too far, 
resulting in a loss of humanity. The control over humanity and the 
diminishment of human nature are exactly what Special Circumstances were 
designed to protect. Dr. Cable points out that without regulation, we, as 
human beings are doomed to repeat our problematic mistakes. Their society 
revolves around in-groups and out-groups in addition to the body modifying 
operations. These groups play a large role in the characters individual and 
collective identities. Whether it is a choice about what type of new surge to 
get, which party to attend, or what side of the city you are on, uglies and 
pretties particularly look to their peers for guidance. 
  
4. Cultural Body Modification 
Westerfeld’s inventive world highlights extreme body modification 
as the norm but mirrors the real world in several respects. Body modification 
has always been a part of our collective human history, ‘[…] right at the heart 
of this symbolic universe, which sets our species apart, is the art and 
language of the styled, customized human body.’26 Primitive or traditional 
tribes have used body modification, in forms such as tattooing, piercing, or 
scarification, to express an informative message about their culture.27 
Contemporary societies have adopted many of these types of modification, 
but in the Western world, we are generally more focused on decoration rather 
than communication.28 This disconnect relates to the values of our culture. 
Tribal tattoos have become increasingly popular in recent years. In fact, 
Tally’s flash tattoo is loosely based on the Moko style of the Maori tribe from 
New Zealand.29 
However, many subcultures today adopt body modification practices 
as part of their group identities. In addition, people seek out body 
modification as a method of expressing their individuality. 
 
Big Contemporary urban and suburban culture […] has 
banished as barbarous the ancient notion of a physical rite 
of passage. Without these rituals people’s lives are often 
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empty, lacking in meaning and demarcation, and nowhere 
is this more evident than in Western teens, who seemed 
dazed and confused by the ambiguity of their social 
status…hungry for a significant ritual to mark officially 
their transformation to adulthood.30 
 
The popularity of body modification may be a result of Westerners, 
particularly, looking to satisfy that need for ritual. Modern Primitives seek 
out ‘body play’ which focuses more on the process rather than the result. The 
experience is the goal. In addition, those seeking the experience are pushing 
the envelope by moving away from the now mainstream act of tattooing and 
piercing into less socially acceptable forms such as scarification, bloodletting 
and pain.31 Traditional cultures have used these types of painful body 
modification to achieve ‘altered states of consciousness.’ This correlates well 
to the text as Shay finds that by cutting herself she can stay bubbly. To them, 
bubbly is an altered state of mind outside of the pretty mind. Not only did this 
bloodletting process cause a shift in perception, but it also left her with 
scarred arms. 
 
5. Future Choice 
As young adult fiction, the Uglies trilogy has been immensely 
popular. In addition to beauty centred body modifications, creative slang and 
unique technical gadgets, such as hover boards, offer the youth culture ideas 
about our potential future. The contemporary audience is one that is highly 
desirable to advertisers and marketers.32 Though Westerfeld’s message about 
the dangers of going to extremes is evident, the success of the series and its 
target audience creates a window of opportunity for the adoptability of 
similar trends and the commercialization of future products. 
In addition, the books offer an impetus for an important dialogue 
about beauty standards and our culture’s obsessive captivation with them. 
 
Why am I unhappy […] because the city makes you the 
way they want you to be, Peris. And I want to be myself 
[…] their reasons don’t mean anything unless I have a 
choice […] and they don’t give anyone a choice.33 
 
One should be able to have the choice whether or not they want to conform to 
societal standards as far as beauty is concerned. Whether mandated or 
through social pressure, one should have the right to choose whether they 
want to become pretty or stay ‘ugly.’ As we move into the future, society will 
continually follow its pattern of conformity and dissent, extremes and norms. 
Body modification has been around since antiquity, and it will continue to 
push the limits of social acceptably. Since the youth culture is susceptible to 
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early adoption of trends, prone to conformity within in-groups and non-
conformity within out-groups, we can look to them to see what the future 
holds in terms of beauty. 
 
Notes
 
1 S Westerfeld, Pretties. Simon Pulse, New York, 2005, p. 185. 
2 S Westerfeld, Uglies. Simon Pulse, New York, 2005, p. 118. 
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4 Westerfeld, Uglies, p. 262. 
5 ibid., p. 39. 
6 ibid., p. 16. 
7 P C Hogan The Culture of Conformism. Understanding Social Consent. 
Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2001, p. 74. 
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9 ibid., 67. 
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29 S Westerfeld, ‘Flash Tattoo Watch 01’, westerblog, 2008, retrieved 19 
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Culture. Scribner, New York, 2004, p. 19-20. 
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 Cyborg Art as a Critical Sphere of Inquiry into Increasing 
Corporeal Human-Technology Merger 
 
Elizabeth Borst  
 
Abstract 
This paper introduces and examines the concept of ‘cyborg art,’ which 
describes literal and figural visual representations of corporeal human-
technology integration. The transforming and emerging human is therefore 
the focus; who we are today, and who (or what) we may become, as 
increasingly interfaced with technology. Overall, theoretical discussion 
centring on visual representations of cyborgs (or posthumans) relate 
predominately to science fiction, in particular film and television, as opposed 
to art. I argue that this constitutes an investigative limitation into the broad 
and relevant field of human-technology interface inquiry. A profusion of 
cyborg art and art practices abound within contemporary Western society, 
each differing art form, for example, conceptual, interactive, performance, 
digital, sculpture or painting, offering possible ‘symbolic function’ and 
‘critical potential’ regarding increasing cyborgisation, and changing human 
physical ontology. Representations of new triadic entities are of particular 
interest, the ways in which artists are fusing human (culture), animal (nature), 
and machine (technology) elements together within one artwork.  
I suggest that the artistic melding of organic and inorganic spheres alludes to 
the common ontology which exists between these states; the scope of 
advanced technologies; the dissolution (and rupturing) of boundaries and 
dualisms under postmodernism, and the far-reaching ideological implications 
this evokes. The goal of this paper is to present the underlying theoretical and 
ontological breadth (and creative depth) of cyborg art, to introduce new 
cyborg configurations, and to argue for the need to develop a specific cyborg 
art genre as a recognised and valid area for research regarding escalating 
body-technology amalgamation.  
 
Key Words: Cyborg, Art, Corporeality, Convergence, Ontology 
 
***** 
 
1. Introduction  
Cyborg art focuses on technology as intimately interfaced with the 
human body, no longer existing as an attachment or tool, but incorporated 
within (or altering) the body’s inherent structures. These ‘cyborgian 
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technologies’ include pacemakers, synthetic organs and valves, artificial 
joints and ligaments, genetic engineering, assisted/artificial reproduction 
technologies, external gestation, xenotransplantation, cloning, cryonics, 
biotelematic implants, direct carbon and silicon links, and the creation of 
transgenic entities - all technologies in existence today, in varying degrees of 
application and stages of development.1  
The myriad of cyborg artworks created today offers ample avenues 
for enhancing awareness and understanding of these developing corporeal 
human-technology links. Additionally, most cyborg art (whether situated 
within popular culture, fine art, or performance art realms) is presented on the 
internet which potentially reaches a large audience. Despite this, cultural 
theory and analysis relating to cyborg art remains limited, adding to its 
elusiveness as a concept, and lack of recognition as an art genre.  
This introductory paper is based on an in-depth study into cyborg 
art, which developed in response to Chris Hables Gray’s call for critics to pay 
attention to the growing cyborg aesthetic prevalent today, and the critical 
potential of human-technology interface art.2 The four artworks presented 
here are metaphorical and figural cyborg representations - with a focus on the 
convergence on flesh and metal - and are situated within three key spheres of 
corporeal-technological developments: prosthetics (machinic technologies), 
telematics (electronic - computer and telecommunications technologies) and 
genetics (biotechnologies).  
 
2.  Prosthetics 
Viktor Koen, a multi award-winning digital artist and illustrator, 
created Nutrition Man,3 shown here, as a figural depiction of technological 
augmentation of the body via prosthetics. Koen’s futuristic cyborg represents 
the enhanced techno-body in motion, where propulsion units and machinic 
technologies are propelling him into the posthuman age. The multifarious 
technology serves as a metaphor for superior nourishment of the human body 
- interface technology as boosting natural systems.  
 
 
 
Image 1 - Nutrition Man (2005) Digital Art Illustration Artist: Viktor Koen 
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Stelarc, the controversial and renowned Australian performance 
artist who centres his artistic focus on prosthetics and robotics, is one of the 
staunchest proponents of the inadequacy of the body’s functioning systems, 
and the outdated concept of aging.4 He refers to the natural body as ‘obsolete’ 
(no longer viable), and theorists in general agree that the quest for enhanced 
strength/beauty, longevity and immortality fuels the force and compulsion of 
technoscience.5 
Increasingly technologies are no longer an appendage or an 
extension to the body, but directly incorporated and assimilated within the 
body’s inherent organic structures.6 Today, many parts of the human body 
can be replaced with prosthetic technologies and devices.7 Therefore terms 
such as ‘prosthetic couplings’8 are increasingly used to define new cyborg 
configurations. Yet, corporeal-prosthetic melding can generate wary reactions 
from individuals as prosthetic limbs and devices are often viewed as artificial 
components invading and contaminating the (natural) body, challenging what 
Elaine Graham calls the human body’s ‘ontological hygiene.’9 Koen’s cyborg 
represents this penetration, as technology is grafted or interfaced into nearly 
every inch of his body.  
 
3.  Telematics 
Christos Magganas, a Greek multimedia artist has created Hermes,10 
shown below, to metaphorically represent wireless telematic ideas merged 
with the human body. Hermes in Greek mythology was a messenger to the 
gods,11 and he is here transformed into a posthuman cyborg messenger, 
receiving and sending the plethora of globally transmitted messages which 
exist today. The divine cherubs have also been morphed into the ubiquitous 
iconic computer screen. Magganas is interested in the role of the body and 
embodiment in the digital era, Greek mythology, and the ‘Shrinking of the 
world through communications technology.’12 
 
 
  
Image 2 - Hermes (1997) Digital Art Illustration Artist: Christos Magganas 
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Telematics is a central topic of discussion today as geographical 
borders diminish, and the speed of communication increases.13 Roy Ascott 
states that ‘With the convergence of computers and telecommunications, the 
‘thinking system’ becomes planetary.’14 Pierre Lévy agrees envisaging a 
future collective society linked by electronic networks, where ‘A nomadic 
distribution of information will fluctuate around an immense deterritorialized 
semiotic plane’15 - the global equidistant internet. The quintessential cyborg 
is often viewed as a cybernetic communication network entity,16 and Hermes 
represents this as his lower torso is shown dissolving and disappearing into 
pure energy.  
 
4.  Genetics 
Lastly, the advanced developments existing within the sphere of 
genetics generate a wealth of artistic inspiration for the creation of new 
transgenic, triadic and quadratic entities. Dave McKean, the award-winning 
English artist has created Feeding the Machine,17 shown here, which shows a 
triadic fusion of animal, human and machine components. McKean’s 
‘techumanic tribrid’ has an upper body covered with reddish fur, and a 
human-machine head and face (pushing through the mouth of a second face) 
symbolising our evolution from animal, to human, through to machine, and 
increasing nature, science and technology convergence. As Steven Best and 
Douglas Kellner state, ‘‘Human beings’ today can easily be part human, part 
animal and part machine.’18 McKean also alludes to Lewis Mumford’s 
concerns that our increasing integration with technology will ‘anesthetise us,’ 
destroying our creativity and empathy.19 McKean’s tribrid is depicted as 
devoid of vigour, passively awaiting ‘progress’ or ‘nourishment’ which 
cannot ultimately satisfy him. 
 
 
 
Image 3 - Feeding the Machine (1999) Surrealist Artwork Artist: Dave McKean 
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Norbert Wiener, who coined the term cybernetics in the late 1940s, 
was the first to suggest that animals, humans and machines all had similar 
cybernetic systems of control and communication,20 and increasingly artists, 
writers and theorists such as Donna Haraway, Eduardo Kac, Dave McKean, 
Faith Wilding, Murray McKeich, Philip Hitchcock and Viktor Koen, are 
showing their interest in the common ontology which exists within these 
spheres, and the far-reaching ideological inferences this alludes to.  
Heidi Taillefer, the celebrated Canadian graphic artist and painter 
moves even further into exploring the junction between organic and inorganic 
realms with Venus Envy,21 shown below, by combining human, animal and 
technological components, and plant matter within one image. In this 
artwork, human female flesh and form covers internal technology and 
machinery; snakes are represented as hair in the manner of Medusa, and fruit, 
flowers and plants are also intimately incorporated within this female 
cyborg’s corporeality. In addition, mechanical pipes are shown filling the 
artificial breasts with milk, ready for the growing human baby shown floating 
in the amniotic fluid of the transparent artificial womb sack. Venus Envy is a 
new millennium quadratic entity, a fusion of Eduardo Kac’s interspecies 
creations ‘plantimals’ (plant and animal genetic mix), and ‘animans’ (animal 
and human genetic mix).22  
 
    
 
 
 
 
Venus Envy also represents the paradoxes often felt towards 
technoscience and its applications, alluding to the ‘miracles’ and 
‘monstrosities’ that can be developed and created today, and the ideological 
struggle over the distinction and disparity between the natural and (the 
fascination with) artifice.23 The cyborg and posthuman body can be seen in 
Image 4 - Venus Envy (1996) Painting: Oil on Canvas 44 in. x 60 in.  
Artist: Heidi Taillefer
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transition in the twenty-first century, passing ‘Through a series of gateways 
that seem now without end.’24 Boundaries are increasingly collapsing 
between species and the machine as a result of our biotechnological 
capabilities and knowledge. Yet, despite this, and the prevalence of tribrids 
depicted in art, the concept of triadic (and quadratic) merger is extremely 
limited in theoretical cyborg or posthuman discussion. 
 
5.  Conclusion  
Theorists and artists increasingly grapple with the question of what 
it means to be human today,25 as such, ‘The cyborg has been used to fill the 
void in attempting to make sense of who we are and what we might 
become.’26 The cyborg is therefore deemed a symbol or icon of the 
technoscientific age, its dual status of being both organic and non-organic 
providing a symbolic function for society, by existing as a mediator between 
these two realms.27  
This paper has demonstrated the way cyborg art points to important 
and relevant themes regarding increasing body-technology fusion, including: 
sites of possible being (prefigurative representations); transgression (the 
crossing of traditional Western ideological binaries and boundaries, such as 
male/female, organic/artificial, nature/culture, human/animal, born/made and 
private/public); cyborgian paradox (the human desires and fears felt towards 
advanced technologies, and the marvels and monsters which can be created); 
the dehumanisation of technologies (and increasing human dependency on 
technology); the instability of the symbiotic body/identity as constituting soft 
(warm) flesh, and hard (cold) machinery; and the way in which skin no 
longer serves as a barrier and boundary to the inner corporeal realm.  
Cyborg art is a discursive tool for addressing the interconnection 
and relationship between humanity and technology, and can be viewed as 
having critical potential as it serves as a possible catalyst for increasing 
theoretical analysis relating to, and societal awareness of (and interest in) 
advanced corporeal technologies. Cyborg art can (and should) have social 
value and societal function, as this art genre offers versions of the 
technoscience debate that are not often considered, and forms of resistance 
not immediately apparent.28 I therefore suggest a need arises to embed and 
ground cyborg art in the realm of corporeal-technological embodiment; to 
recognise cyborg art as constituting a specific (critical and relevant) art genre; 
and for cyborg art to be acknowledged as a significant arena for exploring 
issues surrounding altering human physical ontology, in addition to being  
valued as complementary to theoretical discussion focusing on escalating 
body-technology convergence. 
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Interactive Dance: The Merger of Media Technologies and 
the Dancing Body 
 
Zeynep Gündüz 
 
Abstract 
This article explores the collaboration between bodies and interactive 
technologies in relation to the cultural practice of contemporary dance. 
Aiming to counter-balance the increasing fear of disembodiment of the 
dancing body, it offers a phenomenological approach to examine the partner-
work between physical bodies and abstract digital technologies. In addition, 
this paper examines the consequences of the integration of digital 
technologies for the existing cultural practice of dance and the roles of digital 
technologies incorporated in stage performances and illustrate these changes 
via the case study Apparition (2004). 
 
Key Words: Embodiment, Phenomenology, Interactive Technologies, 
Interactivity, Virtuality, Dance, Cultural Practices. 
 
***** 
 
1. Introduction 
In dance, bodies and technologies have often been seen as 
incompatible, even unethical. Accordingly, technologies have frequently 
been accused of ‘dehumanising’ the body and its dance. Moreover, the 
currently increasing intimacy between dance and digital media, such as 
telematics and motion capture, causes dance practitioners to fear that 
technologies are generating a ‘disembodiment’ of dance, which implies the 
extraction of the physical body from the choreography.1 
However, dance and the phenomenon of dance performance is not 
only an art form, but a cultural practice that changes as the dancing body is 
affected by cultural and technological shifts. In the past decade, interactive 
digital media that share characteristics of cybernetic systems have infiltrated 
art in general, and live dance performance in particular. Theatre theorist 
David Saltz describes this interaction as: ‘sounds and images stored, and in 
many cases created on a computer, which the computer produces in response 
to a live performer’s actions.’2 According to Saltz, interactive media have 
other characteristics than traditional media, enabling new possibilities of 
staging narratives, but also producing a ‘dramatic’ relationship between the 
performer and media. 
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With respect to the collaboration of dance and digital media, my aim 
in this paper is threefold. Firstly, I will underline the crucial necessity of art 
for the interrogation of the relationship between humans and digital 
technologies. In addition, I will show how digital media help address certain 
questions inherent in dance, such as the metamorphosis of bodily form and 
the ‘stubborn’ fight against time, space, and gravity. Secondly, I will argue 
against the fear of disembodiment of dance by showing how this specific type 
of interaction bridges the gap between bodies and digital systems. In order to 
do this, I will take a phenomenological approach based on Mark Hansen’s 
theory of ‘bodies-in-code’ (2006). I will apply my arguments to the selected 
case study Apparition (2004), a dance performance created by the media 
artist and composer Klaus Obermaier. The analysis will also help illustrate 
my third aim: to pinpoint the changing perceptions of technologies and the 
cultural practices of dance. 
  
2.  Dance as a Marker of Changing Cultural Perceptions  
Technologies have an impact on our perception of the body; each 
new technology demands a new corresponding anatomy as well as a new 
conception of time and space. According to Katherine Hayles, living in a rich 
technologically mediated environment brings with it changes and shifts in 
habits, postures, enactments, and perceptions. However, the effect of 
technology, specifically the changing proprioception and sense of 
embodiment, need time, thought, and experience to be registered in the 
‘mindbody’. Art is capable of bridging the gap or discontinuities between 
rapid technological innovations, an abstract understanding of the body, and 
our embodied experience.3 Hence, artworks that incorporate technologies and 
the interaction between technology and the body not only help us understand 
these points, but they actually change experience itself. 
Dance as art form is helpful in illuminating changing perceptions 
and experiences of the body by means of digital technologies because the 
desire to question one’s existence is inherent in its very centre. 
Notwithstanding common associations of dance as ‘just something physical’, 
dance is, in fact, a reaching beyond oneself, an active questioning of ‘time, 
space, the engagement between the intellect and the senses. […] an 
interrogation of the world at the same time that it is a celebration of our 
existence in the world.’4 
In this respect, the collaboration of dance and digital technologies 
requires close examination because being intimately tied to bodily awareness, 
sensual presence, and kinaesthetic experience, dance ‘more than any other art 
form has been reconfigured in terms of new media projects.’5 One of the 
most the prominent changes in the practice of dance is the notion of virtual 
dance and bodies. Although, to certain dance practitioners and 
choreographers, virtuality implies a ‘disembodiment’ of dance; for others 
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virtuality makes possible a renegotiation of corporeality.6 This re-negotiation 
is then a re-interpretation of the body through the image where a continuous 
interchange between bodies and technologies allows presence and pattern to 
interact. At the same time, it is a re-incorporation of technologies; that is a 
confrontation as well as a dialogue between the incorporeal and corporeal. In 
order to counterbalance notions of disembodiment of dance and to illustrate 
how this re-negotiation takes place, I will now examine the theory of bodies-
in-code and its primary source: phenomenology. 
 
3.  Re-Negotiating the Body, Re-Incorporating Technology  
Phenomenology has its roots in the 20th century and is a 
philosophical and existential approach to life, body, politics, and meaning. 
There exist several approaches to phenomenology; however, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s method that celebrates the phenomenal body as our primary 
access to the world suits best for conceptualizing the body and its interaction 
with technologies in everyday life and the arts. For Merleau-Ponty, 
phenomenology has to do with descriptions of man and the world, not as 
objectively constituted, but as subjectively established through the lived 
experience of a phenomenon. It concerns itself with the ‘pre-reflective’ mode 
of being, which is ‘the prior ground or condition of both the subjective and 
the objective.’7 In other words, the world is always already there before 
reflection begins. 
   In his book Bodies in Code (2006), Hansen takes Merleau-Ponty’s 
stance as his starting point and updates it to the domain of new media art.8 
Creating a combination of media theory and phenomenology, Hansen argues 
that technologies alter the very basis of our sensory experience and 
drastically affect what it means to live as embodied human agents. His main 
focus lies on the separation and reconciliation of touch and vision, and how 
this doubleness of perception can be materialized by means of interaction 
with digital technologies. The ability of simultaneously experiencing double 
sensations is inherent to the human body and is conceptualised by Merleau-
Ponty as the notion of ‘reversibility’, exemplified as the body’s ability to see 
and be seen, to touch and be touched.9 
Labelling it as the ‘dancing-danced’, dancer/researcher Susan Kozel 
applies the notion of reversibility to dance, linking its doubleness to the 
dancer’s different levels of consciousness. On a reflexive level, the dancer 
‘dances’ but on the pre-reflexive level, the dancer is also ‘danced’ by the 
force she sets into motion. The constant shift between a pre-reflective and 
reflective level of consciousness marks the ‘hyper-reflectivity’ in dance.10 
The notion of the dancing-danced is part of the everyday routine of any dance 
class: when learning a new combination the dancer is required be very 
conscious of her body, but after the learning process, s/he is encouraged to 
‘let consciousness go’ in order to allow the force of dance to take over as to 
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achieve unpredicted movement dynamics. Choreographer Keren Levi 
illustrates this point: when teaching a new dance combination, she suggests 
the dancers to ‘go through the dance phrase […] the first time slow for the 
mind, and the second time fast for the body.’11 In the former part then, the 
dancer ‘marks’ the phrase by visualizing the movements, while in the latter 
part s/he ‘does’ them ‘full-out’.12 
Hansen elaborates on the differences between the motile and 
representational modes of the body by distinguishing the ‘body image’ from 
the ‘body schema’. The former is characterized by a predominantly visual 
understanding of the body as an external object, whereas the latter, generates 
from: 
The operational perspective of the embodied organism. As 
such, it encompasses an ‘originary’ preobjective process of 
world constitution that, by giving priority to the internal 
perspective of the organism, paradoxically includes what is 
outside its body proper, what lies in the interactional domain 
specified by the embodied enaction.13 
 
In other words, the body image refers to the representational domain while 
the body schema refers to the body ‘from within’, it is that which comes 
before the body image and makes the body image possible in the first place. 
The body image, then, is an embodied extension or externalised form of the 
body schema. 
Moreover, Hansen claims a current shift from representational 
fantasy or cinematic illusion towards a desire for complete convergence with 
natural (embodied) perception achieved through interactions with digital 
technologies. In well-established virtual reality environments, therefore, the 
role of representation as well as the difference between the body image and 
schema is eradicated. In such environments, ‘whatever experience one has of 
one’s body proper does not take the form of a representational image, but 
rather emerges through the representative function of the data of body 
movement, the way these data represent one’s body.’14 As a result, the body 
schema forms a medium through which the actual body opens out, or 
exfoliates between itself and the space. The exterior images are not only 
representations, but they carry traces of movement dynamics emerging from 
the body, reflecting what I call ‘inside-outside-inside’: visual -yet embodied- 
aesthetics created through the onstage dancers’ physical manipulations of the 
technical system. Hence, the materialization of the body image in new media 
environments exemplifies the reversibility of the body as well as its pre-
reflective knowledge of itself as such. 
In Hansen’s view, the increasing physical encounters with digital 
interactive technologies initiate the ‘body-in-code’, a body ‘submitted to and 
constituted by an unavoidable and empowering technical deterritorialization- 
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a body whose embodiment is realized, and can only be realized, in 
conjunction to technics.’15 In other words, engaging with interactive systems 
in new media art creates a self-reflexive experience of the ‘interactor’ or in 
the case of dance, the dancer. While highlighting certain prominent shifts in 
the cultural practice of contemporary dance and the perception of 
technologies incorporated in live performances, let me now elaborate on the 
case study Apparition in order to show how the ‘body-in-code’ is realized. 
 
4.  Case Study: Apparition 
Apparition (Klaus Obermaier, 2004) is an artwork based on moving 
body projections made possible by a sophisticated motion tracking system 
that display real-time responses to the impulses given by the dancer, in the 
form of abstract lines, shapes, and text. An example of what I call ‘interactive 
dance’, this performance is a confrontation between corporeal and 
incorporeal forms; the major persistent theme of the piece is largely realized 
through the collaboration between the ‘live’ input of the dancers and the 
‘live’ responses of the technological system. The starting point of Apparition 
is based on exploring the questions: ‘What is choreography like when your 
partner is software? When virtual and real images share the same space? 
When everything moving onstage is independent and interactive at the same 
time?’16 
The answers to these questions reveal that interactive media have 
consequences for the existing cultural practices of dance. Firstly, interactive 
media complicate the notion of ‘author’ and ‘identity’ of the artwork because 
engaging with these digital media requires the choreographer to share a 
considerable amount of his/her authority with the performer and the 
technician.17 Concerning the technical system for his new piece, Obermaier 
has collaborated with the media engineers and designers of the Ars 
Electronica Futurelab. The system constantly updates information for body 
projections as well as qualitative calculations of certain motion dynamics. 
The information derived from these calculations generates real-time visuals, 
projected back onto the body and/or as large-scale background projections 
that react to the performers’ movements. The choreography was created by 
the dancers. 
Secondly, this collaboration between technicians and artists creates a 
unique performance environment that is activated by the human body and 
‘lives only when a body is living within them, without movement they are 
silent and dark and lifeless.’18 Two well-known contemporary examples of 
‘responsive spaces’ applied to the context of performance are the ‘Intelligent 
Stage’ and ‘åR-Space’.19 In these ‘responsive environments’, all physical 
actions taking place onstage can be sensed by the computer, which marks the 
difference between a ‘traditional stage’ and an ‘interactive stage’. In the 
latter, the theater becomes an ‘intelligent’ space that transforms movements 
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within its borders into potential data to be processed and interpreted by the 
computer. In Apparition, for example, space becomes the: 
 
Materialization of an overall immersive kinetic space, a 
virtual architecture that can be simultaneously fluid and 
rigid, that can expand and contract, ripple, bend and distort 
in response to […] the movement of the performers.20 
 
In other words, the theatre becomes what I call a ‘hyper-sensitive’ space 
where the images created by physical movement are nothing but the 
externalisation of the physical body’s intensity, sensuality, and velocity. The 
visual imagery is not imposed on the dance; instead it originates from the 
body and is the materialization of the body schema in the form of exterior 
images. It illustrates how the body functions as a body-in-code, how it 
deterritorializes and externalises itself through engaging with technologies. 
Creating the performance ‘environment’ emphasizes the process of 
experimentation rather than the end result. This transforms the aesthetics of 
interactive performances into an ‘aesthetics of process’ and the performance 
into sequences or ‘potential concepts’ to be activated differently in each 
performance.21 In other words, these performances are never ‘settled’ or 
‘finished’. What is created is a rehearsed, yet to a certain degree 
unpredictable performance that comes to ‘life’ through the movement of the 
dancers and the reactions of interactive technologies. In addition, depending 
on how the system is programmed, the same movement by the dancer may 
trigger different reactions from the computer each time, which demands that 
the dancer remain alert to the computer’s reactions to create ‘a choreography 
of surprises’. This enhances the hyper-reflectivity of dance- the play between 
the pre-reflective and reflective consciousness. In Apparition, the dancer 
‘dances’ but is also ‘danced’ by the reactions of the digital system. The dance 
is shaped from within the pre-reflective mode of the dancer and from the 
images appearing in the external space, which in fact carry the traces of the 
dancer’s kinaesthetic intensity. The exterior images reflect the dancers’ 
‘inside-outside-inside’ that help determine the (visual) aesthetics of the 
performance as the onstage dancer creates an aesthetically interesting 
performance via his/her manipulations of the system. 
Finally, interacting with digital media has consequences for the 
perception of technologies. According to Saltz, interactive technologies mark 
a new era of ‘liveness’ for technologies by contributing to the ontology of 
live performance. Interactive media and live performance do not represent 
opposite poles; actually, the ability of interactive technologies to ‘sense’ and 
spontaneously react to performers’ stimuli makes them ‘close cousins’. 
Hence, interactive technologies indicate an end of the period of ‘frozen 
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media’ and signal a new era of ‘live media’. In Saltz’s view, the spontaneity 
and ‘live’ responses of interactive media transform technologies into a ‘live’ 
performer that liberates these technologies from their traditional function of 
visual décor and recording technologies, and examines how they affect the 
form and practice of theatre.22 In other words, in contrast to Hansen’s 
approach, Saltz reminds us that technologies are not merely tools; they are 
the non-human partners that assist a performance. 
Perhaps because of this, the world of dance remains resistant to and 
dubious of the incorporation of advanced technologies in live performances.23 
Scholar/dancer Erin Manning emphasizes that even the most sophisticated 
technologies lack the complexity of the human body and require certain 
adaptations from the dancer.24 The dancer’s adjustments of movement help 
the system to ‘recognize’ the dancer; a fully actualised movement is 
necessary for software detection, usually by accentuating extremities of the 
body or a displacement of the whole body across space. As a result, the 
software determines the choreography that qualitatively confines what a body 
can do even as it accentuates what the technology can do. 
Obermaier situates himself on the other side of the scale. Rejecting 
the opinions that label the integration of dance and technologies as 
restricting, Obermaier argues that limitations in art are necessary in order to 
achieve novel perspectives because ‘without any restrictions there would not 
be art at all. Each stage setting/set-up gives you limitations AND creates new 
possibilities. Even a second or third performer is a restriction for the first 
one.’25 Other choreographers working with interactive systems suggest that 
the partner-work between dancers and interactive technologies opens up new 
dimensions of the body that were previously unknown, such as creating a 
body that is ‘sensually emergent, alive with image and sound’.26 In addition, 
this pro-technology pole counterbalances the frequently feared 
disembodiment of dance by pointing out that designing interactive systems 
requires ‘a whole-body interface between human being and technology’ that 
involves all of the body’s senses.27 
Relying on Hansen’s arguments, I situate myself at this pole, 
advocating that body images do not exist independently; rather they appear 
based on to the empowering technical deterritorialization of the body, 
achieved in conjunction with technics. The body images manifested in 
Apparition are not representational imagery ‘given from above’, but are 
extensions of the scope, velocity, dynamics, and sensitivity of the dancing 
body; demonstrating the body’s exfoliation into space. In this process, the 
technology can be considered both as tool and as performance partners, 
depending on the approach taken when examining the ‘lively duet’ between 
bodies and technologies. 
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5. Conclusion 
To counter-balance criticisms of disembodiment of the dancing body 
caused by the integration of digital technologies in performances marks the 
starting point of this paper. Firstly, this paper shows how the qualities 
inherent in dance help to interrogate the relationship between humans and 
digital technologies. Secondly, this paper points out that the engagement 
between the body and digital technologies leads to anything but 
disembodiment; rather, this collaboration merges the two, creating a re-
negotiation of bodily boundaries and a re-incorporation of technologies into 
the domain of the body. Moreover, incorporating digital technologies in 
dance performances requires certain adaptations from the dancer and 
choreographer; it also affects the creation process of a piece, which 
underlines that the art form of dance is a dynamic and changing cultural 
practice, capable of mirroring the shifts caused by digital technologies in our 
current social-cultural life. 
 
Notes 
 
1 R Povall, ‘A Little Technology is a Dangerous Thing’, in A Dils, A Cooper 
Albright (eds), Moving History/Dancing Cultures. Dance History Reader, 
Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, Connecticut 2001, p. 458. 
2 D Saltz, ‘Live Media: Interactive Technology and Theatre’, Theatre Topics, 
vol. 11, nr. 2, September 2001, p. 117. 
3 K Hayles, ‘Flesh and Metal. Reconfiguring the Mindbody in Virtual 
Environments’, Configurations, 2002, 10.2: p. 297-320. 
4 S P Kozel, ‘Athikte’s voice: Listening to the voice of the dancer in Paul 
Valéry’s ‘L’âme et la danse’’, Dance Research Journal, vol. 27, nr. 1, Spring 
1995, p. 7. 
5 Bench, ‘Virtual Embodiment and the Materiality of Image’, viewed on 
26.02.2008,<http://www.wac.ucla.edu/extensionsjournal/Essays/Bench.htm>. 
6 Ibid., <http://www.wac.ucla.edu/extensionsjournal/Essays/Bench.htm>. 
7 S P Kozel, Closer. Performance, Technologies, Phenomenology, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 2007, p. 16. 
8 M Hansen, Bodies in Code: Interfaces with Digital Media, Routledge, New 
York 2006. 
9 Kozel, Closer, 2007, p. 36. 
10 Ibid., p.38 
11 Notes made during my participation in Keren Levi’s contemporary dance 
class, 27-30 May 2008, Henny Juriens Dance Stichting in Amsterdam. 
12 To ‘mark’ a movement refers to movements that are not fully actualized 
while doing movements ‘full out’ means to actualize movements according to 
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Consciousness, Embodiment and Communication: 
Nietzsche’s Bioinformatics 
 
Daniel White 
 
Abstract 
This essay considers an important dimension of Nietzsche’s relevance to 
cybernetics, communication theory, and informatics. Building on the work of 
Gregory Bateson, Friedrich Kittler, and Mark Hansen, I argue that 
Nietzsche’s work offers a solution to the ‘frame problem’ in information 
theory by positing the body (der Leib, der Körper) as the context or 
connection of consciousness (Bewusstsein, Bewusstheit) with human animal 
nature. Nietzsche’s ‘genuine phenomenalism and perspectivism’ (eigentliche 
Phänomenalismus und Perspektivismus) provide a biological and ecological 
frame in terms of which to evaluate, renovate, and educate the new spectrum 
of  ‘posthuman’ identities-in science fiction and fact-produced by electronic 
communications. 
 
Key Words: Nietzsche, Kittler, Informatics, Information, Bioinformatics, 
Communication, Artificial Intelligence, Frame Problem, Corporeality. 
 
***** 
 
Choros 
kai tis tod’ exikoit’ an angelôn tachos; 
Klutaimêstra 
Hêphaistos Idês lampron ekpempôn selas.1 
 
Nietzsche is often thought to have been a materialist who challenged 
idealism-even God himself-to Homeric combat. His victory was signalled in 
the memorable phrase, spoken by his Madman, ‘God is dead! God stays 
dead! And we have killed him!’2 Instead of opting for dogmatic materialism-
the metaphysic underlying ‘science’- or idealism-the metaphysic of 
‘religion’-however, Nietzsche developed an irreducibly pluralistic affirmation 
of life. He therefore attended to the language from which all ‘ideas’ derive, 
and he so turned from the ‘God’ of Christendom to the ‘gods’ and animate 
powers of Ancient Greece, like Hephaestus, divine craftsman in the arts of 
fire (metallurgy), and from divinities to the elemental signs (Zeichen) which 
make up the great cycle (Kreislauf) of nature: not only the ‘material’ element 
but also the ‘ideational’ messenger fire (to pur) invoked by the rebellious 
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queen Clytemnestra to signal the end of the Trojan War and the return of her 
ill-fated husband. For Nietzsche, in brief, the natural and human worlds are 
material-semiotic configurations cycling in an ‘eternal return of the same.’ 
Thus, just as in the emerging field of ‘bioinformatics’-’where the relationship 
between the body and language is reconfigured as a relationship of 
materiality and data/information,’ and communication occurs at a ‘cultural 
site thoroughly enframed by the technological apparatus of computer and 
telecommunications’-in Nietzsche’s texts we and our world are 
communicative artefacts arising in an endless spiral of cosmic 
morphogenesis. Here there is no separation between ‘material’ and ‘ideal,’ 
between ‘body’ and ‘mind.’ 
With the stage and language technology of the Greek theatre in 
mind, Nietzsche attempted to frame the logical discourse of ‘Socratism’3 and, 
with it, Modernism, in terms of a mythopoetic language of art as metaphor, 
which, in turn, he understood as the very language of the body. So, in the 
Dionysian musical festival (dithyramb), he says, ‘[…] all the symbolic 
faculties of humankind are stimulated […] a new world of symbols is 
necessary, a symbolism of the body for once, not just the symbolism of the 
mouth, but the full gestures of dance, the rhythmic movement of all the 
limbs.’4 The language of the body is metaphor, Nietzsche argues, and so ‘For 
the genuine poet, metaphor is not a rhetorical figure but a representative 
image, which really floats before him in place of a concept.’5 Metaphors 
arise, in his account, out of the ‘nervous impulses of the body’: ‘A nerve 
impulse transferred to an image! First metaphor! The image in turn formed 
after a sound! Second metaphor! And in each case there is a complete 
overleaping of spheres, right into the midst of a new and different one.’6 For 
the ancient Greek poet, in Nietzsche’s view, the image arises from the 
language of the body and, with it, the inner world of dream: ‘The higher 
truth, the perfection of these [dream] states in contrast to the only partial 
comprehensibility of everyday reality, the deep consciousness of nature as it 
heals and helps in sleep and dream is at the same time the symbolic analogue 
of the capacity for prophecy and of the arts as a whole, which make life 
possible and worth living.’7 The language of the body,  most fully expressed 
in the metaphoric idiom of dreams, is the stage upon which ‘consciousness’ 
steps to play its role in rationality and logic that determine the discourse-raise 
the  torch-of Enlightenment. In the history of Greek language and literature, 
the emergence of self-reflective consciousness articulated in prose out of  a 
mythic ‘unconscious’ of poetic metaphor and religious ritual is an historical 
antecedent and analogue for the emergence of ‘consciousness’ out of the 
‘frame’ of the human brain or the computer (artificial intelligence) in 
communication theory. 
The ‘frame problem’ in artificial intelligence is defined as ‘the 
problem that arises when a robotic system is being designed to utilize 
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information picked up by sensors from the environment. Since sensory input 
can be interpreted in an infinite number of ways, the robot must be 
programmed with an interpretive ‘frame’ to access usable aspects of the 
information.’8 In other words, sensory information can take on meaning only 
in the context of a set of framing assumptions. In the language of Nietzsche’s 
Birth of Tragedy, consciousness arises as the mind’s ‘dialogue,’ emerging out 
of the Chorus’s dithyrambic poetry. The ‘frame problem’ in information 
theory raises an issue analogous to Nietzsche’s framing of ancient logical 
discourse in terms of poetry: is poetry, which is the ‘language of the body,’ 
the ‘frame’ for dialogue and its ‘logic’ the language of the ‘mind’? Mark 
Hansen addresses the idea of framing in his critique of Friedrich Kittler’s 
idea of ‘digital convergence.’ 
Here the increasing extension of computerized media 
‘dedifferentiates’ the various embodiments of traditional signal conveyance 
so that the audio recording, the photograph, the film, and the televisual image 
all increasingly ‘converge’ into to the same binary code as ‘information.’ 
While digital convergence may make for great home entertainment systems 
based on digital media, the end result might not, in Kittler’s view, be so 
appealing: ‘Without reference to the individual or to mankind, 
communication technologies will have overhauled each other until finally an 
artificial intelligence proceeds to the interception of possible intelligences in 
space.’9 Thus, I assume, not only the media inside our new stereos but also 
the listeners outside will become assimilated to the new artificial intelligence 
running the global communications network, leaving old-fashioned ‘us’ out 
of the picture. Nevertheless, Hansen argues, the syntax of binary coding takes 
on meaning only in terms of the context out of which it is sent and that by 
which it is received: the ear to the telephone, the viewing eye of the 
embodied user in front of computer monitor who interprets the ‘signal’ on the 
screen as a ‘word,’ or the pattern of coloured pixels as an ‘image’. Therefore, 
he argues, following French cyberneticist Raymond Ruyer, ‘[…] information 
always requires a frame (since framing is essential to the creation of 
information) and […] framing always originates in the meaning-constituting 
and actualizing capacity of (human) embodiment.’10 The epistemic picture 
that Hansen sketches includes information as contextualized by 
consciousness, and consciousness in turn as framed by the embodied brain. It 
is the connection between ‘consciousness’ and ‘embodiment’ that 
Nietzsche’s work critically informs. 
Two key texts for understanding Nietzsche’s somatic vision of 
consciousness and ‘digital’ or ‘logical’ encoding appear in Die fröhliche 
Wissenschaft (The Gay Science). In the passage entitled Bewußtsein (lit. 
‘being-in-a-state-of-awareness-of,’ i.e., ‘Consciousness’), he presents his 
basic conception, sketching an evolutionary portrait of the mind similar to his 
cultural-historical account of it in ancient Greece. Nietzsche views ‘mind’-
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more specifically ‘consciousness’ (Bewußtsein, Bewußtheit)-as ‘framed’ by 
‘instinct’ and the set of somatic adaptations that it represents. Thus 
‘Consciousness is the last and latest development of the organic,’ Nietzsche 
says, and so, as a recent evolutionary adaptation it is ‘least finished’ and 
‘least strong’ (das Unfertigste und Unkräftigste); it therefore gives rise to 
‘countless errors which make an animal, a man, perish sooner than 
necessary.’11 There are two basic assumptions that Nietzsche makes here: 
first, consciousness has been structurally derived from the human body in the 
course of its evolution; second, that the more fundamental features of 
evolutionary development are less prone to error-i.e., have been through a 
longer series of adaptive trials and so have been more thoroughly purged of 
misinformation through natural selection. As an evolutionary newcomer, 
consciousness is not yet a reliable feature of human existence. 
Invoking a cybernetic metaphor worthy of Gregory Bateson,12 
Nietzsche observes about consciousness: ‘If the preserving alliance of the 
instincts were not so much more powerful, if it did not serve on the whole as 
a regulator, humanity would have to perish with open eyes of its misjudging 
and its fantasizing, of its lack of thoroughness and its incredulity-in short, of 
its consciousness; or rather, without the instincts humanity would long have 
ceased to exist.’13 He goes on to argue here that consciousness and the forms 
of knowledge it produces are superfluous in comparison with instincts, even 
though it is often thought to be the ‘kernel’ of humankind. Nietzsche picks up 
this same theme later in the same book, under the heading ‘The ‘Genius of the 
Species.’’14 ‘The problem of consciousness […] first confronts us when we 
begin to realize how much we can do without it […],’ he argues. ‘All life 
would be possible without, as it were, seeing itself in the mirror.’ This 
observation raises the question, ‘To what end does consciousness exist at all 
when it is basically superfluous?’ Nietzsche’s answer, in light of his 
aforementioned evolutionary perspective, is, ‘[…] the subtlety and strength of 
consciousness is always related to a person’s (or animal’s) ability to 
communicate; and the ability to communicate, in turn, to the need to 
communicate.’ In a second metaphor, turning from the ‘mirror,’ Nietzsche 
refers to consciousness as a ‘net connecting one person with another.’  
Crucially, he goes on to argue that conscious thinking is only a minor part of 
the thinking done by our bodies: ‘the thinking that becomes conscious is only 
the smallest part of it, let’s say the shallowest, worst part.’ He goes on to 
explain the reasons for this superficiality, beyond the evolutionary lateness of 
the development mentioned above:  ‘for only conscious thinking takes place 
in words, that is, in communication symbols.’ Thus ‘[…] consciousness 
actually belongs not to man’s existence as an individual but rather to the 
community- and herd-aspects of his nature.’ Nietzsche’s assumption here, as 
he clearly reveals, is, ‘At bottom, all our actions are incomparably and utterly 
personal, unique, and boundlessly individual,’ but, the problem with 
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consciousness is, ‘as soon as we translate them [our individual actions] into 
consciousness, they no longer seem to be.’  Thus he concludes by defining a 
key feature of his philosophical outlook: ‘This is what I consider to be true 
phenomenalism and perspectivism: that due to the nature of animal 
consciousness, the world of which we can become conscious is merely a 
surface- and sign-world […] that everything which enters consciousness 
thereby becomes shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, a sign, a herd-
mark.’15 Thus in Nietzsche’s view individual embodiment constitutes the 
foundational evolutionarily established ‘genius’ of the species which, due to 
the necessary interdependence of our individual existences, becomes a ‘net’ 
binding us into a ‘community’ but only based on what is most superficial 
and, as he goes on to argue, ‘falsifying’ in our actions.16 
Both Bateson and Nietzsche thought that the massive expansion of 
the superficial power of consciousness, through what Jürgen Habermas calls 
the rationalization of the lifeworld,17 has in significant part defined 
modernity. The pervasive ‘disenchantment’ (Entzauberung) of human 
experience wrought by modern systems of economy and society could only 
be countered by a figurative reintroduction of the Chorus to advise the 
Promethean Hero that his enlightening fire might burn out of control. In 
terms of cybernetic technologies, particularly the visionary realm of 
cyberspace, recovery of the mythic lifeworld would mean the reintroduction 
of the language and constraints of the body in the virtual realm that would 
seem to transcend ‘ it’ and, in cyberpunk fiction as defined by William 
Gibson’s classic novel Neuromancer, leave it back home as ‘meat’ in earth’s 
locker.18 As in Mark Hansen’s vision of a re-embodied cyberspatial domain, 
so in Nietzsche’s view the realm of Socratic logic can be joined to and 
constrained by the Dionysian languages of the body. 
 Hansen describes the physical-virtual media installations of Jeffry 
Shaw, one of which is set in the Ruhrgebiet (a region along the Rhine river  
undergoing ‘postindustrialization’ with 13.3% unemployment), situating the 
viewer-participant in such a way that virtual imagery of the panorama is so 
closely connected with one’s actual view of it  that the virtual navigator is 
able via a joystick to make a ‘homeothetic’ transition into cyberspace while 
still retaining a sense of bodily location, comportment, ambience, and kinetic 
control grounded in natural space: ‘yielding an exhilarating indifferentiation 
between your ‘subjective’ embodied movement and the ‘objective’ 
mechanical movement of the image.’19 Nietzsche, with his characteristic 
bravado, tried a similar coadaptation with the new communication machine, 
the typewriter, on which he began to compose, in the 1880’s, comprehending 
the device through poetry: ‘The writing ball is a thing like me: of iron / And 
still easy to twist on journeys. /Patience and tact must one amply possess / 
And delicate fingers, to use us.’20 
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Returning to the cybernetic perspective of Raymond Ruyer, Hansen 
argues, ‘Shaw’s recent works give aesthetic form to the trajectory traced by 
Ruyer’s critique of cybernetics: the movement from the technical frame (the 
image) to a confrontation with its constitutive condition of possibility, the 
(human) framing functions.’21 And so, on the new stage of cyberspace 
consciousness reconstructs itself as in a digital mirror returning to the 
kinesthetic embodiment from which it once fled. Nietzsche’s way of 
reinvoking the body was to insist that he could only think well while walking. 
So, in a characteristically well grounded passage, he seems to transfigure 
himself and his readers into the living world: ‘We (godless ones) want to 
have us translated into stone and plants; we want to take walks in us when we 
stroll in these hallways and gardens.’22 
 
Notes
 
1 ‘Chorus: And what messenger might come at this speed? Clytemnestra:  
Hephaestus sending out the fiery lamp from Ida’ (author’s translation), 
Aeschylus, Agamemnon, lines 280-281. 
2 Citations of Nietzsche’s German texts are from Nietzsche, Kritische 
Studienausgabe, G Colli and M Montinari (eds), de Gruyter, Berlin, 1999, 15 
vols. Unless otherwise noted, translations are author’s. The passage cited is 
from Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (The Gay Science), Book 3, sec. 125, 
Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 3, p. 480. 
3 Die Geburt der Tragödie, ‘Versuch einer Selbstkritik’, Part 1, Kritische 
Studienausgabe, vol. 1, p. 12. 
4 Birth of Tragedy, sec. 2, Smith (trans), p. 26. 
5 Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 1, p. 57, Birth of Tragedy sec. 8, author’s 
translation, cf. Smith p. 49. 
6 Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 1, p. 879. 
7 F Nietzsche, D Smith (trans), Birth of Tragedy, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2000,  p. 21;  Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 1, pp. 27-28, Birth of 
Tragedy, sec. 1. 
8 F F Steen., Cognitive Cultural Studies, Glossary, Cogweb, 1997, 20 Sept., 
2008, Link: <http://cogweb.ucla.edu/ep/Glossary.html>. 
9 F Kittler, ‘The History of Communication Media,’ Ctheory, 30 July, 1996, 
20 September 2008, Link: <http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=45>.                 
10 M Hansen, New Philosophy for New Media, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2004, 
p. 83.  Also see Raymond Ruyer, La Cybernétique et l’origine de 
l’information,  Flammarion, Paris, 1954. 
11 Die fröhliche Wissenschaft  (The Gay Science), Book 1, sec. 11 and Book 
5, sec. 54, Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 3, pp. 382-383 and pp. 590-593. 
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12 G Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Aronson, Northvale, New Jersey, 
1987. 
13 Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of 
Songs, Josephine Nauckhoff (trans), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2001, Book I, sec. 11, p. 37. 
14 Gay Science, Nauckhoff (trans), Book V, sec. 354. 
15 Op cit., pp. 211-213, italics in original. 
16 Op cit., p. 214. 
17 J Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols., T McCarthy 
(trans), Beacon Press, Boston, 1984, vol. 1, pp. 145-148. 
18 W Gibson, Neuromancer, p. 6. 
19 M Hansen, New Philosophy, p. 47. 
20 Nachgelassene Fragmente (Unpublished Fragments), Feb.-Mar. 1882, 
Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 9,  p. 673. 
21 Hansen, New Philosophy, pp. 83-84. 
22 Gay Science, IV, sec. 280, Nauckhoff trans. Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 
3, p. 525. 
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Technoscientific Schizophrenia vs. Technoscientific 
Paranoia: Subsumption in the Schizoid Double Pull 
 
Tamar Sharon 
 
Abstract 
In line with Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of paranoia and schizophrenia as 
the effects of the fundamental organizing principles of capitalist society, Rosi 
Braidotti identifies what she calls a ‘schizoid double pull,’ the co-occurrence 
of contradictory or incompatible trends, as one of the distinctive traits of our 
age. I will present a reading of contemporary technoscience as a 
manifestation of this double pull. In this framework, the potentially 
innovative, liberatory and deterritorializing impact of new technologies, the 
‘schizophrenic’ or ‘postmodernist’ tendencies of cyborg sciences that might 
indicate a shift towards a posthuman and post-anthropocentric paradigm, 
come up against ‘paranoid’ or ‘modernist’ tendencies that seem to 
appropriate this transgressive or subversive potential. The nature of this 
double pull, I will suggest, is only paradoxical to a certain extent - it is more 
productive to theorize it within a dialectic framework. In other words, the 
schizoid/postmodern and paranoid/modern tendencies of the cyborg sciences 
are not fixed in a relation of strict opposition, rather, they coexist in a non-
exclusive manner and are ultimately subsumed in contemporary 
technoscience which is neither explicitly postmodern nor explicitly modern 
but itself collapses the border between and hybridizes these two. Thus, the 
most characteristic attribute of the cyborg sciences is not only the breaching 
of the natural/social and human/inhuman dichotomy, but the actual 
breakdown of the schizoid/paranoid dichotomy as well. Such a 
reconceptualization of contemporary technoscience can provide an 
explanation for the seeming continual containment or capture of the positive 
potential within cyborg sciences, it can act as a first step in identifying 
contemporary technoscience as the manifestation of a new configuration of 
power and thus contribute to the pressing conceptualization of new forms of 
resistance.  
 
Key Words: Technoscience, Schizophrenia, Cyborg Science, Posthuman, 
New Reproductive Technologies, GMOs, Psychopharmacology. 
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1.  Introduction 
In Anti-Oedipus, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari identify 
schizophrenia and paranoia as the fundamental organizing principles of 
capitalist society. In this framework, schizophrenia designates an absolute 
decoding of flows, unrestrained desire and the potential for freedom and 
permanent revolution. Paranoia, in contrast, designates a reactionary dynamic 
that strives to absorb subversive schizophrenic energies by reterritorializing 
and recoding desire within social organization or normalizing institutions. 
Here I would like to extend Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis to 
contemporary technoscience, through several examples of ‘cyborg sciences’ - 
those sciences that straddle the divide between the animate and the inanimate, 
the human and the inhuman and the natural and the social. 
In this reading, the ‘schizophrenic,’ or what we might call 
‘postmodernist,’ tendency of contemporary technoscience lies in the 
potentially innovative, liberatory and deterritorializing impact of new 
technologies; tendencies that might indicate a shift towards a posthumanist 
and post-anthropocentric paradigm, what some theorists see as an 
overcoming of modernity. But this schizophrenic force seems to continuously 
come up against technoscience’s ‘paranoid’ or ‘modernist’ drive that captures 
and reterritorializes any transgressive or subversive potential new 
technologies might have. Technoscience thus emerges as a manifestation of 
what Rosi Braidotti has called the ‘schizoid double pull,’1 the co-occurrence 
of contradictory or incompatible trends, which she has identified as one of the 
distinctive traits of our age. 
I would like to suggest, however, that the nature of this double pull 
is only contradictory, or paradoxical, to a certain extent. The 
schizoid/postmodern and paranoid/modern tendencies found within 
technoscience are not fixed in a relation of strict opposition, rather, they 
coexist in a non-exclusive manner and are ultimately subsumed in 
contemporary technoscience - which is neither explicitly postmodern nor 
explicitly modern but itself collapses the divide between these two. Cyborg 
sciences, as paradigmatic examples of today’s technoscience, are not only 
characterized by the breaching of the natural/social and human/inhuman 
dichotomy, then, but by the actual breakdown of the schizoid/paranoid 
dichotomy as well. 
There is always something slippery about that which is new. Its 
relative nature makes it extremely difficult to grasp in terms that do not refer 
back to that which precedes it. The reading of technoscience that I am 
proposing reconceptualizes it as a manifestation of something new, neither 
the explicit continuation of the modern paradigm, nor its overcoming in a 
postmodern paradigm, nor the prelude to this overcoming. I will begin with a 
short discussion of technoscience’s schizophrenic potential and then offer 
several examples that illustrate the compatible, rather than exclusive, 
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coexistence of schizophrenic and paranoid tendencies in several cyborg 
sciences, namely, assisted reproductive technologies, research in genetically 
modified organisms, and the life sciences and psychopharmacology. 
 
2.  The Schizophrenic Potential of Contemporary Technoscience 
In recent decades, developments in biological, cybernetic and digital 
technologies have increasingly complicated traditional notions of the natural 
and the artificial, as well as human and non-human nature. Advanced 
technologies such as genetic manipulations, organ transplantation, expanding 
cosmetic surgeries, artificial intelligence, an array of new 
psychopharmaceuticals and new reproductive technologies, are engendering 
the prospect of technologically enhanced humans, intelligent machines and 
modified nature. For many critical theorists of cyborg and posthuman 
thought, these new technologies have the potential to contest the modern 
‘paradigm’ or ‘project’.2 These theorists often see these technologies as 
contesting modernity in several ways: by challenging the binary oppositions 
that underpin Western systems of thought, by undermining the foundational 
authority of nature, and by introducing models of nonlinearity and 
indeterminacy. 
This is the liberatory and political potential that I am calling 
technoscience’s ‘schizophrenic’ or ‘postmodern’ tendency. The boundary 
transgressions characteristic of cyborg sciences - between the natural and the 
artificial, the technological and the organic, reality and non-reality - lead to 
the collapse of the model of binary, oppositional thought which is held as the 
basis of the central logic of modern domination and exclusion. Such 
breakdowns, furthermore, call into question the very notion of original, 
essentialist categories, of the idea of the genetic integrity or unity of an 
organism. In this way they also destabilize the traditional understanding of 
nature as a stable, foundational concept (as well as its historical use as a 
measuring stick for morality and normality). In this reshuffling of 
foundational terms, the category of the human is also rendered instable, to the 
point that what Elaine Graham calls the ‘ontological purity’ that has informed 
the normatively human in Western thought can no longer be sustained.3 
Indeed, contemporary technologies in which boundaries between human and 
non-human and human and environment are no longer clear, are evidence 
that the unified, autonomous and self-directed subject of classical liberal 
humanism is not only undergoing a crisis in theoretical terms, but also in 
material terms. From the posthuman body that will no longer adapt to the 
disciplining institutions of modern sovereign biopower, to the 
deterritorialized non-place of cyberspace, contemporary technoscience offers 
privileged sites of resistance,
 
and seems to herald a postmodern, posthuman 
and post-anthropocentric paradigm.4 
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3. The Paranoid Trend 
Information and biotechnologies, however, are much more than the 
sum of their potentialities. Amid the cyborgs and the transgenic creatures, the 
‘translated’ hybrids of technoscience, we find a strong paranoid tendency in 
contemporary technoscience alongside its schizophrenic potential. This 
paranoid drive includes a return of master narratives, such as technological 
mastery and scientific progress as the overriding form of human progress, or 
the transhumanist narrative of the inhuman character of the current evolution 
of the human species; it includes widespread discourses of genetic 
reductionism and biological essentialism; and it includes the continuation of 
normalizing and conservative tendencies. 
One could conceptualize this as the gap between technoscience’s 
potential and its praxis, but such a potential/praxis dichotomy is limiting. 
While it may seem like these schizophrenic and paranoid tendencies are 
incompatible they rather coexist quite peacefully. I would like to suggest that 
this coexistence implies that we are dealing with a new structure of power in 
contemporary technoscience, one that already incorporates, subsumes, and 
maybe even resolves the schizophrenic/paranoid or postmodern/modern 
opposition, one that we might tentatively call ‘post-postmodern.’ 
 
4. Compatible Schizoid and Paranoid Trends 
Let us now take a look at how technoscience incorporates and 
renders compatible schizophrenic and paranoid trends through a few material 
examples. 
 Assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) are a clear example of 
our schizoid double pull. As highly technologized forms of intervening in 
nature, they render problematic the naturalness of processes of conception 
and gestation.5 By completing the dissociation between sex and reproduction, 
these technologies also theoretically expand categories of parenthood beyond 
reproduction by means of strictly heterosexual intercourse (to gay, lesbian 
and transgender couples and single parents).6 Nature as a foundational 
concept that defines strict borders is twice unsettled here: first as ‘natural,’ 
biological reproduction, and second, as what a natural reproductive unit is. 
The broad array of partnerings and possibilities for reproduction that can 
disrupt heteropatriachal kinship structures represent the schizophrenic 
potential of ARTs. 
Most feminist theorists, however, are wary of the effects and the 
uses of ARTs.7 For these theorists, the paranoid tendency of ARTs is 
expressed by several components. Processes of isolation and visualization of 
reproductive organs assume a simultaneous ‘invisibilization’ or effacement of 
the maternal body. This displacement of organs from their lived and 
embodied context has both the effect of erasing women’s subjectivity as well 
as providing sites for increased medical control and intervention. 
Tamar Sharon 
______________________________________________________________ 
95
Furthermore, while these technologies do help challenge a naturalist notion of 
reproduction, freeing parenthood from some of its traditional biological 
restraints and from a strictly heterosexual conception of reproduction, 
medical, legal and moral rhetoric contribute to maintaining and 
institutionalizing a conservative network of reproduction and the structure of 
the nuclear family. Thus the proliferation of new opportunities for 
parenthood, no longer based on ‘biological’ or natural suitability, can be 
thwarted by selectivity that is based on social suitability. While new 
possibilities are opened up by the unsettling of ‘nature’ - here as natural 
reproduction - a simultaneous ‘renaturalization’ of reproduction can take 
place along lines of social conformity. 
A similar dynamic is at work in processes of genetically modified 
organisms. On the one hand, these processes advocate a rhetoric of nature as 
originally hybrid and constructivist, of plant identity as always having been 
the result of a dialogue between nature and culture. This assumption is what 
legitimizes from the outset the creation of transgenic breeds, and underlies 
many biotech companies’ claims that crops genetically modified in a 
laboratory need not be distinguished from plants genetically modified ‘in 
nature.’ 
But while the transferring of genes between species transgresses 
natural barriers, compromising species integrity, the boundary between the 
human and its other is left unchallenged: the nature/culture divide is re-
established in a rhetoric of regulating, improving and even perfecting nature 
for the sake of humanity. ‘Improving’ on nature, of course, requires a certain 
distance between an acting agent and what is supposed to be a passive natural 
world. It hence reinforces the modernist narrative of scientific progress as the 
domination and exploitation of nature as inanimate matter. Furthermore, this 
distinction is foundational for the creation of patenting laws, and the 
reconfiguration of organisms as human inventions in the framework of the 
paranoid drive towards commodification.8 
Many theorists have commented on the collapse or overcoming of 
the modernist illusion of the nature/culture divide. But if the reconfiguration 
of notions such as nature and culture, natural and artificial, that is taking 
place in contemporary technoscience undeniably points to a malleability of 
nature that unsettles its foundational authority (and thus expresses a 
schizophrenic tendency); it does not indicate a real collapse of the 
nature/culture binary. This relationship has not so much imploded, as it has 
been refigured, in processes where nature is in effect de-naturalized, but also, 
through a paranoid drive, re-naturalized - I am borrowing the term from 
Franklin, Lury and Stacey in their book Global Nature, Global Culture.9 
Nature is no longer the fixed guarantor of ‘natural’ borders of sex, race, 
gender and the human body. And likewise culture is no longer a wholly 
constructivist concept at a time when it is being biologically reproduced in 
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the life forms of patented property. In this framework the authority of nature 
is undermined but it is also reincarnated. This process does not contain the 
schizophrenic potential of a non-essentialist notion of nature, but incorporates 
it and thrives on it. 
The schizophrenic or postmodernist and paranoid or modernist lines 
of escape and capture merge in the life sciences as well. Molecular biology 
today offers an understanding of human life at the molecular level, a level at 
which everything appears intelligible and open to calculated intervention and 
control, where entities can be identified, isolated, manipulated and 
recombined. This ‘molecularization of life,’ and the geneticization of human 
identity that accompanies it, is clearly an expression of the paranoid or 
modernist pole of our schizoid double pull. But while it reduces aspects of 
human conduct and identity to biology, it simultaneously unsettles the notion 
of nature that modern biology was traditionally based on. Here is where the 
schizophrenic tendency of the life sciences manifests itself. Molecularized 
nature is malleable nature. In the understanding of health and disease, 
normality and pathology that is advanced by contemporary biosciences, one’s 
identity is reduced to biology, yes, but biology is always open to intervention 
- and amenable to choice.10 This is to say that the new life sciences, while 
advancing a discourse of determinism because, in effect, individuals are seen 
as being in great part determined by their biological makeup, see this 
determinism as a starting point rather than an end point, as opening up, to 
quote Nicolas Rose, ‘a space of uncertainty, not certainty,’ where ‘biology is 
not destiny but opportunity.’11 
 Psychopharmacology and SSRIs (serotonin selective reuptake 
inhibitors) like Prozac are a case in point. Based on a materialist 
understanding of mental disorders and by extension an understanding of 
notions such as mood and personality as informed by a biological 
infrastructure, they offer a rhetoric that reduces personhood to biology. As in 
the life sciences, here biology - read nature - is also associated with 
malleability, and determinism also opens up pathways to choice; yet the 
notion of authenticity, in the sense of an ‘authentic’ or ‘real’ self, is 
interestingly enough not disrupted by the destabilizaiton of the notion of 
nature (biology).12 Such psychiatric drugs can promise a return to, or a 
restoration of, a ‘real self’ - rather than the creation of a ‘new self’ - 
specifically because biochemical interventions can no longer be considered 
artificial once nature has been dislocated. Technological interventions that 
assist one in becoming one’s ‘true’ or ‘real’ self are thus not seen as tainting 
that authenticity.13 In the reshuffling of foundational terms that occurs in 
contemporary technoscience, some essences remain intact even while the 
very notion of essence is confused. 
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5. Conclusion 
I have attempted to present technoscience as a manifestation of the 
schizoid double pull, informed by the coexistence of schizophrenic or 
postmodernist and paranoid or modernist trends. Technoscience’s 
schizophrenic tendencies challenge the hierarchical binary oppositions and 
essentialisms that underpin Western systems of meaning and the liberal 
humanist subject, and they undermine the foundational authority of nature. At 
first glance this schizophrenic potential seems to be contained or repressed by 
technoscience’s paranoid tendencies: discourses of genetic reductionism and 
determinism, the renaturalisation of nature, the increasing potential for 
normative, discursive control and conformism. The scope of this paper only 
allowed me to present several, brief examples of this technoscientific double 
pull. But its expressions are abundant, in fields as various as complexity 
thinking in biology - where nonlinear, emergent and dynamic systems exist 
alongside reductionism, a persistent expectation of control and the search for 
a new kind of causality - and cyberspace - where the potential to challenge 
unitary identity formation coexists alongside the continuation of a Cartesian 
mind/body dualism. 
But conceptualizing the schizoid double pull as a paradox prevents 
us from grasping the real dynamic at work in contemporary technoscience, 
where schizophrenic/postmodernist and paranoid/modernist tendencies are 
compatible and often work together. It is only once we recognize this that we 
can begin to conceive of technoscience not as a manifestation of the 
continuation of the modern paradigm, or as a clear break with modernity in 
the form of a postmodern paradigm, but as something that emerges and 
ultimately transcends the opposition between these two. 
 
Notes
 
1 R Braidotti, Transpositions, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006. 
2 I am referring to ‘cyborgologists’ and ‘critical posthumanists’ such as Neil 
Badmington, Anne Balsamo, Elaine L Graham, Chris Hables Gray, Judith 
Halberstam, Donna J. Haraway, Katherine Hayles and Catherine Walbdy 
(this list is not exhaustive). As opposed to ‘liberal posthumanists’ or 
transhumanists, such as Nick Bostrom, James Hughes, Ray Kurzweil or 
Marvin Minsky. 
3 E L Graham, Representations of the Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens and 
Others in Popular Culture, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 
2002. 
4 In their discussion on how the ‘new barbarians’ can counter Empire, for 
example, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri claim, ‘[t]he will to be against 
needs a body that is incapable of adapting to family life, to factory discipline, 
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to the regulations of a traditional sex life, and so forth.’ M Hardt and A 
Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000, p. 216. 
Also, a number of critical theorists stress the positive and empowering impact 
of new virtual, artificial environments, and their potential to challenge power 
formations and unitary identity formation. See also, for example, N K Hayles, 
‘The Seductions of Cyberspace’ in V Conley (ed), Rethinking Technologies, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1993; A Kroker and M 
Weinstein, ‘The Hyper-Texted Body, or Nietzsche Gets a Modem’ in 
ctheory. November1994, viewed on 21 January 2006, Link: 
<http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=144>; S Plant, ‘The Future Looms: 
Weaving Women and Cybernetics’ in M Featherstone and R Burrows (eds), 
Cyberspace/Cyberbodies/Cyberpunk: Cultures of Technological 
Embodiment, Sage Publications, London, 1995, pp. 45-64; M Poster, ‘The 
Information Age’. Comparative Literature Studies, vol. 41, issue 3, 2004, pp. 
317-334; S Stone, ‘Split Subjects, Not Atoms; or How I Fell in Love with My 
Prosthesis’ in G H Gray (ed), The Cyborg Handbook, Routledge, NY, 1995; 
and S Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet, Simon & 
Schuster, NY, 1995. 
5 M Strathern, Reproducing the Future: Essays on Anthropology, Kinship and 
the New Reproductive Technologies, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1992. 
6 Graham, op. cit. 
7 See for example, A Balsamo, Technologies of the Gendered Body: Reading 
Cyborg Women, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1996; R 
Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in 
Contemporary Feminist Theory, Columbia University Press, New York, 
1994; H Rose, Love, Power and Knowledge: Towards a Feminist 
Transformation of the Sciences, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994; M Shildrick, 
Leaky Bodies and Boundaries: Feminism, Postmodernism and (Bio)Ethics, 
Routledge, London, 1997; C Stabile Feminism and the Technological Fix, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1994; and J Wajcman, Feminism 
Confronts Technology, Penn State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1991. 
8 For a good discussion on GMOs and patenting laws, see D Haraway, 
Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium. FemaleMan©_Meets_Oncomouse™: 
Feminism and Technoscience, Routledge, New York, 1997, and V Shiva, 
Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge, South End Press, Boston, 
1997. 
9 S Franklin, C Lury and J Stacey (eds), Global Nature, Global Culture, 
SAGE, London, 2000. 
10 Both Mariam Fraser and Nicholas Rose discuss this ‘opening up’ of 
biology. See M Fraser ‘The Nature of Prozac’. History of the Human 
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Sciences, vol. 14, issue 3, 2001, pp. 56-84, and N Rose, The Politics of Life 
Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2007. 
11 Rose, op. cit., p. 52,51.  
12 Patients prescribed Prozac often speak of ‘being themselves again,’ while 
taking it, or ‘no longer themselves’ off it, of having located a self that is 
‘true,’ ‘normal,’ or ‘whole.’ See P Kramer, Listening to Prozac: A 
Psychiatrist Explores Antidepressant Drugs and the Remaking of the Self, 
Penguin, New York, 1993. Rose, op. cit., also notes that psychiatric drugs 
promise a return to a ‘real self’ rather than the creation of a ‘new self.’  
13 This is similar to the dynamic at work in sex conversion technologies: 
while the transsexual subject subscribes to an essential genderized self that 
was ‘born into the wrong body,’ technical intervention is necessary in order 
to give that authentic self full expression. 
 
Bibliography 
 
Balsamo, A., Technologies of the Gendered Body: Reading Cyborg Women. 
Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1996. 
 
Braidotti, R., Transpositions. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006. 
 
Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.  
M.  Seem, H. R. Lane and R. Hurley (transl). Viking Press, New York, 1977. 
 
Graham, E. L., Representations of the Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens and 
Others in Popular Culture. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 
2002. 
 
Gray, C. H. (ed), The Cyborg Handbook. Routledge, New York, 1995. 
 
Haraway, D., ‘A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-
Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century’, in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: 
The Reinvention of Nature. Routledge, New York, 1991, pp. 149-181. 
 
Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium: FemaleMan©_Meets_Oncomouse™: 
Feminism and Technoscience. Routledge, New York, 1997. 
 
Hardt, M. and A. Negri, Empire. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 
2000. 
 
Technoscientific Schizophrenia vs. Technoscientific Paranoia 
______________________________________________________________ 
100
 
Hayles, K., ‘The Seductions of Cyberspace’, in Rethinking Technologies. V.  
Conley (ed), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1993, pp. 173-190.  
 
———, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature and Informatics. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999.  
 
Kramer, P., Listening to Prozac: A Psychiatrist Explores Antidepressant 
Drugs and the Remaking of the Self. Penguin, New York, 1993. 
 
Kroker, A. and M. Weinstein, ‘The Hyper-Texted Body, or Nietzsche Gets a 
Modem’, in CTheory, 1994, viewed on 21 January 2006, 
<http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=144>.  
 
Plant, S., ‘The Future Looms: Weaving Women and Cybernetics’, in 
Cyberspace/Cyberbodies/Cyberpunk: Cultures of Technological 
Embodiment. M. Featherstone and R. Burrows (eds), Sage Publications, 
London, 1995, pp. 45-64.  
 
Poster, M., ‘The Information Empire’, in Comparative Literature Studies, 
vol. 41 (3), 2004, pp. 317-334.  
 
Stone, S., ‘Split Subjects, Not Atoms; or How I Fell in Love with My 
Prosthesis’, in The Cyborg Handbook. C. H. Gray (ed), Routledge, New 
York, 1995, pp. 393-406.  
 
Turkle, S., Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet. Simon & 
Schuster, New York, 1995.  
 
Waldby, C., The Visible Human Project: Informatic Bodies and Posthuman 
Medicine. Routledge, London and New York, 2000. 
 
Tamar Sharon is a PhD candidate in the faculty for Interdisciplinary Studies 
at Bar Ilan University, Israel. Her research deals with varying 
conceptualizations of the posthuman in contemporary thought and its 
manifestations in technoscience. 
  
Part VI 
 
The Literature of Cyberspace
  
  
Gender Resistance: Interrogating the Punk in Cyberpunk 
 
Katherine Harrison 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, I examine two cyberpunk texts to assess whether their apparent 
resistance to mainstream society includes resistance to gender stereotypes. 
Writing from a feminist perspective, I suggest that much of the disruptive 
potential of this genre is derived from its integration of ‘punk’ as a discourse 
or practice of resistance to social ‘norms’.  I focus on Candas Jane Dorsey’s 
short story ‘(Learning About) Machine Sex’ and Neal Stephenson’s novel 
Snow Crash. I have deliberately chosen texts whose relationship with first-
wave cyberpunk is complicated either by an explicitly feminist standpoint 
(Dorsey) or a generational distance (Stephenson), in order to assess whether 
these authors avoid or succumb to the same critiques levelled at early 
cyberpunk about gender representation. I am concerned with who and what 
these texts are resisting, and how this resistance is performed. This line of 
enquiry, however, also demands a closer examination of the positive 
connotations attached to ‘resistance’ in cyberpunk, and, consequently, to ask 
whose interests are not represented. To do this, I use the disruptive 
associations of ‘punk’ as a tool, looking not only at particular themes of 
resistance within the text, but also how the authors’ innovative stylistic 
manoeuvres resist genre conventions.  
 
Key Words: Gender, Cyberpunk, Dorsey, Stephenson, Technology, Punk. 
 
***** 
 
Cyberpunk - a subgenre of science fiction - mixes up the 
technophilia of cyberculture with the anti-establishment attitude of punk, 
resulting in a number of recognisable characteristics in its texts, including 
‘hybrid’ identities, dystopian futures, and a focus on technology. This focus 
often upsets any easy distinction between human and machine, while its 
alternative (cyborgian) identities perhaps offer new paradigms for thinking 
about gender.1 My premise in this paper is that the disruptive potential of this 
distinctive subgenre is derived from its adoption of ‘punk’ as a discourse or 
practice of resistance to social ‘norms’. In this paper I am going to use the 
well-documented focus within science fiction on language and style to 
interrogate the ‘punk’ in ‘cyberpunk’,2 and to ask to what extent it is effective 
as a means of resisting normative models of technology and gender. To do 
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this, I use close textual analysis of two cyberpunk texts: Snow Crash by Neal 
Stephenson and ‘(Learning About) Machine Sex’ by Candas Jane Dorsey. 
What do these texts offer which is different from better known 
cyberpunk texts, such as William Gibson’s Neuromancer? Neuromancer 
epitomises many features of the genre, its narrative structured around a plot 
to remove the electronic restraints that prevent an Artificial Intelligence from 
functioning independently of its human owner. The main protagonists are a 
male hacker called Case, and a ‘razorgirl’ (a technologically-enhanced hired 
assassin) called Molly. It uses a number of tropes that associate it with 
popular perceptions of punk, including a ‘DIY’ approach to technology, 
resistance to authority, street slang and tribal dress codes. The narrative raises 
many of the hopes and fears associated with new technologies, from the 
euphoria of online disembodiment to the possibilities for bodily enhancement 
through medical technology. It also highlights some of the problematic 
aspects of the genre in terms of gender representation. 
Wendy Wahl, writing in ‘Bodies and Technologies: Dora, 
Neuromancer, and Strategies of Resistance’, notes that, ‘Case doesn’t seem 
to have a body unless he is inside Molly, either in sex or sim/stim […] Molly 
is the body. Case can jack out any time.’3 More recently, June Deery, in her 
comparison of Gibson’s and Marge Piercy’s work, was equally damning 
when she suggested that in his writing we see ‘the world of macho, 
hardboiled console cowboys on the wild frontier, mercenary loners who try to 
outmaneuver each other with the latest weaponry and gadgetry.’4 The 
unproblematised connection between man and mind, and woman and body, 
together with the ‘macho’ discourse of the frontier may limit the potential of 
Gibson’s work when considering it in relation to resistance to gender norms. 
The texts by Stephenson and Dorsey, however, perhaps offer a new twist on 
the genre; Stephenson’s novel is considered ‘second-generation’ cyberpunk, 
while Dorsey’s short story is explicitly billed as a feminist parody of 
cyberpunk. Does this distance from classic, ‘first-wave’ cyberpunk produce 
more challenging gender representations? 
Stephenson’s novel, Snow Crash, tells the story of a computer 
hacker called Hiro Protagonist and Y. T., a skateboard courier.5 Set in a 
recognisable future ‘America’, Stephenson’s novel brings together perennial 
cyberpunk themes such as life online with contemporary social anxieties 
about bodily boundaries, religious fundamentalism, migration and global 
corporatisation. The plot of the novel is centred on Hiro and Y. T. uncovering 
a plot to kill hackers using a new virus called ‘snow crash’. Y. T. and Hiro 
track the source of ‘snow crash’ over the course of the novel, with the action 
slipping easily between online and offline action. 
In the short story, ‘(Learning About) Machine Sex’,6 Dorsey’s 
protagonist is a programmer called Angel who designs an Artificial 
Intelligence. Disillusioned when the small company for which she works is 
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sold to a larger corporation, Angel responds by designing a program called 
‘Machine Sex’. This is based on the idea that orgasm can be programmed and 
the text traces Angel’s development of the hardware she dubs the 
‘Mannboard’ and accompanying software (‘Machine Sex’); this hardware-
software combination results in a piece of equipment with touch pads through 
which the user is effectively ‘programmed’ to orgasm. 
In both texts, the protagonists are portrayed as not wishing to ascribe 
to society’s norms, through anti-corporate attitudes as well as a number of 
other aesthetic cues such as dress or behaviour. This paper will be 
particularly concerned with examining how this ‘resistance’ operates 
specifically in relation to gender, using ‘punk’ as a way in to do this. I open 
by interrogating the term ‘punk’ before moving on to an examination of the 
texts themselves. 
 
1. Interrogating ‘Punk’ 
Cyberpunk explicitly sets out to upset preconceived notions of 
identity and ‘a good life’, by proffering different values that highlight 
alternative ways of being.7 Apart from its obvious status as part of the title of 
the genre in question (cyber-punk), the anarchic disrespect for authority 
associated with the punk ethos also seems to echo certain elements of 
feminist resistance to patriarchy in its ferocity and challenge to social norms.8 
Popularised in the 1970s by bands such as the ‘Sex Pistols’, punk emerged as 
a lifestyle, a commodity – music, dress and behaviours that were designed to 
shock, to upset norms, as well as a different approach to aesthetics. Then, in 
the 1980s, the anti-establishment attitude of punk met the Internet. 
When Gibson wrote Neuromancer on a typewriter in the early 
1980s, computers were technologies of which people were aware. However, 
they were still several years away from being freely available and a regular 
fixture in the ‘average’ home. This distance from lived reality resulted in 
heightened fears and expectations of what this new technology would offer, 
and cyberpunk is the result of the meeting of this hyperimaginative response 
to new technologies (and the Internet in particular) and the anti-establishment 
approach of punk. Locating this subgenre chronologically and culturally is 
important when considering what ‘resistance’ might mean in this particular 
context. In particular, these texts reflect concerns with corporatisation as well 
as an aesthetic (bodily) resistance to the mainstream. 
Making visible socio-historical contexts helps when considering 
whose interests are not recognised by the form that resistance takes. In his 
article, ‘L.A.’s ‘White Minority’: Punk and the Contradictions of Self-
Marginalization’,9 Daniel S. Traber draws attention to the way in which race 
was used by the L.A. punks as a way for white punks to distinguish 
themselves from the ‘privileged white youth.’10 However, Traber is keen to 
stress that these positionings implicitly reinforce the idea of the middle-class, 
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white male as the ‘norm’ in a move that undermines some of the radical 
potential of punk: ‘this subculture claims to desire dissonance and 
destabilization, but it depends on boundaries and regulatory fictions staying 
in place to define itself as oppositional.’11 
Bearing this in mind, it is also worth considering how women have 
been located in relationship to the punk movement. Writing in ‘‘A little too 
ironic’: The Appropriation and Packaging of Riot Grrrl Politics by 
Mainstream Female Musicians’, Kristen Schilt traces the history of the ‘riot 
grrrl’ movement from its punk founding mothers, through the era of bands 
like Bikini Kill, to mainstream ‘angry’ female musicians such as Alanis 
Morrisette.  Schilt notes the connection between the ‘founding women’12 of 
riot grrrl and punk, explicitly framing punk as ‘parent’ discourse, one which 
facilitates and validates Riot Grrrl messages. However, through analysis of 
lyrics from female bands and artists, Schilt shows how the original punk 
messages of the Riot Grrrl movement moved into mainstream popular 
culture, finally emerging in the diluted form of ‘The Spice Girls’ and ‘Girl 
Power’. In light of this, her conclusion is unsurprisingly gloomy, noting that 
while ‘the anger towards patriarchy is present, the discussion of sexual abuse, 
and even acknowledgement of female desire,’13 positive action for women 
seems to have got lost en route. 
With these concerns about ‘punk’, and by extension cyberpunk, in 
mind, I have deliberately chosen texts which are not ‘straightforward’ first-
wave cyberpunk narratives. While both have relationships with the original 
cyberpunks, these are complicated either by a feminist perspective (Dorsey) 
or a generational distance (Stephenson). Can Dorsey and Stephenson avoid 
these traps outlined by Traber and Schilt, and release the ‘resistance’ to 
gender norms in their texts?  In the following sections, I consider what the 
texts are resisting, how this is done and if it can be considered successful. 
 
2. Snow Crash 
In Stephenson’s novel, Snow Crash, he depicts the ultimate 
dystopian future society, a mindless America in which everything has 
become the property of a company, where there are no laws and the Mafia is 
a recognised business. Hiro Protagonist, one of the two main protagonists in 
Snow Crash, is announced to the reader through his business card which dubs 
him ‘Last of the freelance hackers. Greatest sword fighter in the world.’14 
Hiro’s ‘cool’ cyberpunk persona is undercut, however, by his mundane job 
delivering pizza. Stephenson heightens the incongruity between Hiro’s two 
identities by juxtaposing a hyped rhetorical style with the ordinariness of 
Hiro’s job. The book opens with a description of Hiro on a night at work, 
during which he is referred to as ‘The Deliverator’. This description lasts 
several pages. However, it is only on the third page that the reader actually 
discovers that the job is pizza delivery. The two pages prior to that are 
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hyperbolic descriptions of his car, uniform and gun, as the opening sentences 
demonstrate: ‘(t)he Deliverator belongs to an elite order, a hallowed 
subcategory. He’s got esprit up to here.’15 Deliberately playing with 
recognisable styles from action and adventure narratives, Stephenson 
undermines the trappings of cyberpunk machismo in just a few lines. 
The other central character in Snow Crash is a teenage girl called Y. 
T. She lives with her mother but leads a ‘double life’ as a skateboard courier, 
pausing at her local McDonalds on the way home to change her courier 
uniform for a skirt and blouse with a ‘delicate floral print.’16 Independent and 
strong-willed, she rarely goes online, and does not carry a weapon. Through 
their affiliations to the hackers and the skateboarders, Hiro and Y. T. are 
portrayed as existing more comfortably outside ‘accepted’ society, and this is 
reflected in their dress and slang. The lifestyle choices of Y. T. and Hiro 
deliberately contrast with the mindless, corporate suburban future America 
that Stephenson portrays. 
However, we need to ask - following Traber - whether this contrast 
actually reinforces boundaries, and, if so, what other ‘regulatory fictions’ 
remain in place in Stephenson’s novel? Larry McCaffery’s introduction to the 
cyberpunk anthology, Storming the Reality Studio, provides a helpful starting 
point for investigating this. In the following extract, he describes the image 
projected by the early cyberpunk authors: 
 
Decked out in mirrorshades and leather jackets, the 
cyberpunks projected an image of confrontational ‘reality 
hacker’ artists who were armed, dangerous, and jacked into 
(but not under the thumb of) the Now and the New.17 
 
Although not directly identified as male in the quotation above, the 
cyberpunk is implicitly gendered through references to typically male figures 
such as the biker, the hacker and the criminal. Broader cultural associations 
between aggression and masculinity also contribute to this not-so-subtle 
gendering of the (cyber)punk. 
In Snow Crash, this connection is played out in various ways. Hiro’s 
highly developed technical skills as hacker and developer - and his role in the 
narrative as detective and decoder of the plot - seem to associate him with 
mental abilities. Any mentions of his body are connected primarily with 
fighting or driving, and whilst Stephenson clearly shows himself capable of 
parodying dominant discourses in these descriptions (as demonstrated in the 
extract about ‘the Deliverator’), his treatment is not consistently self-aware 
when doing so. For example, in the stages leading up to the final sequence 
Hiro buys a motorbike, and when seated on the bike in his new motorcycling 
clothes he is described as looking like ‘one bad motherfucker.’18 With no 
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apparent irony and in just a few lines, Stephenson thus returns Hiro to the 
mould of earlier cyberpunks. 
Like many female figures in cyberpunk, Y.T. is positioned as 
independent and strong-willed. However, she suffers from the same lack of 
attention to her mental abilities and absence of online persona as earlier 
female figures in this genre. Y. T.’s body is usually mentioned in relation to 
her skateboarding outfits, or her sexual encounters with her courier boyfriend 
and the assassin, Raven. In the passages with Raven she is portrayed as being 
physically and sexually powerless. Stephenson’s reliance on stock scenarios 
such as Y. T.’s admiration of Hiro, her lack of weapons, and the references to 
her physicality and sexuality results in a disappointingly stereotyped 
portrayal. Thus while Stephenson’s novel initially appears to be a self-aware 
updating of the cyberpunk genre seen in his adaptation of the rhetorical style 
of earlier texts and his positioning of Hiro and Y. T. as distanced from 
mainstream/corporate culture, his gendering of the characters falls back on 
stock positions more in keeping with texts such as Gibson’s. 
 
3. ‘(Learning About) Machine Sex’ 
The integration of punk ethics into a technological or futuristic 
framework often results in criticism of corporate concerns becoming a 
fundamental part of the cyberpunk ethos. This anti-establishment spirit is 
very much in keeping with both the tone and the concerns of cyberpunk 
fiction, as can be seen in Dorsey’s short story, ‘(Learning About) Machine 
Sex’. The response of the main protagonist, Angel, to the buy-out of the 
small, start-up, company for which she works is perhaps typical of cyberpunk 
positioning: 
 
‘Had a big day,’ he said. 
‘Yeah?’ 
‘Big deal went through.’ 
‘Yeah?’ 
‘Yeah, I sold the company.’ 
‘You what?’ Reflexively moving herself so that none of her 
body touched his. 
‘Northern. I put it to Bronfmann. Megabucks.’ 
‘Are you joking?’ but she saw he was not. ‘You didn’t, I 
didn’t…Northern’s our company.’19 
 
Angel’s instinctive response here reflects the punk mistrust of authority and 
the hacker commitment to free access to software. Angel is identified from 
early in the story as being resistant to societal norms, as demonstrated by 
both her appearance and her ability to succeed in the male-dominated hacker 
world: ‘they say a hacker’s burned out before he’s twenty-one. Note the 
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pronoun: he. Not many young women in that heady realm of the chip.’20 The 
cynicism and self-awareness of the narrator’s voice, combined with Angel’s 
attitude marks this text as being as much ‘punk’ as it is ‘cyberpunk’. Angel is 
fiercely resistant to corporatisation of her creative programming work. Her 
attitude disrupts the male-dominated corporate world and simultaneously 
returns the technology to the hands of the individual.21 Angel engages in 
behaviours which she recognises as being outside the norm, and which are 
only tolerated by her employer because of her talent with computers. 
Angel’s chosen aesthetic (‘sweaty-smelling, disheveled, anorectic-
looking waif’22) disrupts the image of the desirable techno-body seen in 
earlier cyberpunk, while her choice of ‘uniform’ again marks her distance 
from the corporate world and her membership of alternative culture. Thus, 
Dorsey positions Angel as closer to ‘punk’ than ‘cyberpunk’ in her bodily 
aesthetics. Dorsey’s treatment of Angel aptly captures the ambiguity of the 
position of women cyberpunks - Angel is intelligent, talented and resistant to 
absorption into the corporate sphere. However, whilst a strong, independent 
character, she is riven by betrayals and marked by her chosen forms of escape 
into prostitution and drugs. Dorsey is equally ambivalent about ‘sexy’ 
technologies, simultaneously drawing Angel herself as a kind of machine, 
and associating meaningless, ‘programmable’ sex with male desire. 
 ‘(Learning About) Machine Sex’ thus resists the normative gender 
representations seen in this subgenre by using self-aware commentary on, or 
parody of, the stereotypes associated with cyberpunk. In Angel, Dorsey has 
created a character who marks a distinct aesthetic departure from the glossy 
female figures of earlier cyberpunk, and who, in her attitude to machines, 
relishes the intellectual challenge whilst avoiding blissful disembodiment. 
Dorsey’s resistance to these stock figures and themes of cyberpunk, however, 
goes beyond her portrayal of Angel. Her prose style is sparse and notable for 
its avoidance of technophilic rhetoric, while the mocking tone of the 
narrator’s voice undermines the euphoric rhetoric of early cyberpunk, playing 
with the accepted tropes. 
Dorsey’s style has important implications for the gendering of 
cyberpunk by parodying the ‘sexy’ technologies of novels such as 
Neuromancer, and particularly their techno-sexualisation of the female body. 
Dorsey thus turns the genre conventions back on themselves to resist gender 
stereotypes, drawing on typical modes of punk resistance to help her achieve 
this. Her use of multiple discourses and a circular narrative breaks with 
linear, chronological, storytelling and prevents emergence of a single, stable, 
reading of the text. This disruptive style ‘hooks’ the reader and, for me at 
least, led to constant rereading as I tried and failed to decipher the text. If 
cyberpunk positioned itself as the Other to corporate America, then Dorsey 
seems to resist acquiescence to either corporate norms or the superficial 
otherness of cyberpunk. 
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4. Conclusion 
This genre’s moniker aptly reflects its interest in technology and 
also the anti-establishment attitudes of its characters and themes. ‘Punk’ can 
be seen here as a kind of short-hand for all that is alternative or disruptive. 
However, as Traber highlights in the article I discussed earlier, this 
positioning of punk as a somehow more ‘genuine’ lifestyle assumes an Other: 
‘(p)unks unconsciously reinforce the dominant culture rather than escape it 
because their turn to the sub-urban reaffirms the negative stereotypes used in 
the center to define this space and its population.’23 I would suggest that 
similar limitations can also apply in cyberpunk. The potential for resistance 
suggested by Stephenson’s representation of big business and adaptation of 
existing genre conventions, for example, is limited by the often stereotypical 
gender representations. Punk thus functions as a glossy surface which 
obscures the ongoing reproduction of oppositions and hierarchies. 
If searching for challenging figures or figurations, however, 
Dorsey’s short story might be a more successful example of resistance. 
Dorsey’s protagonist, Angel, is not offered as role model, rather her own 
existence, replete with dissonances and tensions, poses questions to the 
reader about how and where to situate themselves, how to read the text, and 
what to conclude. In terms of resistance, this is a new kind of punk. ‘Punk’ 
here is not only in the choice of words, or the actions and dress of the 
protagonists, it can also consist on another level again where the author 
deliberately baits the reader, refusing any easy answer. Dorsey exploits the 
sexualised rhetoric of technology often seen in early cyberpunk, resulting in 
an ironic, open-ended narrative that challenges both gender and genre norms.   
 
Notes
 
1 D J Haraway, ‘A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-
Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century’, in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: 
The Reinvention of Nature, Free Association Books, London, 1991, p. 178. 
2 For example, S R Delany, The Jewel-Hinged Jaw: Notes on the Language 
of Science Fiction, Dragon Press, New York, 1977. 
3 W Wahl, ‘Bodies and Technologies: Dora, Neuromancer, and Strategies of 
Resistance’. Postmodern Culture, vol. 3, issue 2, January 1993, viewed on 28 
April 2008, Link: 
 <http://muse.uq.edu.au/journals/postmodern_culture/v003/3.2wahl.html>   
4 J Deery, ‘The Biopolitics of Cyberspace: Piercy Hacks Gibson’, in Future 
Females, The New Generation: New Voices and Velocities in Feminist 
Science Fiction Criticism, M. S. Barr (ed), Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 
Boulder, New York and Oxford, 2000, p. 91. 
5 N Stephenson, Snow Crash, Bantam Dell, New York, 1993. 
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6 In a collection of Dorsey’s short stories titled Machine Sex and Other 
Stories, The Women’s Press, London, 1990, pp. 76-97. 
7 My use of scare quotes here is a reference to how the parent genre of punk 
questioned social norms and aspirations by ‘celebrating ugliness in contrast 
to beauty, depression instead of joy, the sordid over the morally approved’, 
from D S Traber, ‘L. A.’s ‘White Minority’: Punk and the Contradictions of 
Self-Marginalization’. Cultural Critique, vol. 48, Spring 2001, p. 34. 
8 For example, the Wikipedia outline of punk ideology reads: ‘Common punk 
ethics include a radical rejection of conformity, the DIY (Do It Yourself) 
ethic, direct action for political change, and not selling out to mainstream 
interests for personal gain.’ Viewed 24 August 2006, Link: 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Punk_subculture&printable=yes 
>. All of these ethics could easily apply to feminism, as the 2006 CFP for the 
‘D.I.Y. for Girls conference’ posted by the National Women’s Studies 
Association demonstrates. 
9  Traber, pp. 30-64. 
10 ibid, p. 33. 
11 ibid, p. 32. 
12 K Schilt, ‘‘A little too ironic’: The Appropriation and Packaging of Riot 
Grrrl Politics by Mainstream Female Musicians’, Popular Music and Society, 
vol. 26, issue 1, 2003, p.6. 
13 ibid, p.14. 
14 Stephenson, p. 17. 
15 ibid, p .1. 
16 ibid, p. 101. 
17 L McCaffery, ‘Introduction: The Desert of the Real’, in Storming the 
Reality Studio: A Casebook of Cyberpunk and Postmodern Fiction,  L. 
McCaffery (ed), Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1991, p. 13. 
18 Stephenson, p. 271. 
19 Dorsey, p. 84. 
20 ibid, p. 79. 
21 See Jenny Wolmark on disruptive figures, in ‘Staying with the Body: 
Narratives of the Posthuman in Contemporary Science Fiction’ in Edging 
into the Future: Science Fiction and Contemporary Cultural Transformation, 
Veronica Hollinger and Joan Gordon (eds), University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia, 2002, p. 79. 
22 Dorsey, p. 81. 
23 Traber, p. 31. 
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Cyber-Shamanism as a Theory of Simulacra in Ygdrasil, a 
Novel by Jorge Baradit 
 
Juan Ignacio Munoz 
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Abstract 
In this paper I stu dy the representation of virtuality and t rauma in Ygdrasil 
(2005), a n ovel by Chilean au thor Jorge  Bara dit. I  consider v irtuality t o 
consist of a series of c ontemporary re presentations o f computer sc ience 
innovations. Virtuality further entails a cultural code of mediation (simulacra) 
and a particular conception of space (virtual space). I examine the different 
types of virtuality that contribute to the formulation of a Chilean Cyberpunk. 
Through the analysis of Ygdrasil, I d etermine wh ich el ements are b est 
adapted to the novel and the Latin American cultural context. 
 
Key Words: Cyberpunk Literature, Virtuality, Latin America Culture. 
 
***** 
 
1.           Introduction 
As p ointed o ut in  the ed ition of Science Fiction Studies d edicated to La tin 
American science fiction, Jorge Baradit’s Ygdrasil (2005) has made it s mark 
on Chilean s cience f iction.1 Ygdrasil completes the  C hilean Cype rpunk 
project, w hich can be  said t o ha ve begun w ith t he n ovel by D iego Muñoz 
Valenzuela, Flores para un cyborg (1997) [‘Flowers for a Cyborg’] , and the 
novella by Darío Oses, El Virus Baco (2002) [The Bacchus Virus]. Muñoz 
Valenzuela a pproaches a cy berpunk se nsibility through a com bination o f 
detective an d sci ence fictions. In his no vel, a  p olitical exile brought it  to  
Chile an android to commit a series of crimes against the former members of 
the dictatorship who, despite the fact that a new democratic government has 
been instated, still hold political and economic power.  The novella by Darío 
Oses, El Virus Baco presents a C hilean cit y p reparing it self fo r an  
international computer technology s how. H owever, the city de scends in to 
total chaos, due to bad weather, an il lness among the staff, and a  computer 
virus that takes on apocalyptic dimensions when it begins to change the laws 
of the physical world.  The  protagonist, a somewhat lazy young man, leaves 
to search out his older brother, whom he suspects is the p erson responsible, 
not onl y fo r the virus, but fo r its p ropagation.  When the vi rus b egins to 
attack   financial institutions and redistribute the money amongst the poor, the 
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novella undertakes the task of describing the consequences that arise from 
idealism and when reality yields to utopian impulses. 
While the Bacchus virus succeeds in momentarily reversing the 
world’s social order, the android in Flores para un Cybrog becomes an 
ethical model in the eyes of his creator, who is sceptical of political 
tendencies. Despite this, the creator dichotomises society between those who 
uphold the law and lawbreakers, in the context of the post-dictatorship and of 
the politics of reconciliation.2 The dichotomies presented in Flores para un 
Cyborg and El Virus Baco reflect the problems facing Chilean society in the 
1990s. After the return of democracy in 1990, a coalition of parties upholding 
different political tendencies has had to share power and manage the blow 
sustained by the 1993 Retting Report. The report publicises the crimes and 
violations against human rights incurred during the dictatorship of Augusto 
Pinochet3, who, until his 1998 London arrest, enjoyed political amnesty and 
retained his positions as both commander in chief of the armed forces and 
lifetime senator (senador vitalicio). 
Ygdrasil first appears during the final years of Pinochet’s life, a 
period of Chilean history still marked by scandals and legal battles in an 
attempt to bring him to trial, and one that would witness the succession of 
two socialist governments (Ricardo Lagos 2000-2006 and Michelle Bachelet 
2006-present). As such, the novel surpasses the political dichotomization and 
utopian reversal presented in Muñoz Valenzuela’s and Oses’s works. The 
main character, Mariana, a 36 year old Chilean and drug addicted hit-woman, 
is abducted from the slums of Puebla, Mexico, by that country’s government 
to investigate a strange technology that was illegally used on its national soil. 
This technology is responsible for the discovery, in the Sonora desert, of a 
man whose soul has been disassociated and fragmented. The discovery takes 
place on the same day that the Bank of Mexico registers unusual monetary 
transfers. With an implant in her brain, by which she receives orders and 
accesses the information network, Mariana breaks into the sewers of the 
Bank’s ‘live’ building. At this point, however, the situation takes on a 
dramatic twist: Mariana is betrayed by the Mexican military and handed over 
to a fraternity that tortures her and makes her body disappear. She is saved 
and rebuilt by a ‘Selknam,’ an extra-dimensional shaman who needs her help 
in order to solve the mystery of the souls who have been detoured from a 
circuit that is vital to God. Mariana returns to the Mexican military. She is 
sent on a mission to Cuba and then to the Chrysler nation-state, where she is 
kidnapped by the leader of a rebellious religious sect. This chain of events 
continues until the story’s end, when she is sacrificed in order to carry out 
Chrysler’s plan to incarnate human souls in war machines and prepare them 
for a rebellion against a dying God. 
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2.           Simulacra and Theatrics of Cyber-Shamanism 
Virtuality is at the heart of a distinction between certain decisive 
concepts related to an ontological understanding of reality. This can be traced 
back to the distinction made between ‘modalities of possibility, contingency 
and necessity,’ in Aristotle’s philosophy, or to Leibniz’s theory of possible 
worlds.4  It was not until the twentieth century, however, that a number of 
discourses surfaced. On the one hand, Holz presents Stanislaw Lem’s 
philosophical essay, Summa Technologiae (1964), which anticipates the 
ethical issues surrounding virtual reality. Lem establishes a classic opposition 
and hierarchy between reality and virtuality through a series of techniques he 
calls ‘phantomatics.’ On the other hand, Holz contrast’s Lem’s work with the 
work of Jean Baudrillard, who reflects on virtuality’s distinction from the 
actual, that is, ‘the empirical given hic et nunc designated by the traditional 
concept of reality’.5 Baudrillard develops the concepts of ‘simulacra’ and 
‘simulation’ to account for the process that takes place amid mutations in ‘the 
law of value,’ in other words, the principles that regulate both the substitution 
of an object and the system of signs normally responsible for representing 
said object. Accordingly, Baudrillard locates the first two orders of simulacra 
where the referent and the object maintain a transparent relationship. From 
the ‘counterfeit’ automaton, which simulated the natural law of value, during 
the Renaissance, to the ‘production’ robot, which established a hegemony of 
‘dead labour over living labour,’6 during the industrial revolution. Subsequent 
to the first two orders of simulacra, Western societies attain an order of 
simulation and hyperrealism in which virtuality flourishes, through the 
expansion of media power, the creation of the internet and virtual reality, and 
an economy increasingly based on speculation. A product of the changes 
introduced by cybernetics, simulation is itself considered a structural law of 
value that anticipates and orders the ‘real’ in all areas of culture. Simulation 
replaces the real by its own excess, ‘the hyperreal,’ pure simulacra. 
From the beginning of his career, Baudrillard has redirected 
Marxism’s interest in the modes of production toward an analysis of the 
modes of consumption in societies that have reached a state of pure 
simulation and simulacra. These societies experience a shift, from a symbolic 
regime to a semiotic regime7, and thus an exit from history. Baudrillard 
attempts to remove all the complexity of historical experience from conflicts 
and observations. The theoretical construction of simulation and simulacra, 
however, is based more on tangible ideological differences than on a regime 
of empty signs. Furthermore, it is delimited to binary geopolitical space. 
Baudrillard’s work is filled with examples that illustrate his mind’s 
Eurocentric inner-workings. His thinking tirelessly constructs an Other, either 
as the antimony of the West8, or as death, representing the West’s symbolic 
spectre. At some point, the faults and/or limitations of this kind of thinking 
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must be recognized, as occurred during an interview that Nelly Richard gave 
to Baudrillard, during a visit of his to Chile: 
 
Nelly Richard: You elaborated a ‘theory-fiction’ of a mass-
mediated country which was entirely levelled and flattened 
by the homogenising effect of a transparent code. That 
theory-fiction does not in any way fit the historic and social 
formations of Latin America, marked as they are by a 
multicultural heterogeneity of disparate references which 
cross and mix with one another, and of signs which contain 
different memories and traditions, because of the 
complicated process of syncretism, mestizaje, 
hybridization, etc. [...] Do you think that those intersections 
of discordant cultural horizons contained in the interior of 
the sign on which they turn, in Latin America, are 
incompatible with your illusion of a transparent 
homogeneous code? 
 
Jean Baudrillard: It’s difficult for me to respond to that 
because I find it hard to place myself in a unique case of 
complex memories of the sign, as it is produced in a 
particular culture like Latin America.9 
 
Simulacra and virtuality, as both artistic and ‘imaginary’ strategies, are not 
Western prerogatives. Neither is science fiction, which Baudrillard views as 
an example of the first three orders of simulacra.10 A society located outside 
the economy responsible for the cultural production of pure simulacra, must 
nonetheless face the same consequences as a consumer of second order 
simulation, even while continuing to be a producer of the first three orders of 
simulacra. The challenge for such a society, therefore, is to represent what 
Richard refers to as the ‘complexity of the memories of signs.’ In this sense, 
the Chilean cyberpunk project would specifically produce, on an artistic 
level, some of virtuality’s mechanisms as well as its historical phases. As we 
have seen, the android in Flores para un cyborg would correspond with the 
first two orders of simulacra. The android is a replica of the social universe 
on account of its synthetic skin (representing its symbolic desire to have a 
penis and become a common man) as well as the location of its construction, 
an American university (symbolising the technological and economic gap 
between the United States and Chile). With El Virus Baco, Chilean 
cyberpunk achieves certain mastery of third order simulacra, and not simply 
as a result of ‘reality games’ crafted within a tradition of metafiction or 
literary simulations, but owing to the impact that the rise and proliferation of 
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computer networks and equipment can have on Latin American literature and 
culture. 
In contrast, in Ygdrasil, it is not a question of automatons or robots. 
As for the computers, they are not simply installed in physical space, nor are 
they inorganic peripheral accessories, as Mariana’s implants might suggest. 
Rather, the computers have incorporated an organic substance into their 
structure and provide access to an interface of cyber and psychic space 
through Ouija-keyboards. In this case, the representation of simulacra 
performs the function of absorbing the organic real through a paradoxically 
organic deglutition, ultimately swallowing up a spiritual principle, that is, the 
souls of the men who were supposed to revive God. It is in terms of this 
spiritual or magical principal that the novel performs, in its own way, the 
concept of hyperreality. During her recovery, Mariana finds herself in a cave, 
face to face with three shamanic entities: Reche, the Selknam who saved her; 
Pedro the Hermit, an agent from the Mexican government who has to capture 
Mariana; and the projection of Tangata Manu, a superior being who ‘orbits 
the Earth at an altitude of three hundred kilometres’.11 Due to an 
‘enchantment’ from the Selknam, Mariana meets Tangata Manu outside the 
cave. Later, she asks if what she saw and heard was ‘real’ and ‘true.’ The 
Selknam answers, ‘more real than what’s happening here right now’.12 At this 
juncture, Baradit uses the allegory of the platonic cave, which has become a 
topic in cyberpunk films, such as The Matrix, to illustrate the effect of 
simulacra on culture (Partridge, Bénatouil, etc.). 
A parallel can be drawn between the shamanic figures in Ygdrasil 
and Plato’s and Baudrillard’s doctrines on simulacra. It is not a coincidence 
that Baradit, and others, assign Ygdrasil to a genre they call ‘cyber-
shamanism’. The shamanic figures are intermediaries between Mariana and 
virtuality. Their reach extends throughout the cosmic and cybernetic 
landscape. The physical description of these shamans elicits something 
visually indistinguishable. The Selknam appears to Mariana as ‘a flat, poor 
definition video image, on pause,’ who can play with time and space.13 
Mariana could walk circles around the Selknam and would never find his 
face14; or, she could stare at him forever and always have the impression of 
seeing him for the first time.15 Pedro the Hermit has a deformed body which 
‘is not completely in space: he moves and vibrates like a deteriorated video 
image’16. Likewise, Tangata Manu is an astral projection that contemplates, 
from outer space, his reflection in a huge rune located in the south of Chile. 
In the Sophist, Plato gives the example of an enormous statue of a man who 
does not respect human anatomic proportions, even though it would appear 
real to a distant spectator17. For Plato the logic of simulacra is, in this 
example, anamorphic. It assumes that the job of the philosopher is to reveal 
the observer’s position and the illusion in order that ‘the irreducible 
difference of the intelligible’ might prevail.18 
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On the one hand, the cyber-shamanism in Ygdrasil closely follows 
the logic or process of pure simulacra and simulation. It disembodies the 
shaman as a historic figure and creates an indistinct representation. It is not, 
therefore, a question of ‘Indigenism’ or of the idealisation of these shamans, 
even if Mariana, whilst contemplating a Mexican sunrise, says to the 
Selknam: 
 
Here they used to say that gold was the sun’s tears. When 
the Europeans arrived, the Indians understood why the sun 
cried. - Mariana sighed - In my country there was no gold, 
but there were Mapuche. I hope I have some of their blood 
in my veins. If so, I have nothing to fear.19 
 
The shamans are mere agents who carry out a mission and obey an ‘aesthetic 
moral’20, as the Selknam tells Günther, a ghost that travels inside Mariana 
during her mission to Cuba and Chrysler. The aesthetic moral is precisely this 
amoral logic of simulacra which gives specificity to cyber-shamanism. Aside 
from the names of Amerindian origin - ‘Selknam’ (an ethnic group from the 
Patagonia), Tangata Manu (a titled granted to the winner of a competition 
held by the Rapa Nui from Easter Island), Lautaro, etc. -, the shamans could 
be replaced by other imaginary creatures, such as elves, pans or aliens. 
On the other hand, cyber-shamanism distances itself from 
Baudrillardian simulation and approaches virtuality more than Stanlislaw 
Lem’s phantomatics. The Polish writer distinguishes between a central and a 
peripheral use of phantomatics. In the former, toxic stimulation, electric 
implants and nanotechnology are supposed to grant access to virtual worlds. 
However, this access is not recommended, the risk of confusing realities 
being imminent. Consequently, Lem recommends a peripheral phantomatics 
that attempts to develop the sensory apparatus of human being through other 
practices. Accordingly, Holz gives an example of ‘rituals that involve 
dancing and music, where the rhythm translated into motor activity, which in 
turn affects the emotional states, is exploited as a means of transcending the 
here and now’.21 The Selknam’s ‘aesthetic moral’ is the result of a dance he 
must do in sync with certain cosmic events. This dance, which does not 
succumb to ‘the commands of a magician,’ can also be found in ‘Japanese 
gardens’22 This ‘shaman’s’ dance is carried out in a virtual space that 
predetermines all other space in which the rest of the characters evolve. It is 
also essential to central phantomatics. For example, the corn based drug that 
Mariana is addicted to in the beginning of the novel is ‘cut’ by the Mexican 
government; the Selknam’s vision does not involve any intermediary 
technology or hallucinogenic drug; and, Mariana’s implants only serve as a 
form of communication between her, the military and Günther, the ghost. 
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The peripheral phantomatics found in the shaman’s dance are also 
virtual devices that literary and cinematographic cyberpunk have known how 
to exploit through Orientalism, as an aesthetic practice, demonstrated by 
Hideo’s ninja ‘dance,’ in Neuromancer23, or through a fascination for martial 
arts’ choreography and the ‘Bullet-Time’ technique (akin to Aikido 
philosophy and to the Bergsonian duration), in The Matrix.24  But the 
virtuality of phantomatics, in a novel like Ygdrasil, must transcend these 
decorative and Orientalist practices if it is to escape the closed logic of pure 
simulacra and simulation. Shamanism might seem just as exotic as the 
‘Japanese gardens’ to a Chilean or Latin-American subjectivity, which 
constructs itself in its own way in cyberpunk. However, it serves the 
important function of allocating a ‘memory’ to the sign. 
 
Notes
 
1 Y Molina-Gavilán, et al, ‘A Chronology of Latin-American Science Fiction, 
1775-2005’, in Science Fiction Studies, vol. 34, 2007, p. 387. 
2 In Flores para un cyborg, one can se the dilemma of forgetfulness and 
vengeance which Brett Levinson describes as: ‘one of the commonplaces of 
postdictatorship cultural production and political controversies’, B Levinson, 
‘Obstinate Forgetting in Chile: Radical Injustice and the Possibility of 
Community’, in Topologies of Trauma: Essays on the Limit of Knowledge 
and Memory, L Belau and P Ramadanovic (eds), Other, New York, 2002, p. 
212. 
3 For an English translation of this report, see: 
<http://www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/reports/chile/chile_1993_toc.html>. 
4 M Holz, Traversing Virtual Spaces. Body, Memory and Trauma in 
Cyberpunk, Universitätsverlag Winter, Heidelberg, 2006, p. 12. 
5 Ibid. p. 10. 
6 J Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage Publications, London, 
1993, p. 54. 
7 R J Lane, Jean Baudrillard, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 58. 
8 For instance, one finds the following comment in Symbolic Exchange and 
Death: ‘Thus the people of the Third World (Arabs, Blacks or Indians) act as 
Western culture’s imaginary (as much an object or support of racism as the 
support of revolutionary aspirations). On the other hand, we, the 
technological and industrial West, are their imaginary, what they dream of in 
their dream of separation’ (Baudrillard, p. 188). 
9 M Sánchez Prieto, ‘Eurocentrism and Critical Latin American Thought. 
Notes on the Theme of Evaluation’ in Third Text 41, Winter 1997-98, p. 11.  
10 J Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations, University of Michigan Press, 
Ann Arbor, 1981. 
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11 J Baradit, Ygdrasil, Ediciones B Chile, Santiago, 2005, p. 64. (Author’s 
translation). 
12 Ibid., p. 58. 
13 Ibid., p. 36. 
14 Ibid., p. 84. 
15 Ibid., p. 48. 
16 Ibid., pp. 51-52. 
17 Platon, The Sophist, Arc Manor, Rockville, 2008, p. 33, (235e).  
18 L Lavaud, L’image, GF Flammarion, Paris, 1999, p. 234 (Author’s  
translation). 
19 J Baradit, op. cit, p. 63. 
20 Ibid., p. 111. 
21 M Holz, op. cit, p. 62. 
22 J Baradit, op. cit, p. 62. 
23 W Gibson, Neuromancer, Ace books, New York, 1984, p. 262. 
24 E During, ‘Trois figures de la simulation ’, in Matrix machine 
philosophique, A Badiou et al, Ellipses, 2003, p. 144. 
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When Differences become Unimportant: Casshern and the 
True Social of Cyberpunk 
 
Maria Poulaki 
 
Abstract 
Through a combination of actor-network theory’s anti-essentialism and 
Badiou’s ethics, this article seeks to explore what cyberpunk can mean today, 
using the film Casshern as a case study. For Latour, the path to the social as 
an event, opens only when no pre-given abstract categories as ‘nature’ and 
‘society’ enclave human action. Technological and biological, human and 
nonhuman actors or actants, both can co-exist and co-work to make the 
social, as the difference between the natural and the technological is rendered 
unimportant. Badiou’s universal ethics also begin when differences between 
self and other become unimportant. In this sense, cuberpunk, rendering the 
human-nonhuman difference unimportant, can be a truly universal genre, 
indicating that human identity is still a goal to be reached; and this goal does 
not recognize the ‘human’ as a solid category. 
 
Key Words: Human, Actor-Network Theory, Universalism, Cyberpunk, 
Identity, Event, Social. 
 
***** 
 
1.   Introduction to What is (not) Typical about Casshern 
 Despite the contradictory critiques1, what is unique about Casshern, 
the Japanese film by Kazuaki Kiriya, (2004), is that, in its borrowing from 
many different genres and science fictional traditions (anime, action movies, 
or classic Frankensteinian sci-fi stories), it retains an original and in the same 
time subversive cyberpunk character. However, I prefer to call this film 
‘meta-cyberpunk’ in the sense that, beyond any genre classifications, it offers 
us the chance to think about cyberpunk, and the peculiar relationship between 
human and nonhumans that cyberpunk as a genre introduced but not fully 
realized; a relationship different from the traditional dichotomies of science-
fiction, and very close to the theory about the ‘nonhumans’ of Bruno Latour. 
Casshern expresses a potential for science fiction to be truly universal and for 
cyberpunk to be truly social. This potential will be explored here using the 
ethics of Alain Badiou. 
Although the film draws from many different genres, it has mostly 
been labeled as cyberpunk2. In many respects, we are indeed placed in a 
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cyberpunk-like setting: dystopian and polluted city, but also country- 
landscape, an authoritarian regime trying to eliminate resistance, a mysterious 
corporation that serves the army’s interests and wants to control the 
biotechnological research and, later on, a war from the part of genetically 
engineered nonhumans, the products of this research, claiming their rights 
from the ‘real’ humans. 
The place of the nonhumans in Casshern is occupied by the neo-
sapiens, artificially engineered humans created by mistake in a lab where 
professor Azuma conducts his experiments to regenerate human tissue. His 
experiments are of vital importance, as his country, called the ‘Eastern 
Federation’, suffers from heavy environmental pollution and incurable 
diseases. The neo-sapiens not only look, but also act just like humans. But 
when the ‘real’ humans deny them their ‘equal right to life’, they decide to 
fight them back and take revenge for their pogrom. And they do so behaving 
exactly like humans -imitating them in their cruelty, which seems to be the 
basic characteristic that the film ascribes to humans. Interestingly, only the 
residents of Eastern Federation are called ‘humans’ in the film. They are the 
‘winners’ of a long-term war between Asia and Europe and conquerors of the 
Eurasian continent, an ancient, not civilized region situated between the two 
competitors. The neo-sapiens and the residents of Eurasia, who are the 
‘losers’ of the war and now fight against the oppressive regime of Eastern 
Federation, are in a way connected from the start, as non-humans and sub-
humans respectively. In the end actually they prove to be the same: it is 
revealed that the neo-sapiens are real humans, inhabitants of Eurasia who 
were abducted during the war to offer their rare neo-cells for the human 
regeneration experiments, but when the experiments failed, were ‘carved up’ 
to provide with their organs and body parts the greedy humans of Eastern 
Federation. The humans needed those cells because, as it is revealed, the 
Eurasians are genetical ancestors of the population of Eastern Federation. 
Therefore, the artificial humans prove to be the ‘original humans’ and the 
causal chain of ancestors and descendants, creators and creations, are 
reversed. 
Leaving aside its historical and political allegories, Casshern could 
be interpreted as a story of an empire with mostly masculine warriors and 
super-heroes, who seek to protect it from the non-human, ‘foreign’ other. 
Throughout the whole film this ‘other’ (the neo-sapiens) mirrors the human 
self, acting just like its double, even imitating him in his atrocities3, while in 
the end the mirror is smashed and otherness is expelled, as both rivals, 
naturally human and ‘artificially’ human, are proved to be natural human in 
origin. Therefore, we could ‘read’ the story as an object-subject dichotomy 
that ends up in the peace of co-existence (and the corresponding ‘assimilation 
of alterity’), through the abolishment of difference, which would render 
Casshern into a totalitarian epic4. 
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However, does Casshern really eliminate the difference? Or does it 
function corrosively to the very ground of the sameness? This paper chooses 
the second, least beaten track. In this view, Casshern will be discussed as a 
very peculiar humanist film, in its explicit anti-humanism, which puts into 
question the foundations of human nature as it has developed from 
Enlightenment until now. 
 
2.  From Actor-Network Theory to Science Fiction: The 
Adventures of Human Identity in Modernity 
If we accept Bruno Latour’s claim in his book We have never been 
modern, that Modernity’s central characteristic is the exclusion, or better 
purification, of hybridity5, we could say that science fiction is a cultural genre 
placed right at the heart of the discourse of Modernity, negotiating -and 
sometimes even disrupting- the space between human subjects and hybrid 
objects - aliens, machines, robots, monsters, humanoids etc. 
As we saw Casshern mixes humans with Modernity’s hybrids or 
Latour’s ‘nonhumans’, just like the biotechnological reality of our times 
does. The question is whether ‘nature’ as such, or ‘human’ as such, have ever 
existed, and if the certainty over ‘human nature’ was recently lost, with the 
advent of new technologies, like bio-engineering or cloning, or if the 
scientific advances of our times just point at what was missing from the start. 
And if ‘Man’ as a solid category is himself a product of modernity, a fake 
entity placed at the origin of all natural and technical world, silencing its 
voice.6 
Another ‘pioneer’ of actor-network theory besides Latour, John 
Law, speaks for a double ‘dissolution of humanism’, coming on the one hand 
from the extension of our scope beyond humans, therefore the abandonment 
of a speciecist position and the opening to other voices, like those of natural, 
technical, monstrous, even spiritual entities, and on the other hand, from the 
abandonment of the very idea of entities as such, as all entities, including the 
human, ‘are effects or products’; ‘Neither are given in the order of things’.7 
The division between humans as subjects and things as objects is 
rendered obsolete when humans and things are considered as equivalent 
actors. Indeed for Latour there is no subject nor object, only equal human and 
nonhuman agents8. In this realm where the subjective world of humans and 
the objective world of things, cease to be strictly separate, the door is left 
open for the hybrids to acquire the ontological status that Modernity denied 
them, just like the humans of the film denied the neo-sapiens their ‘right to 
life’. This ‘invasion’ not only frees nonhumans from the silence where they 
have been condemned in Modernity, but also humans from the necessity to be 
constantly and reflexively defending their ‘human essence’ against 
objectification.  In my view the same move can also set science fiction free, 
When Differences become Unimportant 
______________________________________________________________ 
128
the genre that has also been ‘constantly and reflexively’ defending 
‘humanity’ against its Other. 
The nonhumans in Casshern are not condemned to silence, on the 
contrary they are fighting for a place into the human realm, for an identity of 
their own and rights of their own: they do have politics, but, as soon as they 
imitate human cruelty and try to eliminate humans, they are not really 
fighting for humanity but for its power. Their politics end up inscribed in the 
same net of power that encloses the human world. But actor-network theory 
has been criticized for having the same result: in its (successful) attempt to 
include in the network of the social all natural and technological objects, it 
exerts a form of sociological colonization of the non-social and nonhuman, 
incorporating the Other into the same and expanding the range of disciplinary 
power. Moreover, considering power as the reality principle and also 
inscribing the nonhumans as ‘monadic wills to power’, actor-network theory 
is said to trap everything into a dominance-resistance bipolar, where 
resistance cannot be other than what Baudrillard saw as a redistribution of 
dominance.9 
The only way to avoid this trap that Casshern’s rivals have also 
fallen into, and leads to endless violence, is to exit the identitarian logic, to 
leave back everything that we are defending as individuals, and first of all our 
human identity itself -at least as it has been shaped in Modernity. The neo-
sapiens creation soon becomes the mirror of its creator. What we should be 
afraid of, the film suggests, is not the artificial humans, because there is no 
originality in humanity; what we should be afraid of is the reproduction of 
humanity as it has developed until now in its phantasy of originality -a 
‘humanity’ which the artificial humans in the film have no choice but to 
imitate. 
Actor-network theory has also been struggling to resist the above 
criticism, sticking to its initial character as ‘one of the many anti-essentialist 
movements of the end of the [20th] century’, according to Latour10, and to its 
rejection of identities and fixed points. Even more precisely, it insists in its 
materialistic sociology that treats ‘different materials - people, machines, 
‘ideas’ and all the rest - as interactional effects rather than primitive 
causes’.11 Latour insists that all ‘a priori definitions of [the actors’] world-
building capacities’12, should be left aside, and all modernist contradictions 
should be ignored: 
 
Contradictions, most of the time and especially when they 
are related to the modernist predicament, should not be 
overcome, but simply ignored or bypassed.13 
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And Law continues:  
 
To say that there is no fundamental difference between 
people and objects is an analytical stance, not an ethical 
position. [However,] we might use it to sharpen ethical 
questions about the special character of the human effect 
[…].14 
 
However, as I will argue, the ethical questioning comes here to the fore not 
only as a distraction -as Law sees it- but as a necessary supplement to the 
ontological questioning of the human. The mere visibility of the nonhumans 
and even their participation in the play of power does not really displace the 
pre-fixed human identity from its powerful position- to the contrary, it 
reinforces this position in a reflexive manner, as humans fight to defend or 
win back their lost or threatened power. But how is it possible to really 
sharpen the criticism on what the human means today, without an ethics that 
would be indifferent to all the differences that determine the boundaries of 
human identity? 
Casshern gives an answer: it does not stop in the reflexive 
realization of a common origin of the humans and nonhumans; in the end 
both rivals -the human protagonist Tetsuya and the king of the neo-sapiens 
Burai- reject the very essence of the ‘human’ identity that they prove to be 
sharing. To paraphrase Latour, they have never been human. 
Casshern’s narration comes to a point that the human segregation 
from the nonhuman generates and in the same time serves as an excuse for 
political and nationalistic conflicts, while in essence is unimportant. There is 
some universality in Casshern which places humans and nonhumans in the 
same level and calls for reconsidering of all natural categories. But this 
universality is different from the classic universality of science fiction, which 
tends to draw lines between an all-encompassing ‘human Self’ and an all-
encompassing ‘nonhuman Other’. In that sense Casshern is a call, made 
possible with the mediation of bio-technological developments, for a 
universal redefinition of the meaning of the human, which will include the 
non-human.15 And from this point on, the traditional universality of science 
fiction could give birth to a new human subject, contrasted not to objects or 
nonhumans anymore, but only to its own individuality. 
 
3.  The Unimportant Difference between Humans and Non-humans 
and the Ethics of Badiou 
This is the new meaning that Alain Badiou gives to universalism. 
Badiou is concerned with what the human means, but in an anti-essentialist 
way, with the human subject as becoming, as event. Without ignoring them, 
Badiou rejects the importance of all established human identities, because 
When Differences become Unimportant 
______________________________________________________________ 
130
they are partial clusterings of the infinite multiplicity of the world. According 
to his version of universalism, difference is simply what is; therefore, it is 
unimportant. On the opposite, the Same is the path that leads to the human as 
a category. 
 
[…] since differences are what there is, and since every 
truth is the coming-to-be of that which is not yet, so 
differences are then precisely what truths depose, or render 
insignificant. […] Only a truth is, as such, indifferent to 
differences. This is something we have always known, even 
if sophists of every age have always attempted to obscure 
its certainty: a truth is the same for all.16 
 
The truth lies beyond identities and individuals, because every identity is 
necessarily partial and reflexive. When Tetsuya decides to join the war against 
Eurasia, early in the plot, he acts not as a subject but as an individual, just like 
all the other ‘humans’ in the film do (both homo-sapiens and later neo-
sapiens), protecting their own identity, and trying to impose it on others. We 
could even say, using the terms of Karl Marx, that they are only forms of 
species-life and not of species-being.17 The true subject of Badiou goes 
beyond the reflexive subject, which is no other but the individual, exactly 
because its action does not come as a response to some external threat. The 
subject has nothing to lose. 
Thus Badiou tries to imagine the subject beyond all differences in 
power, with which actor-network theory is concerned. While actor-network 
theory renders the ontological difference between humans and nonhumans 
unimportant and is concerned with the differences in power, Badiou is 
concerned with how humans can create their subjectivity, overcoming the 
established differences in power. Power is what the rivals in Casshern really 
fight for, while claiming that they fight for humanity. The human-nonhuman 
difference is again caught in the identity politics of the Self-Other opposition. 
Latour seeks to know how the nonhumans can shape humanity - how they 
have always been shaping it. Badiou how the humans can shape it a new - 
starting form the surrender of their partial identities. Badiou’s universal 
subject is exactly a subject that gives up its own pre-given power and follows 
its subjective truth with fidelity, either in politics, science or art, in a way that 
cannot be else but good for everyone. 
In Casshern Tetsuya denies his human identity, after the experience 
of an event - the war, the killing of another human. A truth, the process of 
subjectivization according to Badiou, comes from an event that points at what 
lacks from an established situation: in the case of Tetsuya, the void of the 
situation of a ‘pre-established human-ness’, which the Eastern Federation 
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proudly appropriates, is ‘human’ kindness, humanity starting from Good, and 
not as a reflection to the Evil coming from an external threat. 
To go back to Latour, what is always missing from any established 
situation, lies in the fluid that connects the macro with the micro level, the 
social with the individual, the human with the nonhuman, in this movement, 
that not only makes the social but is the social.18 To conclude, if humanity or 
human essence is what is missing from the situation, then it is to be found in 
the movement in which humans and nonhumans meet, which is no other but 
the event of the social. 
 
4. Conclusion: Cyberpunk Thinking - A New Meaning of 
‘Resistance’ 
One of the primary themes of cyberpunk fiction, apart from the 
freedom of access to information and the fight against the corporations which 
exploit it, is the loss of boundaries between what is human and what 
mechanical, what is natural and what artificial, in a way more profound than 
that of the traditional science fiction. In my view, the singularity of 
cyberpunk lies in its overcoming of the human-machine or nonhuman 
dichotomy, and more precisely in the ‘seeing-through’ this dichotomy, 
expanding the glance to a social world outside, where often humans and 
machines share the same fate. 
The need to access the truth, to ‘brake the code’, to unveil the 
hidden and sacred, was prevailing in cyberpunk. But this is also the path to 
every truth that human has to walk, according to Badiou, to confront the 
religious ‘inaccessible’.19  
Surrendering the classic science-fictional authoritarian universality 
to make a move towards the social, cyberpunk ended up caught in the 
identitarian game of resistance as redistribution of power, as many critics 
have pointed out.20 According to Scott Bukatman: 
 
There is a reactionary face to cyberpunk, as technology 
becomes incorporated with a subject position that is 
strengthened but otherwise unchanged […].21 
 
Fights over identity (either majoritarian or minoritarian) are always fights 
over power, and perfectly compatible with capitalism. Likewise, technology 
caught in this identity politics can only serve established power -it is a 
capitalistic appropriation of technology. Cyberpunk as a mode of thinking 
starts where cyberpunk as a genre ends. It is no longer concerned with 
technology as a tool for access, in the same time manipulated and constantly 
threatening to take over, but as mediation for a truth, in the sense that Badiou 
gives to the term, through identification with the technical, the not-original, 
outside the identitarian and possessive logic. 
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What I suggest here is a re-appreciation of cyberpunk’s virtues, 
keeping the social speculation over technology but without ending up 
defending established identities and utilizing technology for partial interests. 
The point is to question - ethically and ontologically - through our encounter 
with technologies, our own human identity and try to think universally and 
truly socially. Opening up from reflexivity to the emergence of the social. 
 
Notes
 
1 The critiques vary from ‘one of the most visually exhilarating anti-war 
movies ever made’ to ‘mostly incoherent, muddled to the point of being 
overly pretentious’, (S T Van Airsdale, ‘This weekend in blown Minds: 
Casshern!’, Reeler Inc., New York, 2007, retrieved June 4th, 2008, 
<http://www.thereeler.com/the_blog/this_weekend_in_blown_minds_ca.php
>, (critique by ‘Nix’ in the article: ‘Casshern: movie review’, 
BeyondHollywood.com, 2004, updated and retrieved on June 4th, 2008, 
http://www.beyondhollywood.com/casshern-2004-movie-review/). 
2 Both by commercial sites like amazon.com, as well as by genre-specific cult 
sites like cyberpunkreview.com. 
3 The choice of the gender is not random here, as only the female human 
characters (Midori and Luna) are presented as having compassion. 
4 There are of course many other possible interpretations, like that of an 
allegory for the role of Japan in both world wars, but that exceeds the scope 
of this paper. 
5 As put by N Lee & P Stenner, ‘Who pays? Can we pay them back?’, in 
Actor Network Theory and after, J Law & J Hassard (eds), Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1999, p. 94-95. See also B Latour, We have never been modern, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1993. 
6 Interestingly, when human identifies with ‘nature’ against the non-natural, 
technological other, he does it in the name of a predefined ‘purity’ of nature, 
of which he sees himself as possessor and controller. 
7 J Law, Organizing Modernity, Blackwell,, Oxford, 1994, p. 193. 
8 According to a conception of agency derived from causality and not 
morality, which was introduced by Heidegger, as N Lee and S Brown 
(‘Otherness and the Actor-Network: the undiscovered Continent’. American 
Behavioral  Scientist, 37:6, 1994, p. 773) show. 
9 ibid, pp.  792-90. 
10 B Latour, ‘On recalling ANT’, in Actor Network Theory and after, op. cit., 
p. 20. 
11 J Law, ‘Notes on the Theory of the Actor-Network: Ordering, Strategy and 
Heterogeneity’. Systemic Practice and Action Research, 5:4, 1992, pp. 379–
93. 
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12 Latour, ‘On recalling ANT’, p. 20. 
13  ibid, p. 16. 
14 Law, ‘Notes on the theory of the Actor-Network’.  
15 We cannot ignore the non-western cultural origin of the film, neither its 
anime and manga influences (Casshern is actually loosely based on a 1973 
anime television series, titled  Shinzō Ningen Kyashān, though in the original 
series the human-nonhuman contradiction was absolute) which possibly 
contribute to its greater openness to the nonhuman. 
16 A Badiou, Ethics: An essay on the understanding of Evil, Verso, London, 
2001, p. 27. 
17 For a discussion of the Marxian distinction between species-life and 
species-being, see E Fromm, Marx’s concept of man, Frederick Ungar 
Publishing Co., New York, 1961, pp. 49-58. 
18 Latour, ‘On recalling ANT’, p. 17. 
19 From Badiou’s letter to Peter Hallward, 19 June 1996, cited by P. Hallward 
in his introduction to the English translation of Ethics, p. xliii. 
20 For criticism on cyberpunk see among others: A Balsamo, Technologies of 
the Gendered Body: Reading Cyborg Women, Duke University Press, 
Durham: North Carolina, 1996; N Nixon, ‘Cyberpunk: Preparing the Ground 
for Revolution or Keeping the Boys Satisfied?’, Science-Fiction Studies, 
19:2, 1992, 219-35; N Easterbrook, ‘The Arc of Our Destruction: Reversal 
and Erasure in Cyberpunk’, Science Fiction Studies, 19:3, 1992, pp. 378-94. 
21 S Bukatman, Terminal Identity: The Virtual Subject in Postmodern Science  
Fiction, Duke University Press, Durham, 1993, p. 315. 
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Robots-Cyborgs & Replicants
  
  
Beholding the Uncanny: Replicants, Cyborgs and Clones in 
Science Fiction 
 
Michael J. Klein 
 
Abstract 
The portrayal of artificially produced organisms in the works of science 
fiction dates back to the origins of the genre. These works have envisioned 
societies confronting the ‘other’ in the form of organisms that are ‘not of 
woman born.’ Whether in the form of cyborgs or clones, these characters 
often upset the balance of their societies, causing havoc and inviting scorn 
and misunderstanding. Ostensibly these works can be read as cautionary tales 
about the excesses of technological hubris in the face of modernity. However, 
the real focus of these works is not on the replicants and cyborgs, but on the 
fictional societies that spawn these creations, and by extension, the factual 
societies in which the authors were writing their stories. These works 
disconcert and inform their audiences, forcing the audience’s revaluation of 
its own prejudices against those they see as separate from themselves. 
 
Key Words: Science Fiction, Clone, Android, Alternative Reproduction. 
 
***** 
 
1. Introduction 
Science fiction operates as a form of modern myth in our 
technological culture. An examination of books on artificial reproduction 
reveals the underlying concerns of the authors and directors. Individuals who 
invoke the names of works such as Frankenstein and Brave New World 
reference the myths, not the actual stories. Although these works comment on 
the power of science and technology in a society, this does not represent the 
primary critique offered by either author. For both authors, the idea of 
technology without regulation and without regard for human dignity 
outweighed concerns about just technology per se. 
An examination of films finds that their critique of science impugns 
the morals of the scientists and industrialists who develop genetic 
engineering and cloning for selfish purposes, not the offspring of modern 
biotechnology. Rather than be alarmed by the creation, these films direct the 
audience to fear the creators of these non-traditional offspring. In holding a 
mirror up to our own society, these films say we should not use this 
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alternative forms of reproduction; not because of the destructive nature of the 
new offspring, but because of our potentially destructive nature. 
 
2. Frankenstein: Tension between Science and the Natural Order 
  Frankenstein stands at a crossroads, bridging the gap between the 
two literary genres of romanticism (especially the gothic) and science fiction. 
While romanticism dealt with nature and conditions of natural society, 
writers conceived science fiction as a response to the rapid developments in 
science and technology brought about by the Industrial Revolution in late 
eighteenth-century Europe. This bridging function becomes evident in the 
way the novel deals with the subject of the reanimation of the dead set 
against the role of family. This tension between familial duty and scientific 
inquiry represents the primary theme of the novel. 
The Industrial Revolution served as the most significant change 
affecting society when Shelley wrote Frankenstein.1 
Beginning in Britain and still in its infancy in 1818, the Industrial 
Revolution rapidly transformed manufacturing processes and the production 
of material goods. Machinery starting producing traditionally handcrafted 
items as the early stages of semi-automation began. A subsequent 
dependence of workers on the scientific processes and technological products 
became an integral part of society. 
Shelley’s novel serves as a critique of man’s changing interaction 
with nature through scientific methods not as an indictment of science itself: 
 
The myth of Frankenstein registers the anxieties of the 
period inaugurated in the twin social and industrial 
revolutions in France and Britain. […] The myth which 
[sic] develops out of it turns repeatedly upon these new 
problems of an age in which humanity seizes responsibility 
for re-creating the world, for violently reshaping its natural 
environment and its inherited social and political forms, for 
remaking itself.2 
 
Frankenstein portrays the tension between the old and the new-the early 
modern and the modern-and has become the rallying cry for those who 
believe technologies impinge upon society’s stability. Instead of just re-
creating the world, science stands on the brink of re-creating the human. 
At first glance, the novel does indeed seem to be solely about the 
foibles of scientific research that pushes the boundaries of knowledge. At an 
early age, the protagonist Victor Frankenstein becomes enamoured of the 
works of physicians and scientists of the Middle Ages. However, after 
witnessing the effects of a lightning strike on a tree, Victor stops examining 
the works of the past and enrols in the University of Ingolstadt to study. This 
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transition from the old to the modern as the focus of Victor’s studies proves 
pivotal, as it sets him on his way to explore the possibility of reanimating 
dead flesh by applying the scientific method to his studies. 
While ultimately successful in his quest to reanimate life, Victor 
expresses moral repulsion for the Creature’s physical hideousness. Victor 
runs away from his laboratory, hoping to distance himself from the hideous 
creature. In abandoning his offspring, Victor sets the events of the novel in 
motion: the work demonstrates the necessity of parental responsibility and 
familial relations, not the destructive power of science. 
Victor’s rejection of his ‘son’ forces the Creature to leave and 
experience the world alone. Because he inspires almost universal repulsion, 
the Creature hides from others, teaching himself how to speak through the 
reading of books, including Plutarch’s Lives and Paradise Lost. Milton’s 
work, in a fashion similar to Frankenstein, tells the story about a new type of 
offspring (Adam) and his relationship with his father, God. However, while 
God punishes Adam for his transgressions and casts him out from the Garden 
of Eden, Victor casts the Creature out for simply existing. 
Frankenstein’s subtitle The Modern Prometheus alludes to the myth 
of Prometheus and his punishment for the theft of fire and the creation of the 
human race. Unlike Prometheus, punished for his transgressions by the gods, 
Victor receives retribution from his offspring, not for his act itself but for his 
subsequent behaviour. Through this portrayal, Shelley offers a critique of 
science without responsibility and without governance. Victor’s reluctance in 
acknowledging his paternal responsibilities to the Creature infuriates the 
Creature and starts him on his homicidal spree. 
 
3.  Brave New World: The Imperative of Societal Control 
 If Frankenstein serves as a tale that warns of science without 
supervision or boundaries, then Brave New World demonstrates what 
happens when society regulates everything.3 Written in 1932, the novel 
depicts a future society of the 26th century in which the state manufactures 
everything (including people), thus embracing the ideals of mass production 
in Huxley’s own time (the industrialist Henry Ford functions as the deity for 
the populace of the World State). With the Bokanovsky’s Process, a 
procedure through which fertilized embryos divide multiple times, humans 
create babies in identical batches. Humans developing in large batches leads 
to uniformity, eliminating differences which could result in prejudice or 
hatred, all impediments to the society’s foremost goal: stability. 
With the creation of humans in the laboratory, the traditional family 
no longer exists. Children grow up in public crèches, separated according to 
their class and function. The World State now considers words such as 
‘mother’ and ‘love’ offensive, and forbids any sort of long-term human 
relationships. The State entertains it citizens through its own form of bread 
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and circuses, including feelies, mildly pornographic films that stimulate all 
the senses, and soma, a drug dispensed freely to the populace to keep them 
happy. Art and literature no longer exist because their contents made people 
uneasy and unhappy, and even science produces only applied technologies. 
The protagonist of the book, John the Savage, lives with his mother 
on a New Mexico reservation, the result of an ‘unnatural’ conception and 
birth. Like the Creature, the Savage has educated himself through the works 
of Shakespeare (the title of Huxley’s work comes from a passage in the 
Tempest). Brought back to the World State, the Savage displays naiveté when 
it comes to the norms and values of his new society. Initially fascinated with 
what he sees, the Savage eventually becomes disillusioned and despondent. 
Although the population remains happy through use of conditioning and 
drugs, the Savage, aware of life outside the World State, cannot accept the 
rigid order placed on life. 
Near the end of the novel, the Savage talks with the World 
Controller Mustapha Mond about the reasons for society’s current state. 
Mond explains to him that after last war, the survivors decided that such an 
event could never take place again. Thus, the state must take it upon itself to 
provide order for its inhabitants. A well ordered society precluded future 
conflicts by eliminating anything unnecessary, including art. ‘‘But that’s the 
price we have to pay for stability,’’ Mond tells the Savage. ‘‘You’ve got to 
choose between happiness and what people used to call high art. We’ve 
sacrificed the high art.’’4 
Thus, this artificial dichotomy depicts the core of Huxley’s critique:  
 
Through their [the Savage and Mond] conversation, Huxley 
focuses on the central problem that Brave New World is set 
up to explore: the extent to which happiness must 
necessarily exclude freedom and to which freedom must 
include unhappiness. The new world civilization is 
predicated on the conviction that happiness and freedom 
are mutually exclusive and that happiness is the greater 
good.5 
 
Like Shelley before him, Huxley examines society’s use of science and 
technology but does not condemn them outright. Rather, Huxley depicts a 
society embracing technology while casting aside other social endeavours, 
especially the drive for creativity. While order may be necessary to a certain 
extent in society, personal expression, be it through art, literature, or even the 
love of another person through social bonds, make us uniquely human and 
become necessary for us to retain our humanity. Science is not bad; but a 
society that only focuses on science to the exclusion of all other 
accomplishments becomes wretched. 
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4. Blade Runner: Defining the Human 
Ridley Scott’s 1982 film Blade Runner-based on Philip K. Dick’s 
1968 novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?-offers the audience a 
nuanced examination of the theme of how society defines humanity.6 In the 
future the Earth has become highly polluted, almost all natural animals have 
died, and most of Earth’s population has left for space colonies. Replicants, 
artificial humans constructed by corporations, live only on the off-world 
colonies performing tasks too menial for humans. While physically similar to 
humans (but with increased strength), the replicants display limited emotions. 
Only the results of a Voight-Kampff test, which measures emotional and 
physical responses, can differentiate between humans and replicants. 
This inability to differentiate humans from more evolved replicants 
symbolizes the failure of humans to maintain control over technology.7 Just 
as humans in Blade Runner’s alternate future have laid waste to their cities 
with nuclear weapons, humans now lose their ability to identify the replicants 
they built to serve them. The replicants’ revolt also demonstrates this fear: 
losing control of a creation and having it run amok, similar to what the 
Creature does in Frankenstein. 
The story focuses on Rick Deckard, a police officer sanctioned to 
‘retire’ replicants who have returned to Earth. In his pursuit of a group of five 
replicants, Deckard starts to examine his own motivations and questions the 
biological and cultural divide between humans and replicants. Part of his 
inquisitiveness results from his meeting with the replicant Rachel, the niece 
of the owner of the Tyrell Corporation, one of the largest manufacturers of 
replicants. She ‘fails’ the Voight-Kampff test, but only after Deckard 
administers more than twice the standard number of questions. 
Rachel confronts Deckard, offering a photo of herself as a child as 
proof of her human heritage. Deckard reveals his knowledge of events she 
has told no one previously, proving her artificial back-story. The news 
devastates them: if technology can construct memories, then it can construct 
objects that serve as memory devices, such as photos. Blurring the clean 
division between natural and artificial life forces the characters, and the 
audience, to re-examine their own definitions of what it means to be human, 
and focus on similarities rather than differences. 
This blurring of the human/non-human, natural/artificial boundaries 
established by reproductive technology raises another fear. If we cannot trust 
our memories or photos we have of ourselves, than how can we know who or 
what we truly are? However, this portrays the very point of Tyrell’s work. As 
Tyrell says, his business creates replicants ‘more human than human.’ 
The final distinction between the two groups, humans and replicants, 
dissolves at the climax of the film when Batty saves Deckard from falling off 
a building, preserving his life. The gesture becomes especially poignant 
because it occurs moments before Batty dies because of his pre-programmed 
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lifespan. Batty has exhibited empathy towards another living creature, 
becoming more human than those who pursued him do. 
 Like the Creature from Frankenstein, Batty has sought his maker, 
and in doing so, has come to realize the value of life. However, unlike 
Shelley’s creation, Batty has this realization before he dies, saving the life of 
the man bent on his destruction: 
 
Because the film focuses so intensely on Batty’s figurative 
reaching out for life, his literal and inexplicable reaching 
out to save Deckard becomes highly symbolized gesture 
that transforms this monster into the truly tragic romantic 
figure that Shelley’s Monster never becomes.8 
 
Blade Runner questions our notions of humanity by making the replicants of 
the film appear lifelike, while at the same time bringing into question the real 
nature of life. Once replicants gain the ability to empathize then they deserve 
equal treatment: not as slaves, but as individuals. The society that 
manufacturers and enslaves these naïve creatures becomes guilty of heinous 
crimes, more problematic than the crimes committed by replicants trying to 
escape their forced captivity. 
 
5. GATTACA: Genetic Essentialism and Undue Expectations 
Instead of depicting a world with replicants, a world where 
manipulation of humans has become the norm provides the scenario for 
Andrew Niccol’s 1997 film GATTACA.9 In the not so distant future, humans 
have nearly perfected genetic engineering, allowing couples to select 
desirable traits for their offspring, rather than leaving the process to chance. 
This process creates ‘natural’ children, the old process of reproduction now 
labelled unnatural. Society has labelled these individuals conceived without 
the benefit of genetic engineering ‘faith births’ or de-gene-erants. Though 
officially illegal, genoism-discrimination against individuals based on their 
genetic make-up-exists, in both hiring practices and daily life. 
In the society of GATTACA, genes predicate the life of all children 
regardless of their method of birth. Genetic tests indicate mental, physical, 
and emotional deficiencies, often limiting the choices afforded to children as 
they grow. The analysis of DNA charts everything about a person including 
their probable cause of death. Invariably, this knowledge ‘seems to dampen 
human initiative, while living up to one’s technologically determined 
potential can also be daunting.’10 The society in GATTACA embraces genetic 
determinism and eugenics taken to an extreme. 
Updating the eugenics movement, the world of GATTACA relies on 
advanced technology rather than selective breeding to create better offspring. 
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The film, however, depicts those created through this alternative technology 
the ones society rewards and values rather than those conceived through 
traditional methods. Members of this society have divided into two classes, 
with the genetically inferior subject to harassment, prejudice, and regulation. 
The film introduces the audience to one of these faith babies, Vincent 
Freeman, who dreams of becoming a flight engineer for the corporation 
Gattaca. At birth, Vincent’s parents received the news that he had a 99% 
chance of dying young due to an abnormal heart. His parents have treated 
Vincent like an invalid, though he does not exhibit any physical limitations. 
Not wishing to tempt fate twice, Vincent’s parents create his brother Anton 
‘naturally.’ He becomes Vincent’s physical, but not necessarily his 
intellectual, superior. 
Unable to find work, and not appreciated by his parents as much as 
his sibling, Vincent strikes out on his own. Frustrated by his inability to get a 
non-menial job (he works as a janitor at Gattaca), Vincent decides to buy the 
identity of a genetically ideal individual, Jerome Eugene Morrow. Because of 
the nature of this society, genetic profiles have become the most precious 
commodity. Utilizing Jerome’s bodily fluids and clippings (hair, blood, urine, 
etc.), Vincent takes on the name and identity of Jerome (while Jerome now 
only uses his middle name, Eugene) and gains employment at Gattaca, this 
time as an engineer rather than a janitor. 
In a society that places so much faith in technology, people trust 
readouts of DNA rather than believe in their senses. They have become 
myopic because they trust the results provided by technology without 
question, believing machines infallible. However, trust in humans rather than 
in technology remains the key to improving the race because superior genes 
do not necessitate superior morality. The filmmakers depict the use of 
technology in improving the species as unproblematic: 
 
Unlike most bioethics texts that discuss gene therapy, 
however, GATTACA maintains that many of the problems 
associated with the new eugenics, such as genetic 
discrimination, genetic prophecy, and the homogenization 
of society, are not due to the technology itself. Rather, 
GATTACA proposes that these problems will only arise if 
the belief that individuals are no more than the sum of their 
genes becomes a matter of consensus: a black box.11 
 
There is nothing wrong with seeking to improve the physical attributes of 
individuals as long as we seek to improve the emotional ones. Engineered 
humans might be physically superior but they suffer from the same emotional 
weaknesses that their predecessors did, including discrimination. 
Enhancement needs to be as much about the spirit as about the body. 
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6. Conclusion 
Frankenstein and Brave New World deal with the loss of humanity 
through the auspices of technology. In Frankenstein, Victor exhibited moral 
failure, not because he created the Creature, but because he abandoned his 
responsibilities for his creation. While we identify with the society portrayed 
in the book, we also identify with the Creature, an orphan of early-modern 
society who must educate himself and rise above his ‘humble beginnings.’ In 
Brave New World, the situation reverses, with John the Savage taking on the 
role of the Creature. John mirrors the horror we feel for the society he has 
been introduced into. Huxley condemns this society not for its use of 
technology but for its worship of it in place of all other human endeavours. 
The films share many of these themes, depicting the effects of an over-
reliance on technology and the subsequent marginalization of those who fall 
into socially constructed categories of the undesirable. The creation of 
individuals through artificial means alters the way society conceives of 
reproduction, the creation of life, and defines the natural. Conversely, even as 
technology shapes society, members of society remain accountable for the 
effects of technology. Scientists cannot ignore the repercussions of a 
technology, dismissing the effects as someone else’s problem. Just as they 
worry about how their new offspring will act towards them, members of 
society must appreciate the way they will react to their discoveries. 
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My Self, My Avatar, My Rights: Rights of Avatar Identity 
and Integrity in Virtual Worlds 
 
David Lindsay, Melissa de Zwart and Francesca Collins 
 
Abstract 
Many people invest a lot of time and money in developing and customising 
their avatar, and consequently feel closely bonded with that avatar. This 
interdisciplinary paper will undertake a psycho-sociological analysis of the 
relationship between users and their avatars in social virtual worlds, and an 
assessment of the implications of this analysis for establishing legal rights in 
avatars. 
 
Key Words: Avatar, Identity, Regulation, Virtual Worlds. 
 
***** 
 
1.  Introduction 
This paper is an examination of the relationship between self-
expression, consumerism and identity in virtual worlds. In particular, the 
paper presents a psycho-sociological analysis of the relationship between 
users and their avatars in social virtual worlds, and an assessment of the 
implications of this analysis for establishing legal rights in avatars. The paper 
argues that normative questions relating to the extent to which users should 
have rights in their avatars necessarily depend upon the particular paradigm 
applied to understanding the relationship between users and avatars. 
 
2.  Avatars in Social Virtual Worlds 
The term avatar, derived from the Sanskrit for ‘incarnation’, has 
come to refer to a user’s online representation of herself or himself.1 The 
term, can mean any online representation of a user, including a simple screen 
name, the purely text-based constructs of early Multi-User Dungeons 
(MUDs), a two-dimensional icon used on internet forums, a pre-set visual 
character used in computer games, or a personalised three-dimensional visual 
representation used in social virtual worlds. 
Our current understanding of what amounts to an ‘avatar’ therefore 
lies on a continuum ranging from relatively simple forms of identity choices 
to choices that are becoming ever more complex, as virtual worlds become 
more sophisticated and immersive, and as the functionality of online bearers 
of identity increases. This continuum can, in fact, be traced to simple 
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representations of players in traditional off-line games. In different ways, and 
to varying degrees, traditional games have always offered players a choice of 
in-game identity. In chess, for example players have the choice of black or 
white pieces and in Monopoly, the choice of racing car, top hat or shoe. 
The nature of in-game identity formation became more complex 
with the advent of formal role-playing games, which have at their very core 
the adoption of player-created in-game identities. These formal role-playing 
games (RPGs) have taken a variety of forms, ranging from live action games, 
such as How to Host a Murder, to traditional table-top strategy games, such 
as Dungeons and Dragons. The pencil-and-paper RPGs, such as Dungeons 
and Dragons, were the progenitors of the first digital RPGs, which emerged 
in academic computer networks in the late 1970s. These digital RPGs, which 
became known as MUDs, were purely text-based worlds that revolved around 
the creation of an in-game character, with a declared name, qualities, abilities 
and preferences. In early MUDs, player self-expression through their digital 
identity was severely constrained by the rules of the RPG and game-play. 
With the development of graphical MUDs, and the increasing functionality of 
MUD-based programs, the visual appearance of a user’s online character, as 
opposed to other characteristics of the avatar, became more significant. 
In the late 1990s, the increase in computing power and readily 
available internet connectivity resulted in the development of multi-user 
online graphical RPGs, known as massively multiplayer online role-playing 
games, or MMORPGs.  While there is considerable divergence among 
MMORPGs, they share a number of features, especially the extent to which 
activities are goal-oriented, often taking the form of ‘quests’. Within this 
context, the progressive development of each user’s character through, for 
example, the accumulation of ‘experience points’ is, at the very least, a 
significant objective. At the same time, the overall goal-oriented character of 
these MMORPGs establishes some constraints on the ability of a user to 
create and modify her or his online representation. For example, in World of 
Warcraft, a new player must choose her or his online representation, known 
as a ‘character’, from two factions, ‘Alliance’ and ‘Horde’, and  ten playable 
races. 
MMORPGs must be distinguished from what may be termed social 
virtual worlds, which are essentially platforms for unstructured social 
interaction, rather than goal-oriented games. In social virtual worlds, such as 
Second Life, (SL) users can create and operate their avatars largely free from 
restrictions or rules. The visual appearance of the avatar assumes the utmost 
importance as it is the key medium for users to express themselves and their 
individuality, and the main way for users to signal their identity to other 
users.  Consequently, a major activity in social virtual worlds consists of the 
customisation of the appearance of an avatar by, for example, the alteration 
of body shape, skin, eye colour, and hair colour or style. The extent to which 
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a user is able to personalise her or his online representation and, 
correspondingly, the amount of time and resources invested in this activity, 
obviously influences the intensity of the relationship between the user and her 
or his avatar. Accordingly, this paper focuses on an analysis of the 
relationship between users and avatars in those social virtual worlds, such as 
SL, that provide the greatest capacity for individual modification of avatar 
appearance. 
 
3.  Identity Formation in Social Virtual Worlds 
  In complex, technologically-mediated, post-modern societies, 
problems relating to identity - including the nature of self-identity and 
subjectivity - have become absolutely central to socio-political analysis.2 
This is related to the progressive disconnection of individual 
identities from traditional, more rigidly-defined, collective identities. For 
example, in his influential account of the differences between identity 
formation in traditional societies and in post-traditional societies, Giddens 
draws an important distinction between personal identity and social identity.3 
According to Giddens, the problem of identity is central to modern societies 
in ways that it was not in traditional societies, as traditionally identity was 
essentially externally determined, whereas in modern societies, self-identity 
is made and not inherited. Thus, Giddens explained that, in post-traditional 
societies, identity is a ‘reflexive’ project, in which individuals must create 
themselves by means of their own narrative. In this way, Giddens was able to 
relate the contemporary focus on identity formation to broader institutional 
and political forces, including globalisation and the progressive 
fragmentation (or disintegration) of modern and postmodern societies. 
Problems of identity formation have been extensively applied to the 
online context by theorists, commencing with Sherry Turkle in her seminal 
work, Life on the Screen.4 Largely through an exploration of text-based 
MUDs, Turkle essentially argued that the exploration of identity through 
online interactions could be therapeutic, involving a continual reconstruction 
of the self through simulation. Turkle drew an important connection between 
experimentation with online identities and postmodern theory, maintaining 
that online interactions illustrate the extent to which life is discontinuous, 
fragmented, episodic and consequences-avoiding. 
Interestingly, the relative lack of constraints in social virtual worlds, 
such as SL, does not mean that such worlds are characterised by a lack of 
rules. Indeed, it appears that rules and ritualised behaviour, generated by 
communities of users, become relatively more important than in other online 
environments. For example, in SL there are distinct communities of users, 
such as Goreans and vampire bloodlines, whose interactions are characterised 
by extremely strict, and often quite detailed, rules of behaviour.5 
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A possible explanation of the importance of community rules in 
social virtual worlds can be found in the work of Judith Donath. Donath has 
applied signalling theory to investigate the revelation and withholding of 
identity information in online environments.6 Signalling theory, which 
analyses honesty and deception in communications, models the relationship 
between ‘signals’ and ‘qualities’ in order to show why some signals are 
reliable, while others are not. In social virtual worlds such as SL, the most 
important signals, such as name, avatar appearance and profile information, 
are both more highly controlled, and more malleable, than in offline contexts. 
Offline, there are a range of complex signals that are transmitted and 
processed, both consciously and unconsciously, concerning individual 
identity. For example, there are subtleties of gestures, body language, eye 
movement and voice intonation that are difficult to replicate online. As the 
accuracy of identity signals is more difficult to authenticate online, there is a 
need to develop a range of online signals, such as the exaggerated appearance 
of avatars and adherence to ritualised forms of behaviour. Thus, the 
exaggerated appearance of avatars, which often take the form of highly 
stereotyped characters, transmits immediate visual signals that may form the 
basis for future interactions. Similarly, the adoption of strongly rule-based 
forms of behaviour serves to ease anxieties about predictability in the absence 
of the full range of offline signals. In this respect, there are apparent parallels 
between communities in social virtual worlds and prison-based communities 
where the inmates are stripped of the accustomed richness of signals which 
form the basis for interactions outside of the prison walls.7 
There is also a corresponding convergence of online and offline 
models of identity formation, arising in part, because identity formation 
increasingly incorporates a virtual component. Consider, for example, the 
success of virtual communities such as Facebook, illustrating increasing 
dependence on the virtual for a continuing affirmation of self-identity. The 
virtual continues to ‘bleed’ into the real with the development of virtual 
‘friendships’. As a consequence, it appears that people are adopting and using 
some of the signalling behaviour learnt online to the offline context with an 
emphasis on appearance, and on the superficial and transient, over depth and 
persistence. 
 
4. Implications of Identity Formation in Social Virtual Worlds 
Post-modern theories of identity formation, on the fluid and 
fragmented nature of the self, are bifurcated into those who see the 
fragmented self as an opportunity for the creative exploration of multiple 
identities and those who regard these developments as, overall, a form of 
impoverishment of the self. Sherry Turkle, for example, highlights the 
potentially liberating features of the discontinuous, fractured and episodic 
nature of post-modern life. As opposed to this, Richard Sennett, in his book 
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The Corrosion of Character, sees the fragmented self as degenerating into a 
kind of ‘supermarket identity’, where each individual is in a perpetual state of 
anxiety about self-identity, which is dealt with by purchasing and consuming 
scraps of identity, that never quite fill the void.8 
   These competing tendencies in postmodern identity theory are 
related to the coexistence of modern and postmodern identities, a feature of 
contemporary societies that has been explored in the work of the sociologist, 
Zygmunt Bauman.9 Modern identity formation is based on a unitary concept 
of self-mastery, control of the contingent that leads to an idealised view of 
the perfectible self. The modern self is therefore defined in terms of a 
coherent project or narrative but, as the perfectible self can never be 
achieved, there is a void at the centre of the self that leads inexorably to 
alienation. The postmodern self, on the other hand, is based on the avoidance 
of any fixed identity, or ordered structures, with life being a series of 
fragmented, short-term events. 
The coexistence of the modern self and the postmodern self in 
contemporary societies has significant consequences when set against the 
backdrop of globalised market economies. The modern self is caught in a 
Sisyphean search for an ideal identity - for self-fulfilment - which the market 
promises can be purchased and consumed, but the postmodern self can only 
ever be ephemeral, as identity must continually be rebooted. Personal identity 
therefore becomes a process of continual questioning, which can never have 
any fixed answers. It is in this broader context that identity experimentation 
by means of the visual appearance of avatars must be positioned. 
 
5. Self-expression, Consumerism and Identity Formation in Social 
Virtual Worlds 
Just as there are two main interpretations of postmodern identity 
formation, there are two interpretations of the form of identity 
experimentation consisting of the acquisition and modifications of an avatar.  
On the first view, these activities are a form of creative self-
exploration, with the avatar comprising an extension of the offline self, and 
social virtual worlds presenting opportunities for forms of identity play that 
are not available offline, where the self is necessarily framed by a physical 
body. Applying this view, which feeds into the well-established 
cyberliberation and cyber-transcendence memes, avatars represent an 
opportunity for liberation and social virtual worlds are an important, 
relatively unconstrained, platform for self-development. 
The second view is that the fully customisable avatar represents the 
reductio ad absurdum of globalised consumer culture. On this view, the 
search for postmodern identity is neatly encapsulated by the obsessive, and 
apparently endless, modification of the appearance of avatars by means of the 
purchase of new skins, apparel or other accoutrements. Thus, the self is 
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condemned to the interminable, but unsatisfying, consumption of the virtual 
self. 
The two views of identity formation via avatars are associated with 
two fundamentally different ways of conceptualising the relationship between 
a user and her or his avatar. Applying the first view, if we interpret an avatar 
as a vehicle for self-exploration, then it represents a virtual extension of the 
user as a person; a creative projection of the self into the virtual world. On 
this approach, rights in or over avatars should be conceptualised as essential 
to the protection and promotion of the dignity and autonomy of users in 
virtual worlds. If the second, consumerist view is adopted, however, avatars 
are reducible to mere tools or puppets, to be used for the predominantly 
instrumentalist purposes of the user. On this approach, the relationship 
between the user and her or his avatar is essentially proprietorial, with the 
user having ownership rights in the avatar which may be readily bought and 
sold in the marketplace. On one view, rights in an avatar are an aspect of the 
rights that a user has in her or his person, whereas on the other view, avatars 
are little more than tools for the satisfaction of the consumerist needs of the 
user. 
In determining a legal regime that establishes user rights in avatars, 
it is of the utmost importance to choose which paradigm to apply. In this 
respect, the key normative legal issues are, first of all, whether the rights of 
users in avatars should be able to override the terms of service established by 
the provider of a social virtual world and, secondly, assuming that there is a 
case for overriding the terms of service, what are the circumstances, and on 
what basis, should the terms of service be overridden? 
   
6. Avatar Identity: Current Legal Issues 
The primary source for rights and rules affecting avatars is, as with 
everything else regarding virtual worlds, the relevant Terms of Service (ToS). 
The ToS are generally a one-sided contract for the benefit of the service 
provider, the only option the user having in the event of not being content 
with the ToS is exit. Even in SL, which promotes itself as the only world 
which grants rights of ownership to users of their creations, none of these 
rights are clearly defined, either in the ToS or any other Linden decree. The 
relevant ToS state that users retain copyright and all other intellectual 
property rights with respect to the content they create ‘to the extent that’ they 
have such rights under applicable law. 
Whilst the grant of ownership of copyright in creations in SL is well 
publicised, less well promoted are the exceptions also granted by the ToS. 
Users grant Linden Lab a worldwide licence to use, reproduce and distribute 
their content, including the right to delete such content at any time. Further, 
at the core of much user-generated content will be Linden Lab intellectual 
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property, such as textures and scripts. The user is expressed to have rights to 
use such Linden content only whilst they in compliance with the ToS.10 
So is it possible to clearly define in legal terms what the position is 
regarding a person’s ownership of intellectual property rights with respect to 
their avatar in SL? The lack of clarity of the ToS is further exacerbated by the 
practical fact that everything that is created within SL is currently stored on 
the Linden Lab servers in the form of computer code. Therefore, although the 
residents may think of their creations in terms of ‘things’, such as clothing or 
buildings, they are really the output of a computer program. That program is 
created and owned by Linden Lab. If Linden Lab were to go out of business 
overnight, and their servers seized and all content residing thereon deleted, 
the avatar, no matter how lovingly created, or how much money had invested 
in it, would cease to exist outside of photos and imagination. Thus, as Marcus 
has recently observed: ‘the total copyright environment is one of unclear 
rights and potentially infringing creative activity.’11 
What does this mean for projects which purport to offer users the 
ability to take their avatar outside of the walled garden of the game or world 
in which that avatar was created? In October 2007, Linden Lab and IBM 
announced a joint project to develop open standards to enable avatars to roam 
from one virtual community to the next. The goal is let a person create a 
digital alter-ego that can travel to many virtual worlds, keeping the same 
name, look and even digital currency. The companies speak of ‘a truly 
interoperable 3D Internet.’ Of course, this implies that a user is free to take 
the avatar they have created in one world and move it into the next.12 
The sole legal consideration of the ownership issues in the virtual 
world context to date has been by the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in a case which commenced in 2006. The 
plaintiff, Marc Bragg, a US attorney known in SL through his avatar, Marc 
Woebegon, owned a number of land parcels in SL and also operated a 
business selling virtual fireworks.  Linden Lab alleged that in April 2006, 
Bragg obtained a parcel of SL land in breach of the ToS. Linden Lab 
terminated Bragg’s account and confiscated all of his inworld assets 
(estimated value between US$6000-8000). Bragg brought an action against 
Linden Lab and CEO Philip Rosedale, claiming breach of the trade practices 
and consumer protection law, fraud, conversion, breach of contract, unjust 
enrichment and other claims in tort and contract.  Linden Lab and Rosedale 
resisted the action on a number of grounds, in particular, they filed a motion 
to compel arbitration of the dispute in San Francisco in accordance with the 
ToS. Robreno J held that the arbitration clause was unenforceable on the 
basis of procedural and substantive unconscionability. The case was settled in 
October 2007 without resolving the question of whether what Bragg 
possessed was virtual property and thus not providing any guidance on avatar 
rights. It is likely that Linden wanted to avoid opening up the question of 
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whether any rights existed in Bragg’s in-world assets outside the Linden-
favourable ToS.   
Another development is the increasing interest in marketing to 
avatars in-world. This raises the question of to whom the marketing is 
targeted, the avatar itself or the person behind the avatar?13 Notably, the 
operators of online communities retain the ownership of data generated about 
the user and this data may prove to be extremely valuable, in terms of 
transaction patterns, data about consumption and friendship groups. Privacy 
rights have yet to be created for avatars, yet of course, much of their data 
would map neatly against the interests of the human behind the avatar. Again, 
it is likely that users are not aware of the rights they give away in the 
standard ToS. For example, the SL ToS provide that Linden may observe and 
record user interactions within SL, and share that information with third 
parties. Further, Linden may collect and share general and demographic 
information, and may track, record, observe and follow your actions within 
SL. 14 Such rights may be become more valuable and contentious with the rise 
of new ‘consumer worlds’ such as Kaneva and Sony Home, which encourage 
the user to create an avatar which is a virtual clone, programmed with the 
user’s personal details and preferences. The ability to protect the identity, 
privacy and integrity of such an avatar may be even more important than with 
respect to the lovingly created social butterflies of SL. 
 
7. Conclusions 
  We are only beginning to understand the psychological and social 
processes underlying the creation and use of virtual world avatars and still 
further away from resolution of questions of avatar rights. What is clear is 
that, as users become more closely bonded with their avatars and invest more 
of themselves in those creations, they will become more concerned with 
protecting that investment, and the expressions of self embodied in those 
creations. Also, as social worlds emerge into more commercial environments, 
the protection of the information and creativity embodied in those avatars 
will become more important. It may be necessary to curtail the power of the 
ToS by introducing general laws that respect and protect the rights of the 
virtual self, through the grant of rights such as privacy and freedom of 
expression.
 
Notes 
 
1 In this context, the term was originally used for a character in the 1985 
computer game Ultima IV, before being popularised by Neal Stephenson in 
his 1992 cyberpunk classic, Snow Crash, see ‘Avatar (computing)’, in 
Wikipedia, June 2005, viewed on 4 June 2008, 
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<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avatar_%28computing%29>; N Stephenson, 
Snow Crash, ROC, London, 1992. 
2 See A Elliott, Concepts of the Self, 2nd ed, Polity, Cambridge, 2007. 
3 A Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late 
Modern Age, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1991. 
4 S Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet, Weidenfeld 
& Nicholson, London, 1996. See further, S L Calvert, ‘Identity Construction 
on the Internet’ in S L Calvert, A B Jordan & R R Cocking (eds), Children in 
the Digital Age: Influences of Electronic Media on Development, Praeger, 
Wesport, Connecticut, 2002, pp. 57-70 and J S Donath, ‘Identity and 
Deception in the Virtual Community’ in M Smith and P Kollock (eds), 
Communities in Cyberspace, Routledge, London, 1999, pp. 29-59. 
5 Gorean society, modelled on John Norman’s Chronicles of Gor series, is a 
master/slave society with extraordinarily strict rules: see Artemis Fate, ‘The 
Problems of Gor - Part 1: Philosophy, Society, Conditioning’ in The Second 
Life Herald, 27 November 2006, viewed 10 June 2008, 
<http://www.secondlifeherald.com/slh/2006/11/the_problems_of.html>. For 
an example of a SL game involving vampire bloodlines see: ‘The Thirst: 
Bloodlines’, viewed 8 June 2008, <http://www.slbloodlines.com/index.php>. 
6 J Donath, Signals, Truth, and Design, MIT Press, 2008. 
7 On ritual behaviour in prison gangs see K A Cheeseman, ‘Importing 
Aggression: An Examination and Application of Subculture Theories to 
Prison Violence’ The Southwest Journal of Criminal Justice, vol. 1 (1), 2003, 
pp. 24-38. 
8 R Sennett, The Corrosion of Character: the personal consequences of work 
in the new capitalism, Norton, New York, 1998. 
9 Z Bauman, Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality, Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1995; Z Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. 
10 See also MDY IndustriesLLC v Blizzard Entertainment, Inc CV-06-2555-
PHX-DGC, 14 July 2008. 
11 T Marcus ‘Fostering Creativity in Virtual Worlds: Easing the 
Restrictiveness of Copyright for User-created Content’, in 52 New York Law 
School Law Review 68, 69, 2008. 
12 See further New York Times, Link: <http://bits.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2007/10/10/free-the-avatars/>. 
13 P Hemp, ‘Avatar Based Marketing’, in Harvard Business Review, 48, June 
2006. 
14 Second Life, Terms of Service, accessed 5 June 2008, Link: 
<http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php>. 
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What does a Scanner See? Techno-Fascination and 
Unreliability in the Mind-Game Film 
 
Laura Schuster 
 
Abstract 
In popular cinema, paranoia and conspiracy plots often go hand in hand with 
questions of technological innovation. For example, A Scanner Darkly1 
combines issues such as audiovisual surveillance, conspiracy, and mediated 
manipulation without disambiguating between paranoid delusion and 
conventional causality. Films such as A Scanner Darkly signal a current shift 
in narrative cinema, and prompt a kind of spectator-engagement much in line 
with posthumanist views on subjectivity. Rather than pertaining to traditional 
notions of illusionism and suspension of disbelief, these ‘mind-game films’2 
employ unreliability and spectacle for the creation of unstable and synthetic 
storyworlds. While firmly embedded in the institution of narrative fiction 
cinema, this film presents novel and significant modes of signification and 
agency (even if limited or dystopian), both for those ‘trapped’ within its 
filmic story and for the spectators on its other end. 
 
Key Words: Cinema, Mediation, Perception, Posthuman, Spectatorship, 
Surveillance. 
 
***** 
 
1.  Introduction 
What if you found yourself in a surveillance monitoring room, 
forced to inspect recordings of yourself for signs of bad behaviour, and saw 
yourself in a situation you didn’t remember ever having been part of? Would 
you trust the surveillance camera, your memory, or your conscience? 
Luckily, the occurrence of this situation is not all that likely in reality. It 
would be almost a cliché, however, in nowadays’ cinema, where a wide array 
of what-if questions prompts an even wider array of scenarios concerning the 
future of technocratic western society. 
A Scanner Darkly fully exploits contemporary cinema’s vast range 
of possible image manipulations through a story of concealed identities, 
surveillance ‘scanner’ recordings, and large-scale conspiracy. It engages with 
current preoccupations around the thinning lines between mediation and 
manipulation, man and machine, perception and recording. The film’s 
protagonist, Robert Arctor (Keanu Reeves) is an undercover narcotics 
detective, but his undercover-ness works miraculous ways. In all police 
contact, he wears a so-called ‘scramble suit’, a full-body cover projecting a 
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continuous mixture of facial and bodily images to cover his own. His 
individual appearance, in reverse, serves as undercover identity. Arctor’s 
assignment is to infiltrate a circle of drug users and trace the source of their 
supplies, a goal pursued through a vast collection of informants, recordings, 
and interventions. As the group of addicts grows increasingly paranoid (or 
conscient) of surveillance, Arctor sinks further into addiction and delusion, 
and his two identities come under extensive interference. The question arises 
which identity preceded the other; it is suggested that the police or 
government have lured him into addiction unknowingly, in order to plant not 
a mole but a near-unconscious robot into their scheme. 
A mixture of recorded performances and animation, this film’s 
extravagant appearance allows for the seamless incorporation of different 
‘kinds’ of filmic sequences, most notably surveillance recordings and 
individuals’ hallucinations.3 Disambiguating between ‘actual’ and 
‘imagined’, or ‘past’ and ‘current’, events becomes a task in itself, and this 
trouble creates a parallel between characters and spectators, both attempting 
to make sense of their perceptions. The non-realistic appearance of this film 
also renders the film’s closing sequence rather stunning: it was all true, or at 
the very least the paranoia was not at all irrational. All along, the truth about 
their situation was much wilder than the protagonists’ imaginations. 
Like many recent films, A Scanner Darkly is as much concerned 
with the future of audiovisual media as with their effects on human 
perceptions. Technological manipulation and psychological delusions have 
long been a winning team in cinema, and the general nature of cinematic 
presentation is a probably cause for this. Itself a technology for manipulating 
time, reality, and observations, cinema has a well-stocked toolkit for playing 
with our minds and perceptions. In recent years, and quite likely under the 
influence of digitisation, it has perhaps begun to finally exploit this potential 
in full. This film is exemplary in how it thematizes contemporary cinema’s 
exploration of old, new, and imagined audiovisual technologies. Surveillance 
and data-gathering are a common concern here, reminiscent of control-
society science fiction films such as Gattaca (1997) and Minority Report 
(2002). Another clear preoccupation is the manipulability of perceptions and 
memories, also featured in the Matrix trilogy (1999, 2003) and Eternal 
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2003). 
 
2.  Unreliable Cinema 
These films clearly indicate that technological control is not 
something external to mankind, but an extension of man’s desire to survey, 
record, control, and where needed, manipulate. Along with this insight, 
typically flaunted and effaced at the same time, often comes a tight structure 
of self-reflexivity that foregrounds a film’s own technology display; it 
presents advanced media technologies as a cause for fear while fetishising the 
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threat, allowing the spectator to admire those cinematic technologies that 
produced such spectacle. Technology display is often the most heavily 
advertised attraction of a feature film concerned with the possibly harmful 
consequences of technological innovations, which elicits a rather ambiguous 
position on the matter. 
Though techno-dystopia has for long been a strong current in 
popular cinema fiction4, it makes sense to interpret its recent proliferation as 
‘symptomatic’ of various mutations within narrative cinema. There has been 
much discussion of cinema’s confrontation with its 100-year anniversary and 
history, while postmodern pastiche and self-reflexivity practices may suggest 
that both ‘artistic’ and Hollywood storytelling conventions have long 
exhausted themselves and the Ouroboros circles of poststructuralist theories 
collide with the cinephilia of semiotic and aesthetic film analysis. These 
issues have contributed to a felt collapse of borders and demarcations, 
ranging from genre classifications to industrial organisations. 
And then, of course, there is the horizon of the digital, which 
changes our definition of cinema even if it does not announce its end. While 
some theorists have long proclaimed the ‘death’ of cinema, and others predict 
a fully transformed cinema of the future, many remain sceptical on whether 
the digital really announces such a paradigmatic shift.5 A common conclusion 
is that whereas the manipulability, impermanence, and flexibility of digital 
information allow and force cinema to go just about anywhere, the 
established principles of narrative cinema are unlikely to be fully abandoned. 
Spectatorship as a theoretical concept once more steps to the fore; as Matt 
Hanson observes:  
 
The digitization of cinema means elements can be fused 
and altered by the processor, blurring the lines previously 
dividing these established schools and their traditions. The 
800lb gorilla of moving image, the feature film, is 
increasingly coming under attack. It needs to shape up, 
mutate, and evolve if it is to stay relevant in a universe of 
changing hardware, content, and, ultimately, the thing that 
matters most: viewer expectations.6 
 
The impact of the digital is also crucial to Laura Mulvey’s notion of a current 
‘technological curiosity’. Diversifying digital film practices and the current 
proliferation of cinema history through DVD culture, she argues, add to a 
situation where almost anything can be ‘done’ to pre-existing film images 
(while, as Hanson points out, almost anything can be created in new ones):  
 
In this dialogue between old and new, past and present the 
opposition between film and new technologies begins to 
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break down and the new modes of spectatorship illuminate 
aspects of cinema that, like the still frame, have been 
hidden from view.7 
 
Rather than address their position within the institution of cinema, however, I 
want to discuss how recent techno-fascinated films, with A Scanner Darkly as 
a representative, incorporate and produce changing notions of spectatorship 
and subjectivity. Thomas Elsaesser suggests that this type, which fits his 
notion of ‘mind-game films’, creates something like a novel ‘viewing 
contract’ with audiences: 
 
The new contract between spectator and film is no longer 
based solely on ocular verification, identification, 
voyeuristic perspectivism and ‘spectatorship’ as such, but 
on the particular rules that obtain for and, in a sense, are the 
conditions for spectatorship […] What makes the mind-
game films noteworthy in this respect is the ‘avant-garde’ 
or ‘pilot’ or ‘prototype’ function they play within the 
‘institution cinema’ at this juncture, where they, besides 
providing ‘mind-games’, ‘brain-candy’ and often enough, 
spectacular special effects, set out to train, elaborate, and 
yes: ‘test’ the textual forms, narrative tropes and story 
motifs that can serve such a re-negotiation of the rules of 
the game.8 
 
Though hardly new inventions, the current popularity and ubiquity of self-
reflexive technology comments in popular cinema affect our sense of 
perception, cognition, and ultimately, our sense of subjectivity, indeed 
creating a new kind of spectatorship. One of the new rules is ‘take nothing for 
granted’: a typical mind-game film will play on viewers’ expectations and 
disprove assumptions by showing its own manipulative sleight of hand. 
Unreliability is a returning factor in the mind-game film, quite more 
extensively so than it has been in detective, avant-garde, and art-house films 
over the past century. In these films, unreliable narration always carries an 
ontological component, a doubt about the trustworthiness of reality and of 
perceptions. Audiovisual technologies within the filmic world are often 
blamed for the loss of reliability: they facilitate the manipulation of 
characters’ perceptions, memories, and/or environments, and sometimes 
literally pull the ground from under one’s feet. 
Surveillance recordings in A Scanner Darkly colour the filmic 
presentation, but also interfere with characters’ perceptions of their own 
identities, and with the world around them. The trouble, however, neither 
ends nor starts here: regardless of the scanners, protagonists’ own perceptions 
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and conclusions are hopelessly compromised by drug-induced paranoia and 
cognitive deterioration. There is no stable or natural ground below the 
confusions and manipulations. Conspiracy, paranoia, surveillance, and 
delusion interact in a causal feedback loop, where a narcotics agent is 
manipulated into a brain-damaging addiction and forced to spy on himself, 
finding his own perceptions muddled by recordings. Once fully alienated 
from any self-image or reliable thought, he is planted in a rehabilitation clinic 
in the hopes that he, unaware, will supply proof of the suspicion that these 
clinics themselves manufacture the drugs they proclaim to fight. 
 
3. Machine Vision 
By emphasising issues of perception and memory, mind-game films 
often hint at the position of the spectator vis-à-vis the film. When considering 
the way we understand narrative cinema, and the confusing narrative 
presentations of the mind-game film in particular, it is only a small step from 
spectators’ ‘illusions’ to protagonists’ delusions, and this is one example of 
how mind-game films tie their audience into the game. In their insistence 
upon the unreliability of information and the fragmented nature of 
consciousness, these films offer a sense of subjectivity that is characterised 
by synthetic-ness in both senses of the word: it is as fabricated as it is 
combinatory. 
A peculiar sequence in A Scanner Darkly is instructive here. After 
first dismissing as a dream-like hallucination his disturbing experience of 
waking up next to a prostitute and for a moment seeing her change into 
Donna, the girl he actually desires, Arctor is shocked to find his hallucination 
validated a few days later. When reviewing surveillance footage of himself as 
part of his incognito narcotics investigation, it turns out that the camera has 
registered the exact same transformation: it shows Arctor waking up at night 
and staring in shock as his anonymous bed-mate changes into the image of 
Donna, and back. This constitutes a doubling of artificiality-effects. What we 
spectators see is pure mediation, to be attributed with as much realism as we 
like, but within the filmic diegesis there exists a concrete battle over the 
ontology of the filmic image, the tensions between objective registration and 
the mental projections of the observer. This battle, moreover, is not an 
auteurist, intellectual observation but exerts a concrete effect upon the lives 
of the film’s characters. 
‘When narrative functionalities change’, N. Katherine Hayles 
remarks on cyborg literature, ‘a new kind of reader is produced by the text.’9 
This is exactly what happens with the mind-game film: it dramatically 
transgresses the traditional positioning of the spectator by Hollywood 
mainstream pre-1990s cinema. Both more open and more closed to the 
spectator, offering views from ‘impossible’, multiple, or contradictory 
perspectives, deciding not to distinguish between objective and subjective 
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views or representations, jumping between characters and playing constantly 
with factors of restricted and omniscient narration, its storytelling and style 
create a high degree of narrative complexity.10 Some typical effects and 
stylistic strategies have quickly established themselves as genre markers: 
examples are the now-famous bullet time and point-of-view shots from the 
‘perspective’ of non-organic currents or information flows. Through the 
constant ambiguations between actual, imagined, and diegetically recorded 
sequences, A Scanner Darkly corresponds exactly to what Elsaesser, in a 
discussion of the authenticity and archive function of recordings, refers to as: 
new ones):  
 
a contest […] between two kinds of recording-system (the 
human mind and psyche on the one hand, the camera and 
sensor on the other), whose data in each case are treated 
[…] as (raw) material or information, rather than as 
documents or embodied action.11 
 
Whether the filmic enunciation motivates its information as psychic or actual, 
both remain the ‘raw data’ of the film itself and function as its real 
components. To my mind, such self-reflexive layering of recordings can 
achieve more than a mere ‘postmodern’ sense of hyperreality or techno-
fetish. It suggests a redefinition of human subjectivity, knowledge, and 
engagement with the technologically mediated world presented by and within 
a film. 
These novel perspectives and effects often point to the interaction 
and (in)compatibility of mechanical and human perceptions, a continuous 
preoccupation in cinema from Vertov to Godard. Now, however, it is all over 
the mainstream multiplex cinemas and our home entertainment systems. 
From a film-historical, but also from a much wider perspective, this is no 
coincidence: in western culture today, concrete manifestations of this matter 
abound. We find ourselves interacting with - and depending on - machine 
observations most every day, in ways not altogether dissimilar from the 
dystopian situations in A Scanner Darkly or Minority Report. Manifestations 
and examples range from long-distance communication to artificial 
intelligence, videogames and training simulations to information warfare, 
Photoshop to DNA analysis. 
There are a number of different ways to argue that the mind-game 
film is symptomatic of a relatively new conception of subjectivity - one that 
has emerged over the past 10 years and under the influences of technological 
restructurations and scientific preoccupations. This notion is usually 
assembled under the header of ‘the posthuman’, although it in fact has little 
to do with not-being-human-anymore. Posthumanist issues such as artificial 
intelligence and consciousness lead to a conception of the human individual 
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that does not pose a break from humanity, but rather a move away from a 
historically-developed and culturally distinct sense of humanism which 
involves individuality, uniqueness, truth, objectivity, embodiment, freedom, 
will, and agency. Very much in line with the posthuman, Garrett Stewart 
proposes the term ‘postsubjective virtuality’ for what happens in films akin to 
those I have mentioned, though for the underdetermination of images, 
perspectives, and validity that I take as determinants in my corpus, I prefer 
the term ‘transsubjective’.12 This choice is partly in order to avoid confusion 
with the Lacanian and Lyotardan understanding of intersubjectivity as a 
social phenomenon of communication and meaning-production,13 and partly 
to emphasise the transferable, borderless, and unstable nature of subjectivity 
amidst the technological and psychological distortions of mind-game films. 
 
4. Obscure Perceptions 
Identity is the key arena for all these distortions to be played out: 
like many mind-game films, A Scanner Darkly is riddled with doppelgänger 
motifs, counter-identities, amnesia, and split personalities. Without entering 
the realm of cyborgs, the questioning, fragmentation, and splitting of 
identities in A Scanner Darkly establishes a similar discussion of human 
identity, consciousness, and subjectivity. Arctor finds his identity muddled 
not only by the surveillance of himself he is forced to process, but also by the 
dwindling of his mental faculties due to the drugs he has himself become 
addicted to during his undercover narcotics investigation. All these internal 
and external influences contaminate any clear-cut, coherent sense of self; 
Arctor perfectly illustrates the posthuman notion, here phrased by Slavoj 
Žižek, that: 
 
At the level of material reality (inclusive of the 
psychological reality of ‘inner experience’) there is in 
effect no Self: the Self is not the ‘inner kernel’ of an 
organism, but a surface-effect. A ‘true’ human Self 
functions, in a sense, like a computer screen: what is 
‘behind’ it is nothing but a network of ‘selfless’ neuronal 
machinery.14 
 
In a fitting scene, Arctor delivers a work speech in his scramble suit, but 
suffers extreme discomfort halfway. His perceptions of the audience are truly 
caught in the prism of filmic representation: before the blur of his scramble 
suit, we see the markings ‘Live’ and ‘HQ’ within what is supposedly Arctor’s 
vision. Arctor’s subjective perceptions appear filtered by the panoptical reign 
of his employer; our perceptions of the film are filtered by its logic of 
surveillance and mediation. 
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In this sense, the inhabitants of A Scanner Darkly’s world are 
subject to pre-selected and fragmented information as much as its spectators 
are - body, mind, and soul, it seems. Arctor’s quasi-philosophical soliloquy 
(another trademark feature of mind-game films), taken almost verbatim from 
the film’s literary source, Philip K. Dick’s 1977 novel of the same name, 
goes as follows: 
 
Whatever it is that’s watching, it’s not human, unlike little 
dark eyed Donna. It doesn’t ever blink. What does a 
scanner see? Into the head? Down into the heart? Does it 
see into me, into us? Clearly or darkly? I hope it sees 
clearly, because I can’t any longer see into myself. I see 
only murk. I hope for everyone’s sake the scanners do 
better. Because if the scanner sees only darkly, the way I 
do, then I’m cursed and cursed again. I’ll only wind up 
dead this way, knowing very little, and getting that little 
fragment wrong too. 
 
Such ontological doubt, caused by confrontation with alternative, nonhuman 
perceptive and interpretive systems, is a key structure of techno- and 
futurophobia. It corresponds nicely with what Hayles identifies as a common 
connection between the assumptions undergirding the liberal humanist 
subject and the ethical position that humans, not machines, must be in 
control. Such an argument assumes a vision of the human in which conscious 
agency is the essence of human identity. Sacrifice this, and we humans are 
hopelessly compromised, contaminated with mechanic alienness in the very 
heart of our humanity.15 
But we need not necessarily ascribe to A Scanner Darkly’s pessimist 
foreboding of a future technocracy with our bodies and mind lost in 
mediation. Arctor expresses hope that exactly the non-humanness of scanner 
vision will compensate for the ‘murk’ of his own, for his incapability of 
reconstructing himself as a subject. The manipulations at play in this film are 
of humans, by humans, and often by individuals upon themselves. 
Furthermore, whereas this film’s characters may be trapped in the 
doomsday picture of a humanity without self or agency, I suggest that the 
way we spectators can understand, enjoy, and engage with such disorienting 
narrative structures and presentations is in itself good news. Over the course 
of a century, film spectatorship has come a long way. A Scanner Darkly is 
arguably not an outstanding intellectual film, and did not do particularly well 
in sales. It shows, however, that narrative cinema does not necessarily rely 
upon illusionism, photographic indexicality, or on psychological audience-to-
protagonist identification. In the end it is the filmic text that we must believe 
in, not the (in)accurate perceptions of an ‘informant’. The blinking ‘HQ’ 
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indicators, along with many other markers of machine vision and sound, 
disembody but also render coherent its mode of communication. We only 
have its enunciation as a whole, comprised of fragmented sequences of 
heterogeneous origins - contamined by mediation, perhaps, but also rendered 
presentable by it. 
Confusion in itself can be a source of enjoyment; in fact, the puzzle 
aspect of mind-game films is their most appreciated and discussed feature. 
This I take as an indication that, indeed, these films serve as our pilots into 
‘the posthuman’, if we are not already there. Mind-game films show that the 
subject is willing to give up a bit of stable ground and surrender to the 
unreliable or the hypothetical - as far as cinema is concerned, at least. 
 
Notes
 
1 R Linklater, (dir), A Scanner Darkly, Motion Picture, Warner Brothers, 
Warner Independent Pictures, 100 min., 2006. 
2 Coined by Thomas Elsaesser. 
3 Through the use of rotoscoping, camera recordings were re-rendered as 
animation; this facilitates the incorporation of surrealistic objects, 
technologies, and sequences. As such, Linklater’s film fully affirms the 
‘return’ to animation and imaging explorations that, according to a number of 
media theorists including Sean Cubitt and Lev Manovich, is a side-effect of 
digitisation in filmic practice. 
4 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) and Blade Runner (1982) are classic 
examples. 
5 Within the arena of media-technology debate, theorists predicting a fully 
transformed future cinema include Mark B.N. Hansen, Friedrich Kittler, 
David Tafler, Yvonne Spielmann, and Peter Wollen. Perspectives 
emphasising the continuation of established cinematic principles are 
forwarded by Sean Cubitt, Anne Friedberg, Daniel Frampton, Matt Hanson, 
Lev Manovich, and Marie-Laure Ryan, to name but a few. For more on this 
matter, see Thomas Elsaesser and Kay Hoffmann (eds), Cinema Futures: 
Cain, Abel or Cable? The Screen Arts in the Digital Age, Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam UP, 1998, or Shilo T. Mcclean, Digital Storytelling: The 
Narrative Power of Visual Effects in Film, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2007. 
6 M Hanson, The End of Celluloid: Film Futures in the Digital Age, 
Rotovision SA, Hove (UK), 2004, p. 9. 
7 L Mulvey, Death 24x a Second: Stillness and the Moving Image, Reaktion, 
London, 2006, p. 27. 
8 T Elsaesser, ‘The Mind-Game Film’, in Puzzle Films: Complex Storytelling 
in Contemporary Cinema, W Buckland (ed), Blackwell, Oxford, 
forthcoming. 
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9 N K Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature, and Informatics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago/London, 
1999, p. 47. 
10 The narrative complexity of contemporary popular fiction films has been 
stressed by many narratologically-inclined film theorists, including David 
Bordwell, Edward Branigan, Warren Buckland, and Erven Lavik. I am 
convinced, however, that its identification is not a sufficient end in itself, but 
rather a means of entry into the complexity of the issues raised through these 
films’ difficult storytelling strategies. 
11 T Elsaesser, ‘The New Film History as Media Archaeology’, in Cinemas, 
vol. 14, nr. 2-3, Spring 2005, p. 108. 
12 G Stewart, Framed Time: Toward a Postfilmic Cinema, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago/London, 2007, p. 211: ‘the technofantastic plots of 
recent Hollywood films, along with their low-tech supernatural variants, 
indulge in what we might call a postsubjective virtuality.’ Though Stewart’s 
interest lies with the temporal distortions brought on by technological and 
supernatural presences in contemporary cinema, his conclusions apply 
perfectly to this article’s concern with mediation and subjectivity.   
13 For more on this conception of the intersubjective, see for instance Haidar 
Eid, ‘Lyotard, Habermas, and the Virtue of the Universal’, in Kritikos Online 
Journal, Vol. 4, May 2007, Intertheory Press, last updated May 2007, viewed 
May 28th, 2008, <http://intertheory.org/eid.htm>. 
14 S Žižek, The Parallax View, MIT Press, Cambridge (US), 2006, p. 206. 
15 Hayles, p. 288. 
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Abstract 
Recognised as one of the greatest inventions of the 20th century, the Internet 
has received overwhelming attention as a conduit for sales, deviance and 
experimentation. This paper examines one of the oldest forms of 
communication in Cyberspace, the Bulletin Board, as a community and space 
shaped by the same philosophical theories that shape the spaces that we relate 
to in ‘the real’. In order to add social weight and urgency to cyberspace, the 
paper uses the analogy of ant colonies, a near perfect example of ground-up 
organization. The author postulates that Internet aggregates in a similar way 
to ants, through the study of necessity and pattern, suggesting gold circuitry, 
soldered metal and spinning magnets represent only a small portion of what 
makes the Internet function. 
 
Key Words: Cyberspace, Bulletin Board, Message Board, Virtual 
Community, Ground Up Organization. 
 
***** 
 
 The idea of ‘the web’ without ‘net neutrality scares me. It scares me 
because I feel as though the idea of a completely filtered or ‘channelled’ net 
is a symptom of a mindset surrounding the Internet that it is less then what it 
actually is. It’s just a game, a shopping mall, an adult film theatre. It’s a 
grotesque manifestation of a Western desire to consume, or a place where 
people make each other angry for the sake of amusement. That it is just these 
things and that because it is just these things, boxing it and controlling it and 
wrestling it the ground to make it easier to consume, understand and navigate 
is alright. 
 But the web can’t always be added and subtracted like that. It 
doesn’t always add up because cyberspace is made up of more then just 
simply designer shoe outlets and movie theatres. When focused on those 
things it’s easier to lose sight of what makes the web a truly remarkable 
invention but by looking at its structure, one can be reminded. 
 One amazing and often under-appreciated aspect of cyberspace, or 
the great unplanned web called the Internet, is that it is a near perfect 
example of ground-up organization without a pacemaker, a theory with roots 
in behavioural science, that can been seen from self aggregating slime mould 
to ant colonies. There was no grand design for what users see today when 
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they visit cyberspace, no creator. There was an idea, or rather, a series of 
ideas that led to the generation of new thoughts and projects, like a worker 
ant’s pheromone trail directing its peers by simply doing its own job, or a 
single cell’s cyclic AMP acting as makeshift instructions for others 1. It could 
be said that the Internet aggregated in a similar way, through the study of 
necessity and pattern. It was designed entirely by people meeting needs. 
‘Perhaps great portions of the Net are composed of these cultures of 
compatible, thought not always convivial, consumption.’2 A great deal of 
cyberspace is people, not the machine, a bizarre thought for something that 
has spawned so much ‘self realizing evil machine’ literature. It acts as a 
‘vision machine’3 that connects people in a myriad of different ways. 
 It would seem as though cyberspace is a great invention of mankind, 
and while it is by no stretch of the imagination a ‘natural structure,’ it came 
to be in a very organic way. For certain, the ‘parts that facilitate the practice’ 
[modems, routers, hard disk] of the Internet are inorganic and designed with 
an express purpose, but what of the structure of the Internet itself? Consider 
ant colonies. The structure of the ants living space, the creation and 
maintaining of cemeteries, garbage dumps, the protection of the queen, the 
defence of the colony by the collective, all of these phenomenon come from 
the bottom up. A need is assessed, expressed through the release of 
pheromones and then met by individual workers4. In Steve Johnson’s book 
‘Emergence,’ he draws parallels between this behaviour and the way humans 
structure many of their own ‘artificial’ creations like cities. The fact is ant 
colonies are a great metaphor for the Internet as well. People [or groups of 
people] observe what is out there, and then create content based on what they 
see or do not see. If the Internet is in actuality an ‘organic’ structure, of what 
stuff is it made? The answer, of course, is human beings. The technology is 
gold circuitry, soldered metal and spinning magnets but a great portion of the 
net is organic. It may be easier to think of cyberspace, the Internet and 
‘virtual communities’ in this way, but allocating a physical location and a 
mode of passage to a tiny circuit board seems indefinitely constraining when 
talking about what many argue is the most important invention of this 
century. ‘But such a mapping of hardware, while absolutely crucial, misses 
so much of what is going on in cyberspace.’5 
  
Where is cyberspace? We can answer this in a number of 
ways. We might say that cyberspace exists in the network 
of computers, modems, communication links, nodes and 
pathways that connect users to something (or some things) 
like the World Wide Web, the Internet, the information 
superhighway, and so on. We could make Cyber-Space, in 
short, as the sum of the hardware that facilitates its 
practice.6 
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This inability to separate the Internet from the confusing technology that 
‘makes it work’ [a concept that is foreign at worst and difficult to embody at 
best] is part of the reason people experience a disconnect from its importance 
and potential. The idea that the Internet, and the cyberspaces which it 
contains are somehow ‘inhuman’ or ‘alien’ because they are ‘virtual’ and not 
‘physical’ or somehow ‘robotic,’ creates an effect that essentially makes 
cyberspaces the other, in relation to ‘real spaces.’ 
 
Space is in essence that for which room has been made, that 
which is let into its bounds. That for which room is made is 
always granted and hence is joined, that is, gathered, by 
virtue of a location that is by such a thing as the bridge. 
Accordingly, spaces receive their beings from locations and 
not from ‘space.’7 
 
Spaces are those for which room is made by the act of thinking of them. 
Areas where humans dwell in, which become locations, and then, after the 
establishment of boundaries on this location [this is the bridge, and this is 
not] man breaks locations into spaces. To use Heidegger’s example of the 
bridge, he states: 
 
Before the bridge stands, there are of course many spots 
along the stream that can be occupied by something. One of 
them proves to be a location, and does so because of the 
bridge. Thus the bridge does not first come into a location 
to stand in it; rather a location comes into existence only by 
virtue of the bridge.8 
 
It is the thing [in this example, the bridge] that allows for location and 
ultimately space. The thing is what allows for the reflection of existence 
[what Heidegger calls the ‘fourfold’] that leads to the creation of spaces, in 
the ‘real’ world.  The bridge facilitates the creation of a space by people’s 
relationship to the location. What it may be for one person in terms of space, 
say a ‘homeless’ person who sees it as a ‘living space’ would be different for 
another person who simply uses it to cross a stream. 
 Cyberspaces are, in terms of this definition, similar to real spaces, in 
that they are in fact creations of those people who occupy or dwell within 
them. The creation of cyberspaces can be seen to be in parallel with the 
creation of real spaces. Heidegger’s bridge example is experienced in the real 
world. There is a stream, and on this stream man builds a thing, a bridge. 
What is a stream? A need, one would suppose. A stream, in relation to man, 
is a need to be able to cross it. So, in cyberspace there is a need, identified by 
people, to cross a virtual gap, to connect with others with similar interests. 
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They create a thing that facilitates this crossing [in the context of this paper, a 
web based discussion board]. Once this thing comes into existence, it 
becomes a location, and when people start relating to this location, it 
becomes a space. 
 ‘Dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on earth,’.9 An 
important statement, he’s saying that this is what people do, they exist on the 
planet earth, and reduce that to a scale they can relate to by the building of 
things that allow the creation of place. ‘We do not dwell because we have 
built, but we build and have built because we dwell, that is, because we are 
dwellers.’10 If dwelling is intrinsic to the human experience [or more so, it 
simply is the human experience], then where we dwell and how that space is 
built become very important factors. 
 Locations and places are constructed with purpose. The bridge was 
built to cross. Whether or not these places are ‘virtual’ or not does not change 
this fact. Sometimes, though, critically analyzing the structure of a place can 
reveal that it’s not always contributing toward the meeting of its purpose as a 
space. For example, public schools in the U.S are supposed to be institutions 
of education, but a walk through of many of these schools, who’s supposed 
goal is to become a ‘learning’ space, would reveal a myriad of distractions 
for the students. Soda machines on every floor supplying beverages loaded 
with sugar, uncomfortable chairs and tiny classrooms. How do these things 
affect the mindsets of students and teachers who are creating the space 
through relation? Is that making it easier or more difficult to treat it as a 
learning space? 
 Virtual communities as they exist on the Internet have no real 
physical manifestation beyond the hardware, which stores the code that 
enables these things to exist. However, in terms of the above definition, they 
are certainly cyberspaces. They have the ability to be occupied by any 
number of things. First, the user, a person who has chosen to participate in 
the community and engage in a discussion about a range of topics, and then 
whatever the user chooses to ‘post,’ whether that be text, photographs, videos 
or sounds. Of course, the question remains: who are these people and what 
exact part of them is occupying this cyberspace. It cannot be their actual, 
physical bodies. No, those bodies never move when engaging in the 
relationship with the website. So it must be something else, an extension of 
one’s supposed personality or identity. It cannot be the physical presence or 
‘authentic’ identity [not necessarily physical but often verified that way], as 
that can only exist in the physical world, and so it must be a ‘virtual identity.’  
There is much argument in literature about cyberspace, both academic and 
fictional, that the crux of the difference between the ‘cyber-world’ and the 
‘real world’ is this notion of ‘virtual’ or constructed identity, the freedom for 
the user to be whomever he or she wants, to look [or say they look] however 
they want, and of course have license to act however they want. However, as 
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Kevin Robin’s states in his piece, ‘Cyberspace and the World we live in,’ 
‘only the technology is new: in the games and encounters in cyberspace it 
seems, there is little that is new or exciting. Rheingold believes that they have 
their roots ‘deep in that part of human nature that delights in storytelling and 
playing pretend.’11 The idea of identity as performance or constructed 
identity is not new or by any means exclusive to cyberspace. So, while yes, 
among message boards and forums, the fact that identity is a malleable factor 
for the users certainly can contribute to patterns of behaviour, focusing on 
that notion would seem more of an excuse, suggesting that regardless of the 
work put in to shape a space, the outcome would be the same, given that 
human beings cannot act anonymously and responsibly at the same time. 
 The first community being examined is Tribalwar.com. 
Tribalwar.com is, as rated by Big-Boards.com, the 102nd largest discussion 
forum on the planet, out of the top two thousand boards. This led to the 
creation of Tribalwar.com, described by Big-Boards.com as ‘supposed to be 
about the Starsiege: Tribes series of games, it hasn’t been for a while, but has 
become a community about life, news, games, drama, girls, and so much 
more. It is considered by its members like a little hostile family.’12 The 
community has roughly 21,000 individual members and has hosted almost a 
million separate discussions. 
  The second virtual community being looked at is 
SomethingAwful.com, affectionately called SA by its users, who themselves 
identify as ‘goons.’  SA is the 12th largest forum on the planet, boasting 
106,000 individual active users and has facilitated well over 6 million 
individual discussions since it’s creation in 1999.13 
 The first set of rules that any cyberspace must have are dictated by 
the programmer[s] who creates the website and writes the code that allows 
users to make posts, reflect, and discuss. These rules generally do not take in 
account content, and such is the way both of the cyberspaces looked at in this 
piece were created. There is no ‘bot’ parsing the site for curse words or hate 
speech. The code states what users can and cannot do in regards to the 
functionality of the space. They can write, post images, and link other content 
user hyper links. They cannot user voice chat, video chat, or instant 
messaging or chat rooms. A user would need to enter a different cyberspace 
for those things, as these websites simply do not facilitate those functions. 
The ultimate law in cyberspaces is the code, and the code doesn’t care how 
you behave. Much like the laws of physics for example. 
 Beyond the cyberspace’s ‘natural law,’ there is a written law crafted 
by the creators. When a user enters both of the websites in question, before 
being allowed to officially create an account and start posting, there is a list 
of rules that they must read, or at least confirm they’ve read by checking a 
box. The logical reasoning would be to read the rules if you actually want to 
stay on the board for a long period of time. Failure to follow the rules and the 
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administrator of the board [or any number of deputies appointed by them] 
will result in either a temporary or permanent ban from the website. 
Tribalwar.com’s formal rules start with an interesting disclaimer. 
 
Interpretation and enforcement of the rules is up to the 
moderators and administrators of the site. This document is 
only a general guideline and not a definitive document of 
the actions taken by those left in charge of making sure the 
forum is running smoothly and within the boundaries of 
some semblance of taste ... not to mention the law. Don’t 
try and rules lawyer an administrator based on what you 
think the rules should be or you will wind up with a pissed 
off administrator unsympathetic to your cause. Reasonable 
explanations and apologies will of course be considered.14 
 
Essentially the people who run this cyberspace are taking the right to 
interpret the rules they list [which are in themselves relatively relaxed] with 
full flexibility. As the description from Big-boards.com says, Tribalwar.com 
identifies as a sort of ‘hostile little family’ and as such in families, exceptions 
are made ‘given the circumstances.’ In reality, however, that disclaimer has 
led to a number of long drawn out fights between the users and the 
administrators about unfair treatment, special treatment, and refusal to uphold 
rules. SomethingAwful.com also has a disclaimer, though theirs is of an 
entirely different nature. 
 
We here on the Something Awful Forums are very elitist 
and strict assholes. We pride ourselves on running one of 
the most entertaining and troll-free forums on the Internet. 
This is accomplished by charging a $10 fee to filter out 
folks not serious about adhering to the rules, and banning 
those who manage to slip through and break them. We are 
very serious about keeping our forums clean and troll-free, 
so please consider your account an investment and treat it 
accordingly. Read the rules, use common sense, and help 
keep the SA Forums the best message board on the 
Internet.15 
 
The rules then go on to give users guidelines and warnings about how and 
when to post, and reply to threads. They suggest ‘lurking’ before posting, 
which essentially means just reading the site for a number of weeks and 
really getting a handle on the way things work. Almost all of the rules on 
SomethingAwful.com’s site have to do with facilitating conversation, where 
as Tribalwar.com’s site rules are really more based around appeasing 
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administrators and keeping the website out of legal trouble. SomethingAwful 
warns against ‘low content posts...worthless posts...’ and has a definite stance 
on harassment. They say ‘flaming’ which is basically arguing with, cursing 
at, or annoying another member of the community does not, in fact, break the 
rules unless it gets in the way of other peoples conversation. You cannot be 
banned for sending someone private messages expressing your hatred for 
them, but you can be banned for having that conversation right in the middle 
of an active discussion. One interesting point is that their ‘hate speech’ rule is 
completely about the interpretation of the message. 
 
I Hate Speech: Offensive terms such as ‘f-word’ or ‘n-
word’ may or may not be bannable based on context of the 
sentence. If they were meant as humour with absolutely no 
offensive slurs meant, the user may not be banned or 
probated. This rule is completely, 100% subjective and is 
based on the mod reading the post at the time. Use at your 
own peril.16 
 
Clearly these rules, part of the ‘foundation’ that these communities were 
based on [comparing them to the bill of rights seems wrong] have shaped the 
way it has been constructed, by both users and creators alike. The rules of 
SomethingAwful are meant to drive home a feeling that if what you’ve got to 
say is well thought out and interesting, you’re allowed to say it. If it isn’t, but 
it’s still funny [according to those who run the site], you are still allowed to 
say it. On Tribalwar.com, if it won’t get the website sued, you’re allowed to 
say it, and that usually means most of Tribalwar.com’s content is infighting 
between members. 
 Beyond the colour scheme and ‘emoticons’ allowed [smiley faces 
depicting different actions] the look of the cyberspace becomes important as 
soon as it begins to affect the way the content is delivered to the user. In 
almost all Internet message boards, the organization of the posts is the same 
[Tribalwar.com and SomethingAwful.com are no exception.] Posts are 
organized by activity, the most active posts are brought to the top, and then 
the less active are stacked below. Activity is decided by how many people are 
actively discussing things within that post at that given time. When people 
stop posting, the thread will drop down the main page and eventually be 
sorted into the running archive [thread death]. So, on both cyberspace 
examples, the posts that will garner the greatest response are ‘rewarded’ by 
being sent to the top. This generates a feeling in the user base that starting 
conversations is better then simply posting information. On Tribalwar.com, 
the most effective way to get a popular thread is to call someone out in the 
title and then attack him or her personally in the content. A quick look into 
the ‘TWHOF’ [Tribalwar Hall of Fame] can confirm this. Two of the most 
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popular threads of all time are named ‘Hey Vir:Go Fuck Yourself,’ and ‘Dear 
Lockntross, Juggernaut, Critter, Onnotangu,’ and both are basically personal 
attacks on the people in the title. SomethingAwful is less based around 
personal attacks and more about simply being provocative. Threads like 
‘How to build a remote control plane,’ will slowly fall down the listing, while 
threads titled ‘Who else on this message board is a high paid call girl’ will 
remain at the top for weeks and eventually be archived in the ‘SAclopedia’ 
and become Internet legend. 
 Another visualization factor that drives users to be provocative is the 
rating system that SomethingAwful implemented shortly after they started 
charging for membership. When a user clicks on the thread, they have the 
option to give it a rating, from one to five, signified by gold bars. Thread 
rating is shown next to the post on the main listing. A higher rating means 
people will be more apt to click, and producing a ‘gold’ thread will instantly 
make a name for yourself on the board. The reflexivity of Tribalwar.com 
[meaning a majority of the ‘content’ on that site is mainly just fighting 
between members who have known each other for years] keeps them from 
implementing such a feature. Without any real content, ratings would quickly 
be a just another way to ‘troll’ people, giving people you didn’t like a bad 
rating no matter what they posted. 
 SomethingAwful’s rating system is great for a user that is looking 
for that day’s most interesting threads as dictated by their peers, but it 
certainly has implications on how the users who write [or are unable to write] 
these ‘golden posts’ relate to the space. Rating systems, post counts [the 
recording and rewarding of posting a certain amount, or at a certain 
frequency] and the movement of posts based on activity all facilitate the 
‘gaming’ of the virtual community. John Suler describes this as one of his 
factors of online disinhibition. Rewarding ‘productivity’ creates a sense of 
‘game-playing’ within the community. Users can feel like they are creating 
characters and with that, their own play-world. 
 
People may feel that the imaginary characters they 
‘created’ exist in a different space, that one’s online 
persona along with the online others live in an make-
believe dimension, a dream world, separate and apart from 
the demands and responsibilities of the real world. They 
split or ‘dissociate’ online fiction from off line fact.17 
 
User’s absorb these structural queues and then in turn create the spaces. 
Things like active threads moving to the top based on posting and not 
readership, thread rating, post counts, advertisements all over the page, ‘hall 
of fames,’ create a user base more likely to create a ‘clubhouse’ space then a 
‘discussion’ space. New users are ‘jumped in’ or turned off completely, and 
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the space never develops a new relationship because those who would 
attempt to do that simply don’t have the means. A feedback loop is created, 
with the structural choices that were originally intended to drive traffic to the 
site feeding the behaviour of the users there. Their behaviour, in turn, only 
reaffirms that spatial relationship. 
 The Internet can often seem like a toy or a sandbox. What happens 
there somehow matters less then what happens in reality? This will change 
with time.  The facade that most of what people deal with within cyberspace 
is actually a machine or inorganic is slowly being lifted. The more time 
people spend within these cyberspaces, the more evident it will become that it 
is not an ‘alternate’ or virtual reality. It is a part of the pre-existing reality. I 
think it would be foolish to attribute what we see of human behaviour on the 
Internet solely to ‘human nature in an anonymous environment’ or an innate 
desire to play the deviant with a safety net. It seems that it would be more 
prudent, instead of making excuses, to start identifying more with that 
behaviour as a real part of ourselves and trying to figure out what about our 
cyberspaces allows for all of that behaviour to proceed. 
 
Notes 
 
1 S Johnson, Emergence: the Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and 
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Social Sciences as Multimedia Games 
 
Peter Ludes 
 
Abstract 
A few classical social scientists realized that the format of articles and books 
does not always provide us with the best medium of elaborating and 
conveying important insights. Therefore they experimented with a theater 
play in the sociology of knowledge (Karl Mannheim), a utopian tale on the 
great debate of the intellectuals (Norbert Elias in an interview with Peter 
Ludes), insightful drawings (Kurt H. Wolff, a student of both Mannheim and 
Elias) or a Sylvester Symposium on the principle of love (Agnes Heller).1 
Arguing that some sociologists (for certain types of problems) felt more 
elective affinities with artists than with scientists or political activists, certain 
characteristics of this approach can be detected: These authors have 
transcended the simplifying functional differentiations of truth, justice, and 
taste - or science, morality, and art in order to create a new form of 
understanding. Individual actors are not the most important or decisive units 
of analysis, but figurations of groups of people, which do not always 
consciously choose their actions. Not only are the concepts of individual 
actors and of short-term orientations and actions at stake, but the very notion 
of action itself, to be replaced by trans-generational interdependencies. The 
latter refer to impersonal forces, hardly open to deliberations or discourses, 
but which are constituted by so far hidden and may be unintelligible 
constraints. A few of these traits will be sketched here, to enlarge the scope 
of social scientific modes of theory-formation beyond traditional uni-linear 
texts to networked social-science-as-arts games. 
 
Key Words: Social Sciences, Multimedia Games, Discourse Theory, 
Civilizing Processes, Functional Realms, Social Science Arts, Shalom, 
Norbert Elias, Juergen Habermas. 
 
***** 
 
1.  Social Sciences Across Functional Realms 
The century-long and still dominating scientific argumentation in 
terms of oral speeches and, mainly, written texts (rather than multi-
sensuously, especially visually) has been a historically particular mode of 
argumentation. The connections between graphics, written texts and moving 
images, which predominate already in multimedia networks, will be used 
ever more in a complementary way to traditional textual scientific 
argumentations-not least because of the new technological possibilities in the 
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direction of an increasing importance of ‘visual argumentation’. Up to now, 
media communications typically exclude smelling, tasting and touching. 
Nintendo Wii, however, can be considered as a new phase of interactive mass 
media, which allow for new identification models, e.g., figures like Mario or 
self-created Miis at the Olympic Games in Beijing 2008, in simulations of the 
real ‘bird’s nest’ or other Olympic sites. 
Experiences of and with all senses demand personal interactions 
from face to face, most intensely in friendships and especially in love’s multi-
sensual expressions.  But it must not be underestimated that at first glance 
mono-sensually appealing artworks like music productions can indirectly 
capture all senses or that the excitation of only one sense can silence  or 
resonate all the others. Multimedia games for example have already left 
behind film, TV and video in their technical development and economical 
importance. They are still mainly played by children and teenagers and 
thereby shape notably the pre-pictures, personality structures, fears and 
wishes, norms and values that will prevail in the next decades. In Western 
societies and Japan, the generation between 30 and 50 years of age, which 
fills many leading positions in economy, politics, the military or culture 
usually has had formative experiences with multimedia games. Some of them 
still play once in a while and transfer aesthetic, moral, or strategic principles 
from games to other realms of life and death. 
Gadgets and fastness in this market usually push aside complex 
emotions, subtle and completely sensual modes of behavior and the 
imaginative testing of new leeway. A new cultural procurement would be for 
example that composers, authors and festival directors, who were so far 
creatively active for the opera, theater or festival, should prepare 
performances that are tried simultaneously on classical stages and in 
worldwide multimedia networks.  The social science works of art by Karl 
Mannheim, Norbert Elias, and Agnes Heller could be tried out as 
contributions to corresponding festivals. There has already emerged a 
network culture of digital audio-visual symbols. Multimedia networks 
reproduce, combine, and diversify old media images of events, people, or 
landscapes, which the majority of users have never seen immediately and 
never will. Thus not only fictional representations become day-to-day 
consumable with their origins still rooted in real occurrences--but also forms 
and colors, which were created computer-based and have so far not been 
encountered in any life situation. With the increase of these historically new 
modes of experiences and of expressions, this re-figuring of space, time, 
intimacy, interaction, self and others, important changes in human cognition 
and, albeit with a considerable delay, in respective relevance schemata, 
assessments and modes of behavior emerge. At the same time these modes 
are mixed or brought into alternation with sedimentations of old situations, 
landscapes and people, whereby mixed worldviews open up new chances for 
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insights, for which Elias’ (1984, 1997) Utopia of the Great Debate of the 
Intellectuals already sets an example. 
The radical changes in modes of cognition, behavioural models and 
perspectives in media communications demand a novel aesthetic mode of 
transferring fragments of immediate experiences. Inter-media games, for 
example, work understandably across functional realms, national and 
generational cultures and may contribute to overcome nationally spoken 
languages, but tie in with nonverbal communication and visual symbols. This 
potential achievement is based in common sense pre-linguistic and nonverbal 
socialization processes. The combination of older and newer media into film-
TV-theater-video-computer-games, thus inter- and multimedia-games, in the 
next section therefore is not deployed as an end in itself. It is to enhance 
imaginations, for which multi-mediated networked self- and world 
perceptions become a part of the life-world. Representatives of various 
cultures, generations and professional groups thereby may build up a 
common background which connects, combines, and further develops 
networked, multi-mediated relationships with immediate and multisensual 
ones. This development shows beyond Habermas’ discourse theory (cp. 
Ludes 2007) and connects elements of this old European tradition with 
Castells’s theory of mass self-communication. 
 
2.  Social Science Arts: Project Shalom 
In 1939, the Nazis were rumoured to be developing an atomic bomb. 
The United States initiated its own program under the Army Corps of 
Engineers in June 1942 in order to build an atomic weapon before Germany 
or Japan did. General Leslie R. Groves, Deputy Chief of Construction of the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, was appointed to direct this top-secret 
project. For Norbert Elias’ 90th birthday, in 1987, I wrote a counter-play, 
Project Shalom, on the development of historically new means of 
understanding, on a similarly large scale, which trespasses traditional 
boundaries of social scientific work. In the succession of generations of 
specialized occupations and identities social-scientific artists and artistic 
social-scientists will in the future develop/live/play insights, which were so 
far lost because of the established system borders. 
Let us imagine: Project Shalom, Excerpt of Act 1: The Detached 
Prophet: Thank you. We are here to contribute our share, so that it goes on: 
the development of humankind. We discussed our time diagnosis over the 
last years. There is no clear solution. I suggest that we initiate a project to 
acquire new means of understanding instead of weapons of mass destruction 
or a trinity bomb. I guess I don’t need to explain to you why this project 
should be called ‘Shalom’? 
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The Human Wolf: Who are the collaborators in this 
project? 
 
The Bright: That’s the point. 
 
The Human She-Wolf: Who knows the fear and can stand 
it, those who looked death in the eye and want to survive, 
who know about their own pain and feel with others. 
 
The Detached Prophet: Who can get over his self-
absorbedness and concentration on the immediate presence, 
those who know for the tensions in themselves and between 
humans and can live with them, who can find their contents 
in other people. 
 
The Bright: Those belong to it. It won’t be a talk and no 
conference. That which contributes to survival must be 
experienced in exemplary ways. 
 
The Human She-Wolf: In confined space, in shortest time, 
what an effort, but also what a goal! 
 
The Human Wolf: In search of commonalities despite all 
contradictions. 
 
The Detached Prophet: Let us open hands, eyes, ears and 
noses until we can stand each other again, not a slave to 
someone but mature, looking oneself and others straight 
into the eye, others who want to continue living and living 
anew today and tomorrow. 
 
The four get up. The Detached Prophet walks very slowly on the winding 
staircase towards the third level; the Bright walks with determination towards 
the first level where she then hastens up and down between the different work 
and political assembly points and in each case changes some objects 
(machines, tools, posters, multimedia equipments); the Wolf-pair stays on the 
second level and mostly looks into the audience; after a few minutes the 
Human She-Wolf sits back down and pours herself some tea. 
  
The Bright: The national conflicts, religious and civil 
wars, class and gender struggles, the conflicts with external 
and our own nature, all this in the smallest possible space, 
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on two islands of this world, for some years, how should 
that go well? 
 
The Human She-Wolf: Humans, that knew the hunger, 
anger, mourning, hate, lost close relatives, important parts 
of their selves, those who want to survive, animated with 
the wish that all they suffered from should not happen 
anymore. 
 
The Human Wolf: Those who reached the bottom of their 
fear, that even fell through there and caught themselves in 
what connects us humans, those who did not loose the trust 
to get back out of this hole, this crack in the world and in 
us. 
 
The Detached Prophet: Those who no longer first think of 
themselves, who fell without being pushed, those who 
know of the pains and happiness of their predecessors, they 
do not want to stem the tide of generations. 
 
The Human Wolf: Korcula, island in the middle of the 
Dalmatian archipelago, Croatia, 47 kilometers long and 276 
km2, tourism and winegrowing, fishery and processing of 
fish. 
 
The Human She-Wolf: Newfoundland, eastern province 
of Canada, 417000 km2, timber industry, mining, no more 
Cod’s land. 
 
The Bright: In the South and the North, densely crowded 
and vastly scattered, thousands of scientists who experience 
the conflicts of their time first body, from contrasting 
classes, nations and religious groups. 
 
Excerpt of Act 2: The four initiators of Project Shalom came to know many 
people, countries and situations since their emigration more than half a 
century ago. They themselves continued to be displaced people wherever 
they wanted to gain a foothold, past Gestapo and concentration camps just by 
days or minutes. In the will to survive and in the struggle for existence they 
became survival specialists. Now the boundaries are different. The four 
protagonists have met numerous of such newly displaced people. They 
brought them together from different countries and parts of the world; three 
of these displaced and survivalists in a complex world, full of computerized 
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attack potential which can destroy everything within minutes are on the 
brightly lit stage on the first level at the beginning of the second scene. […] 
The three somebodies are each individually put into glistening light. 
They let their arms dangle and walk or stand in the direction of the audience. 
Through technical tricks each of the illuminated bodies becomes 
synchronically darker from the middle. Thus the impression arises that the 
three dissolve from their middle on, meaning from their genitals onwards. 
They open their mouths as if for a cry of help, but no sound is heard. The 
darkness, the nothing on their bodies spreads until with their forehead and 
their feet the last body parts disappear. In total darkness the sound of three 
falling bodies can be heard. In that moment the movie illumination turns on, 
the three somebodies are again in the bright, individual spot light. The 
process is reversed. As soon as the eyes are to be seen again, they look at 
their own bodies and the bodies of their fellow sufferers. Then they walk 
towards each other, look each other into the eyes. Once all three bodies are 
complete the light turns off. […] 
Maria Maculata, resembling the Bright, climbs up the spiral 
staircase, being chased by five armed soldiers. On the second level they enter 
the secretarial pool of the Detached Prophet. The Detached has fallen asleep, 
forever. The soldiers follow, dazzled by a life that resisted violence for so 
long.  Maria and the five soldiers face each other. In slow motion the raid 
starts. In this room the blows don’t hit, they always stop shortly before Maria: 
kicks and jots, ripping. 
In slow motion the occurrence happens until just before the five 
soldiers: pacing and rising, soft sounds. 
Clenched fists bash forward - open hands receive them. Butts swish 
down - fragment when they hit the desk.  Bayonets hit - into the books, which 
move. A grenade explodes - down the balcony. 
Only the eyes will be illumed - Maria’s full of sadness, the five full 
of hate. Only the mouth will be illumed - Maria’s slightly opened, the tip of 
the tongue guessable; the five widely opened, the right corner of the mouth 
hanging down. 
Maria: Another five years, maybe, and humanity will be 
extinguished. […] A task group of seven soldiers and five intellectuals sits at 
the wooden table on the balcony of the secretarial pool, which is again on the 
second level. They have some personal items from their homelands on the 
table in front of them. Mussorgsky’s ‘Pictures at an Exhibition’ in the 
orchestration of Ravel sounds. 
The twelve scatter across the first and second floor. Together with 
their homeland symbols they represent first each individually, then in groups 
and finally as a collective group the following developments. These will not 
be explained in more detail, as each time it must be left to the fantasy and 
expressiveness of the actors. 
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1. From the embryo to the dead body. 
2. From joy of life to fear of death. 
3. From dominance to self-control. 
4. The prey becomes hunter. 
5. The militaries become more self-controlled in their 
movements; the intellectuals more aggressive. 
 
Afterwards all bodies are disintegrated through special illumination effects 
similarly as in the second scene. This time it is not a coherent dissolution, 
from the middle onwards that can be reversed. This time it is an irreversible 
process. For each of the actors who are running up and down, crawling or 
crouching different body parts are spotlight: eyes, hands, chest, genital, 
knees, and feet. The rest is dark. Suddenly it seems that the illuminated body 
parts of the twelve move away from their original bodies and toward each 
other. Where they were brightly illuminated, bleeding wounds remain. On the 
spiral staircase, on the way from the first to the second level, a new 
combination comes into being: a vast majority of body parts and behavioral 
patterns of the military, and in the minority intellectuals represented through 
their eyes. Bleeding body parts are pushed into each other until they fit; the 
blood dries; the new combination slowly seems to be natural, like a costume 
for carnival, its bumpiness appears more comical than threatening. 
According to this expression the figure doesn’t act very goal 
oriented. Slowly the first and second floor is illuminated. The remaining 
eleven persons are aggregated similarly, they move partially rather clumsy, 
uncoordinated, partially playful like on their journey of discovery into a new, 
hardly threatening world. The twelve, while shortly pausing in various 
distances and in different courses of motions: not very interested, they 
resemble each other like animals in a flock. The violence-experts lost their 
homeland symbols, mainly weapons. Likewise the intellectuals lost theirs: 
paintings and sculptures, musical instruments or USB sticks, books or 
manuscripts. The twelve roam about, come across these items, and cannot do 
anything with them. 
More or less by chance they meet again within a few minutes at the 
table on the balcony of the secretarial pool, which has been set with a meat 
platter. They sit down; look at each other with hardly active, partially sad, 
partially hungry eyes. The body movements are only little controlled, within 
a few seconds all start to eat loudly. […]  
 
To praise her, the all-embracing, 
Beyond the knowledge of time 
Him, the all-creating, 
Who needed a home. 
You in us, and us in you, 
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For we are still alive 
In life’s mercy 
Still 
How long, you child of men 
Still innocent of time 
And strength 
On the margins of your self 
You bow your childlike head 
And you smile, and smile 
Into this hole 
To plead to hear, the all-embracing, 
More urgently than ever 
Him, the all-creating, 
We need a home. 
You in us, and us in you 
For we are still alive 
In life’s mercy 
Still 
How long, you and you 
Sensing the consequences 
Of the powerlessness 
Even on the margin 
You bend backwards your youthful head 
And you laugh, you laugh 
About the abyss 
Inside ourselves 
 
3. Epilogue: Civilizing Media? 
According to Norbert Elias’s theory of long-term unplanned 
civilizing processes, neither individuals nor actions constitute major 
components of social processes, but figurations of interdependent people 
across generations. These networks of interdependencies are multi-
dimensional: multi-sensual and multi-functional, only very partially known or 
intelligible to the actors. They are so numerous2 that it is impossible for any 
individual actor to oversee millions of connections already in small-scale 
networks. Even less probable is that individuals can calculate advantages and 
disadvantages, costs and benefits of individual actions within such networks 
or even parts of figurations beyond their own lifetimes. Elias mainly argued 
that unplanned long-term social processes predominate any kind of short-
term individual constraints and options as well as affective ties and deep-
seated levels of anxieties. The latter can hardly be put into words and 
therefore mass and network mediated visuals gain importance. 
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In earlier publications Ludes (1989 and 2008) elaborated and revised 
Elias’ original theory to take into more adequate account ‘political long-term 
alternatives,’ and upheavals of civilizing processes due to networked 
communication and non-European patterns of state-dis/formations or failing 
states. From Elias’ classic theory, however, three major components are also 
pertinent to our inquiry into visions of humanity in cyberculture, cyberspace 
and science fiction:  
 
1.  Individual actors are not the most important or decisive 
units of analysis, but figurations of groups of people, which 
do not always consciously choose their actions. 
 
2.  Especially in violent conflicts, feelings of hurt (relatives 
and friends killed or mutilated), hate and extreme distrust 
dominate over clear interests and rational choices of rather 
short-term actions of a few weeks or at most years, well 
below, e.g., individual life-spans, those of established 
states, or networks (figurations) of generations. 
 
3.  Not only the concepts of individual actors and of short-term 
orientations and actions are at stake, but the very notion of 
action itself, to be replaced by trans-generational 
interdependencies. 
 
The latter refer to impersonal forces, hardly open to individual deliberations 
or even discourses, but which are constituted by so far hidden and may be 
unintelligible constraints. A few of these traits have been sketched here, as I 
have argued to enlarge the scope of social scientific modes of theory-
formation beyond traditional uni-linear texts to networked social-science-as-
arts games. 
 
4. Endnote 
This text is partially based on three earlier and much more elaborate 
inquiries: Peter Ludes: Kulturtheorien als Intermediaspiele, Essen: Blaue 
Eule, 1989; Peter Ludes (Ed.): Sozialwissenschaften als Kunst, Constance: 
UVK, 1997; Peter Ludes/Maor Shani: Civilizing Media: Peacemaker? 
Presentation at the European Sociological Association Meeting in Glasgow, 
September 2007. I am indebted to numerous face to face conversations and 
mail to mail communications with Norbert Elias, Agnes Heller, Carla, and 
Kurt H. Wolff. My presentation is a continuation and transformation of these 
personal encounters. 
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Notes
 
1 All published in: Peter Ludes (Ed), Social Sciences as Arts. Original 
Contributions by Karl Mannheim, Norbert Elias, Kurt H. Wolff and Agnes 
Heller (Sozialwissenschaften als Kunst. Originalbeiträge von Karl 
Mannheim, Norbert Elias, Kurt H. Wolff und Agnes Heller), Konstanz: 
UVK, 1997. 
2 Cp. Elias, chapter 3 on Game models and his calculation of the complexity 
of social relationships in Elias 1978, p.101, Table 1. 
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Game Design Technology as a Tool for Research and 
Education in Cultural History 
 
Daniel Riha 
 
Abstract 
This article investigates a potential of an interactive 3-D medium for the 
documentary work in the context of cultural studies. The first part 
summarizes a methodology from the game studies that supports the use of a 
3-D game space as dispositive for knowledge representation and informs how 
to encode and decode spatial narrative information within an interactive 
cultural-historical simulation. The second part informs about a future 
research that plans to approach a representation of art works and the Prague 
lives of the select Bosnian artists during 1990´s in the form of an interactive 
documentary space (3-D ID). 
 
Key Words: Serious Games, Spatial Narrative, 3-D Interactive 
Environments, Cultural Transition, Bosnian Artists, Prague. 
 
***** 
 
1. Introduction 
This article investigates a potential of an interactive 3-D medium for 
the documentary work in the context of cultural studies. 
The first part summarizes the concepts from the game studies that 
support the use of a 3-D game space as dispositive for knowledge 
representation and inform how to encode and decode spatial narrative 
information within an interactive cultural-historical simulation. Jenkins’s 
concept of environmental storytelling deals with preconditions of immersive 
narrative experience in spatial storytelling. Fuchs introduced the concept of 
virtual knowledge space where the process of de-categorisation and re-
classification may be successfully implemented. The concept of story map 
developed by Nitsche and Thomas may serve for content structuring of such 
a knowledge space. In the interactive project Memory Theatre VR Hegedues 
revived a historical concept of memory theatre. 
The second part informs about a future research that plans to 
approach a representation of art works and the Prague lives of the select 
Bosnian artists during 1990´s in the form of an interactive documentary space 
(3-D ID). 
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2. Spatial Narrative in 3-D Interactive Applications 
Nitsche declares the virtual space as a key element of the experience 
in 3-D videogames and the designer as acting in the virtual environment 
development in the role of the ‘spacemaker’.1 He points out to the fact that 
‘Whereas the playwright and the filmmaker both try to communicate the idea 
of an experience, the spacemaker tries to communicate the experience itself’.2 
Jenkins recognizes the design activity of virtual environments producers as a 
narrative architecture. Canter proposed to view the virtual place-making as a 
setting up the objects and spaces with a focus on the environmental design 
that will support action in the virtual environment while conveying the social 
and cultural conceptions of the user communities.3 
What methodologies are actually available for designers/producers 
to enable them to design these ‘experiential’ virtual spaces in the context of 
an interactive cultural-historical simulation? 
 
A. Environmental Storytelling 
How it is possible to represent the urban lives in the big city? In the 
framework of Lefebvre’s triadic model of space this issue relates to the 
category of representational space which is defined as the combination of 
spatial practice and represented space, experientially lived.4 In Jenkins’s 
words, such a representation deals with the spatial representation of personal 
stories that shall ‘express something of the complexity and heterogeneity of 
urban life’.5 According to Jenkins, spatial stories may be a solution for 
transforming the big city ‘from a mundane space into a fantastic one’6. 
Jenkins proposes centralizing the structure of spatial stories around tours and 
incorporates this idea into the concept of environmental storytelling (CES), 
where he claims CES to bring an immersive narrative experience to the user 
in four ways: 
 
Spatial stories can evoke pre-existing narrative associations; 
they can provide a staging ground where narrative events 
are enacted; they may embed narrative information within 
their mise-en-scene; or they provide resources for emergent 
narratives.7 
 
The enacted narrative sub-concept, inspired by Eisenstein’s concept of 
‘attractions’, introduces the idea of micronarratives in games that 
communicate their main themes and which work towards increased emotional 
involvement by the user through a series of short narrative units, recalled in 
user’s mind as ‘memorable moments’. 
The information resources to be implemented in the 3-D ID medium 
have often fragmented character. Micronarrative elements may so present an 
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important feature that will support the comprehension process of the 3-D ID 
space into the user’s grand narrative. 
As well the embedded narrative sub-concept might be fruitfully 
employed in the 3-D ID productions. The interactive 3-D space is here 
recognized as a part of the discourse that will, in turn, function itself as an 
expressive element. But the embedded narrativization must be implemented 
across multiple information channels (interactive 3-D, websites, web 2.0 
services, webcasting and other) to present contextual information which 
enables users to switch available information contents into the above-
mentioned ‘documentarizing lecture’8. 
 
B. The Concept of Story Maps 
Nitsche and Thomas emphasize the need to understand the spatial 
composition of virtual environments. They declare that: 
 
Visitors to a building - movie audiences to a film projection 
- readers of literary texts - users of real time 3-D virtual 
environments have to make sense of the spatial data 
provided. The results are individual cognitive maps of the 
understood space and its ingredients.9 
 
Nitsche and Thomas offer the concept of Story Map. For them such a model 
gives designers a point of reference how users comprehend the virtual world 
and offers a tool to improve the content structures of virtual environments. 
For Nitsche and Thomas the basic elements of Story Maps include: 
 
The connection of event and navigable space, the cinematic 
mediation of space and event, and the cognitive mapping of 
these events and the dramatic setting in space. The Story 
Map is the result of the comprehension process that can be 
influenced through evocative means of event-, space-, and 
mediation-structure.10 
 
Nitsche and Thomas declare each Story Map as a unique and without 
identified general form, but having a recognizable effect as ‘the better 
understanding and generation of meaning from the experience by combining 
space and events’.11 The Story Maps might be used to comparatively test the 
comprehension process on a user side during all stages of a player-oriented 
environment development. 
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C. The Concept of Knowledge Space 
The 3-D ID productions include important locations that represent 
real town places in the form of 3-D content, but such an environment can’t be 
realized just as a simple reconstruction of the town’s cultural landmarks. 
Fuchs understands interactive 3-D as a genre in which de-
categorisation and re-classification may be positively implemented. Fuchs 
declares that ‘The gamers not designers set reference point of individual 
interpretation. The gamer navigating the space individual way describes the 
objects of experience in re-shaped contexts.’12 For Fuchs, serious games may 
be classified as processually produced ‘Ludic Archive for Cultural Studies’13. 
Following Fuchs, knowledge spaces attempt „as space and time overcoming, 
trans-cultural and anti-rational games to produce what Warburg intended with 
his ‘Library for Cultural Studies (LCS)’’. Fuchs further argues about 
Warburg’s methodology: ‘Warburg’s research emphasized to gain relevant 
knowledge on materials of timely open-ended origin through process of 
collage. Equally Warburg used to relocate locally disparate objects, 
narratives and symbols.’14 According to Fuchs, videogame designers may 
apply, in a similar way, Warburg’s method of time-collage and space-collage 
to evoke ‘amazed experiences’ for their users. 
Hegedues realized an interesting approach to the structuring of the 
virtual space in the interactive installation Memory Theater VR. She revived 
the work of the Neo-Platonists that constructed virtual temples of memory. 
Grau declares that memory theaters were: 
 
spaces of thought, memory storage spaces for the 
assembled knowledge of their time, where multilayered, 
theoretically infinite associations between the displayed 
objects and memory spaces were possible. In the 
imagination, the mind could navigate through spaces that 
facilitated combinatory process.15 
 
According to Grau, Hegedues has applied the old concept of the memory 
theater while offering the user with virtual space ‘as dynamic structure with 
intermedia elements, thus expanding the historic mnemonic techniques with 
contemporary media.’16 
Although the 3-D ID productions can’t create complete or partially 
complete hyper-maps of the big town’s virtual cultural geographies, the 
experimental collage method offers a tool that enables to integrate 
geographically and culturally dislocated cultural landmarks and items. 
 
E. Implementing the Virtual Architectures 
According to McGregor, videogames do not endlessly improve the 
patterns of spatial use but are reusing, reapplying and restructuring the 
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elementary patterns already existing in the real world. She identifies six 
patterns that describe the majority of interactive acts in the virtual 
environment: 
 
Challenge space - Game space directly challenges player - 
Forms gameplay  
 
Contested space - Game space as arena for conflict - Affects 
gameplay  
 
Nodal space - Game space structured by social layout - 
Structures gameplay  
 
Codified space - Game space as interface & information - 
Contains information in gameplay  
 
Creation Space - Game space is created & altered - 
Becomes gameplay  
 
Backdrops - Game space as non-interactive - Not part of 
gameplay17 
 
The majority of interactive 3-D virtual environments often use a combination 
of all above listed patterns. 
Following Roudavski and Penz, the presumptions about the meaning 
of an environment are always socially dependent and always refer to the 
collective practice. In order to affect a user understanding, memory and 
navigation they propose to employ the individual character of the mental 
image: ‘The structure of the mental image transforms as familiarity with the 
place grows and the meaningful relationships between components become 
established.’18 They propose to implement the redundant elements, deduction 
and prediction to help the user deal with the inconsistency always present in 
the virtual environment. 
The presence of mediation devices may significantly limit the 
designer’s intention to implement the above-mentioned real world patterns. 
While the mediation devices will always have a strong impact on the 
understanding of the virtual space, the designer may take into account the fact 
that ‘The influence of these constraints can be averaged for all users at all 
times if the set of mediation devices is identical for all.’19 
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3. Advantages of 3-D Interactive Form for Documentary 
In the discourse of the game studies an ID 3-D environment relates 
to realist videogames as understood by Galloway, where games ‘reflect 
critically on the minutia of everyday life, replete as it is with struggle, 
personal drama and injustice’.20 
The interactive 3-D form offers several important advantages over 
film and video production. For Brinson, in the case of documentary film: 
  
The filmmaker’s portrayal and delivery of the events is at 
the foreground of the experience. […] Often a viewer will 
agree with the film’s subjective points as well as take the 
portrayal of events as historical fact. […] This negotiation 
of the content is a result, an after effect of the film 
documentary’s narrative. In a documentary game, the 
player’s reaction to the content -- both within the game and 
in mind -- is the narrative. It is part of the real-time, present 
tense experience of the game’s portrayal, rather than a 
personal addendum to the grand narrative. […] The 
game’s simulation of events acts as a set of supportive story 
threads to the player’s grand narrative.21 
 
Similarly, Nitsche et al22 emphasize the continuity of experience and action 
through spatial navigation, where interactive 3-D non-linear narratives have a 
major advantage not available in Hypermovie structures, for example. 
Dankert & Wille point to the fact that a designer is, in the case of 
interactive 3-D documentary, not limited by genre conventions and the 
demands of linearity and continuity. They reveal the major advantages of this 
media form, including decreased importance on tempo and an easier creation 
of believable illusion with use of unobserved observation via virtual camera. 
So, the ultimate goals for this genre, as declared by Dankert & 
Wille, is to set the user free from ‘all the limitations of spectatorship’ and to 
provide ‘multiple choices with a wide range of possibilities in the form of 
interactivity’ The rapid popularization of documentary through faction form, 
as envisioned by Raessens, is still major challenge, even for today’s 
experimental crossmedia documentary productions. 
 
4. Prague Lives of Bosnian Artists in 1990´s 
After the fall of the Czechoslovak communist regime in 1989, the 
City of Prague became the most popular post-communist residential 
destination among the Western expatriates23. The expatriate community 
members established many important cultural institutions such as art 
foundations, English newspapers and journals, language schools, literary 
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cafes, book stores, music clubs, music shops and others. Their presence and 
activity significantly influenced Prague’s socio-cultural transition. The 
town’s cultural history and the then extremely open nature of the Czech 
community were among the main attractions for expatriates - not only for 
Americans but, since 1992, for many Bosnians following the breakdown of 
the Yugoslav Federation, including several recognized Bosnian intellectuals 
and artists. Bosnians formed one of the important foreign communities in 
Prague. Bosnians started their post-war life in the newly-established Czech 
state, gradually recovering economically from the command economy to the 
market system and culturally transforming into a post-communist cultural 
environment. 
Bosnian intellectuals established friendly relations with each other, 
but they have never formed a directly self-promoted expatriate community24 
as was the case with Prague-based Americans. In the contrast to the Western 
residential community that lived from savings and advantageous investments, 
Bosnians were forced to apply for permanent employment, learn the Czech 
language and accommodate themselves to the surrounding Czech social 
environment. 
In the 1990s they lived daily experience so intensely that it often 
challenged them to transform their feelings immediately into the poems, 
stories or soundscapes. The Prague-based Bosnian artists now actively 
publish, exhibit and perform. But their historical relevance in relation to 
Prague’s cultural transition in the 1990s has not been yet fully documented 
and comprehensively evaluated by Czech or international scholars. 
 
5. 3-D Interactive Documentary on Prague life of Bosnian artists 
The future works on 3-D ID aim to draw an attention to this 
interesting artistic community by documenting and cross-medially 
representing their art work and daily lives, which illustrate an important 
alternative vantage window into Prague’s post-communist social and cultural 
transition. The Bosnian artists’ productions reflect the City of Prague’s socio-
cultural during the 1990s in a unique way. The moments of protagonist’s 
daily activities possibly express the substance of the Prague life in 1990´s and 
offer the differentiating characteristics via the Bosnian eye-lens. The medium 
of the 3-D ID offers a challenging environment for the cultural-historical 
simulation to be experimentally built in the form of dramatized events in the 
interactive 3-D space. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This article presents a summary of the selected approaches to the 
incorporation of the information contents into 3-D virtual space and identifies 
several added value elements to be employed in the frames of the interactive 
3-D documentary production as a cultural-historical representation. The listed 
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concepts share the understanding of the virtual space as kind of explorative 
information space or ‘memory palace’. 
 
Notes
 
1 Coined by R Walser, cited in M Nitsche, ‘From Faerie Tale to Adventure 
Game’, in P Frelik and D Mead (eds), Playing the Universe: Games and 
Gaming in Science Fiction, Maria Curie-Sklodowska University Press, 
Lublin, 2007, p. 213. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Canter cited in S Roudavski and M Penz, ‘Spatial Context of Interactivity’ 
in S P Schaffer and M L Price in Interactive Convergence: Critical Issues in 
Multimedia, Inter-Disciplinary Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 47. 
4 Analyzed in A Stockburger, The Rendered Arena: Modalities of Space in 
Video and Computer games, PhD. Thesis, University of Arts London, 
London, 2006, p. 78. 
5 H Jenkins, ‘Tales of Manhattan: Mapping the Urban Imagination through 
Hollywood Film’, in L Vale, S B Warner (eds), Imagining the City, Center 
for Urban Policy Research Press, 2001, p. 9 (in article). 
6 Ibid. 
7 H Jenkins, ‘Game Design as Narrative Architecture’, in N Waldrip-Fruin, P 
Harrington (eds), First Person: New Media as Story, Performance, and 
Game. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 5 (in article). 
8 J Raessens, ‘Reality Play: Documentary Computer Games beyond Fact and 
Fiction’, in Popular Communication, 4(3), Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
2006, p. 214. 
9 M Nitsche and M Thomas, ‘Stories in Space: The Concept of the Story 
Map’, in O Balet, G Subsol, P Torquet, Proceedings of the Second 
Conference on Virtual Storytelling (ICVS '03), Springer Verlag, Berlin, 2003, 
p. 85. 
10 Ibid, p. 88. 
11 Ibid, p. 93. 
12 M Fuchs, ‘Spielräume als Wissensräume’ in Kunstforum International, 
Kunst und Spiel I. Band 176, Juni - August 2005, p. 4 online, translation by D 
Riha. 
13 Ibid p. 9 online, translation by D Riha. 
14 Ibid p. 3 online, translation by D Riha 
15 O Grau, Virtual Art: From Illusion to Immersion, MIT Press, Boston, 2003, 
p. 231. 
16 Ibid. 
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17 L G McGregor, ‘Situations of Play: Patterns of Spatial Use in 
Videogames’, In Proceedings of Situated Play - DiGRA Conference, The 
University of Tokyo, Tokyo, September, 2007, p. 539.  
18 S Roudavski and M Penz, p. 50. 
19 Ibid, p. 51.  
20 A R Galloway, ‘Social Realism in Gaming’ in the International Journal of 
Computer Game Research, volume 4, issue 1, November 2004, p. 5 (online). 
21 Cited in T Fullerton, ‘Documentary Games: Putting the Player in the Path 
of History’ in Whalen, Z, Taylor, L. (eds), Playing the Past: Nostalgia in 
Video Games and Electronic Literature, Vanderbilt University Press, June 
2008, p. 23 (in article). 
22 M Nitsche, S Roudavski, M Thomas, F Penz, ‘Narrative Expressive Space’ 
in ACM SIGGROUP Bulletin, vol. 23, issue 2, August 2002, p. 10 - 13. 
23 The estimated number of the American expatriates living in Prague in the 
90s reached 40,000 - Source: K Drew, CNN, 5. October 2004. Alan Levy, the 
editor of Prague Post introduced Prague as the Paris of the 1990s. 
24 For more information visit the following websites: 
www.damer.com/prague/, www.praguewriter.com or www.beefstew.com . 
 
Bibliography 
 
Dankert, H. and N. E. Wille, ‘Constructing the Concept of the ‘Interactive 3D 
Documentary’: Film, Drama, Narrative or Simulation’, in Virtual Interaction: 
Interaction in Virtual Inhabited 3D Worlds. Quortrup, L. (ed), Springer, 
London, 2000. 
 
Drew, Kevin., ‘Rex-patriate Games’, in CNN, October 5th, 2004. 
Link: http://edition.cnn.com/2004/SHOWBIZ/Movies/10/05/rexpatriates/ 
 
Fuchs, M., ‘Spielräume als Wissensräume’, in Kunstforum International, 
Kunst und Spiel I. Band 176, 2005, pp. 56 - 69. 
 
Fullerton, T., ‘Documentary Games: Putting the Player in the Path of 
History’, in Playing the Past: Nostalgia in Video Games and Electronic 
Literature. Whalen, Z, Taylor, L. (eds), Vanderbilt University Press, 2008. 
 
Galloway, A. R., ‘Social Realism in Gaming’, in the International Journal of 
Computer Game Research, volume 4, issue 1, November 2004. 
Grau, O., Virtual Art: From Illusion to Immersion. MIT Press, Boston, 2003. 
 
Game Design Technology 
______________________________________________________________ 
206
 
Jenkins, H., ‘Tales of Manhattan: Mapping the Urban Imagination through 
Hollywood Film’, in Imagining the City. Vale, L., Warner, S. B. (eds), Center 
for Urban Policy Research Press, 2001. 
Link: <http://web.mit.edu/cms/People/henry3/manhattan.html>. 
 
Jenkins, H., ‘Game Design as Narrative Architecture’, in First Person: New 
Media as Story, Performance, and Game. Waldrip-Fruin, N., Harrington, P. 
(eds), MIT Press, Cambridge, 2004. 
 
McGregor, L. G., ‘Situations of Play Patterns of Spatial Use in Videogames’, 
In Proceedings of Situated Play - DiGRA Conference, The University of 
Tokyo, Tokyo, September, 2007. 
 
Nitsche, M., ‘From Faerie Tale to Adventure Game’, in Playing the 
Universe: Games and Gaming in Science Fiction. Frelik P., Mead, D. (eds), 
Maria Curie-Sklodowska University Press, Lublin, 2007, pp. 209-229. 
 
Nitsche, M. and M. Thomas, ‘Stories in Space: The Concept of the Story 
Map’, in Proceedings of the Second Conference on Virtual Storytelling 
(ICVS '03). Balet, O., Subsol, G., Torquet, P. (eds), Springer Verlag, Berlin, 
2003, pp. 85-94. 
 
Nitsche, M., Roudavski, S., Thomas, M., Penz, F., ‘Narrative Expressive 
Space’, in ACM SIGGROUP Bulletin, vol. 23, issue 2, August 2002, pp. 10 -
13. 
 
Raessens, J., ‘Reality Play: Documentary Computer Games beyond Fact and 
Fiction’, in Popular Communication, 4(3), Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
2006, pp. 213 - 224. 
 
Roudavski, S., Penz, M., ‘Spatial Context of Interactivity’, in Interactive 
Convergence: Critical Issues in Multimedia. Schaffer, S. P., Price, M. L, 
Inter-Disciplinary Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 45 - 66. ISBN: 1-904710-09-3 
 
Stockburger, A., The Rendered Arena: Modalities of Space in Video and 
Computer games. PhD. Thesis, University of Arts London, London, 2006. 
 
Daniel Riha, Ph.D. Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Humanities, Charles 
University in Prague, Czech Republic. His research includes issues on 
Serious Games, Interactive Documentary Production and Multi-user Virtual 
Environments Design 
  
Part IX 
 
Character-Community & Anthropology
  
  
Shared Space: Seeking Real Insights from Virtual 
Friendships 
 
Jordan J. Copeland 
 
Abstract 
As relational beings we intuit that the complex weave of human associations, 
institutions, and structures-from the immediate and natural (e.g. progenitor 
and progeny) to the constructed and abstract (e.g. nation and citizen)-is at a 
minimum instrumental to our fulfilment and/or happiness as human beings.  
However, the challenges concerning the proper integration and balance of 
these associations seem particularly daunting in the contemporary context.  
Modern political and ethical discourse has rightly compelled us to think 
critically about proximity, similarity, and special inclinations as the bases and 
regulating motivations for our ethical lives. Moreover, technological 
advancements and increased globalization have provided a unique (often 
virtual) arena for testing these intuitions and expressing these commitments. 
The relative isolation and homogeneity of, say, Aristotle’s polis has been 
infiltrated by wires, cables, and waves capable of carrying real-time 
information regarding the events and activities of persons who reside far 
beyond the decaying borders of our once relatively insulated moral and 
political communities.  Consequently, we find ourselves confronted with new 
questions concerning the nature of our relationship to individuals who 
populate an ever larger world community. In view of these challenges, this 
paper draws on Aristotle’s classical theory of friendship and contemporary 
philosophical reflections on preferential relationships to investigate the nature 
and significance of virtual friendships. By ‘virtual friendships,’ I have in 
mind the types of relationships that are the promise and effect of virtual 
social networks such as MySpace and Facebook. Rather than lament the 
seemingly tenuous or superficial character of such relationships, the paper 
argues that virtual friendships offer both analogical and tropological insights 
that are pertinent to contemporary debates concerning the structure, role, and 
value of ‘real’ friendships in our moral lives. 
 
Key Words: Friendship, Social Networks, Aristotle, Facebook, Ethics. 
 
***** 
 
The intersection where Aristotle’s moral theory meets virtual social 
networking, does not present itself for obvious identification.  However, the 
important confluence proves to be a significant anthropological supposition 
that is espoused by the former and evinced by the latter. The supposition is 
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that humanity is, by nature, a social animal. We are relational beings. To 
speak to the contrary, in my mind, is to disregard the ubiquitous evidence of 
our sociality, which is rooted firmly in the ground of shared experience and is 
thereby readily exposed to the till of academic investigation and common 
observation alike. Ontologically situated and psychologically structured as 
we are, I believe we intuit that the complex weave of human associations, 
institutions, and structures-from the immediate and natural (e.g. progenitor 
and progeny) to the constructed and abstract (e.g. nation and citizen)-is at a 
minimum instrumental to our fulfilment. Thus, while conceptions concerning 
the components of such fulfilment will vary according to the flux of history, 
culture, and individual experiences, the intuition itself abides. It generates an 
interest in determining the proper organization and prioritization within and 
among various social spheres and the best ways that each of us can situate 
our lives within these spheres. 
Thus, it is no surprise that when technology offers a new space for 
experiencing, expressing and, perhaps, amending aspects of our social nature, 
it is greeted with an equal measure of expectation and suspicion. It is the 
same dialectical blend of optimism and caution that has propelled the history 
of ethical, social, and political discourse concerning the function and 
regulative principles of our more traditional social contexts-of families, 
friendships, communities and nations. Such discourse is inevitable. It is 
invaluable. It arises out of a collective recognition that the diverse 
phenomena of human relationships, activities, and institutions provide us a 
window onto the heights and depths of our social and moral inclinations. 
Accordingly, as we engage this space and participate in the variegated virtual 
communities to which it gives rise, we must consider its relationship to and 
affects on our broader social lives. As we do, I argue that we would do well 
to avoid succumbing to the easy appeal of either sharp dichotomies or 
reductive conflations. 
Here I wish to provide only an introduction to a larger project, 
which draws on Aristotle’s classical theory of friendship and contemporary 
philosophical reflections on preferential relationships to investigate the nature 
and significance of virtual friendships. By ‘virtual friendships,’ I have in 
mind the types of relationships that are the promise and effect of virtual 
social networks such as MySpace and Facebook, but would also include the 
various forms of social communities being discussed at this conference. 
Rather than lament the seemingly tenuous or superficial character of such 
relationships, I will argue that Aristotle’s philosophical taxonomy of 
friendship types offers an instructive lens for understanding the potential 
significance of virtual friendships, and, moreover, that the nature and context 
of such friendships supply instructive insights for rehabilitating Aristotle’s 
model of friendship in ways that address contemporary critiques of 
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preferential relationships, which identify within such relationships a tendency 
toward insularity and the neglect of broader social and political obligations. 
In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle presents a teleological vision 
of humanity, grounded in an anthropology that isolates particular rational 
activities as uniquely and paradigmatically human. Against this conception of 
our nature, Aristotle proceeds to evaluate common opinions regarding what 
constitutes a good human life. Aristotle’s evaluation disqualifies and refines 
potential candidates and initiates his own prescriptive account of the states, 
activities, feelings, and goods that facilitate and comprise human happiness. 
The vision he develops-as well as the method he employs-makes it clear that 
Aristotle recognizes the ontological, psychological, and natural necessity that 
the good life be sought and realized within the context of a variegated web of 
social relationships. Just as, for Aristotle, ethical questions cannot be 
divorced from political considerations; the individual agent cannot be excised 
from the intimate relationships, communities, and social institutions wherein 
her life takes shape. Aristotle concludes, then, that our happiness and 
fulfilment depends to a considerable degree on our success at forming and 
sustaining good social relationships. 
One form of social relationship to which Aristotle dedicates a 
conspicuous amount of attention is friendship. What is striking about 
Aristotle’s theory of friendship is his unequivocal and persistent exhortation 
that friendships constitute an inimitable and necessary feature of a fulfilling 
life. According to Aristotle’s understanding, friends represent intrinsic goods 
and assist one another in the formation and ongoing integration of an 
instructive vision of the good in their daily activities and pursuits. 
Given that Aristotle considers friendship to be an essential 
ingredient in the good life, he takes care from the outset to stipulate a 
working definition of friendship, including its necessary and sufficient 
conditions. Whereas the necessary conditions he outlines serve to distinguish 
friendship from other forms of social relationships, the sufficient conditions 
stretch the definition widely enough to include under its canopy a range of 
relationships we might not immediately consider under the category of 
friendship. One gets a sense of the sweep of Aristotle’s conception of 
friendship if one considers the preliminary definition Aristotle provides, 
which is summarized concisely by Diana Cates when she writes that, 
according to Aristotle, ‘friendship is a relationship of mutually known and 
reciprocated affection and well-wishing in which each person wishes and 
does good to the other for the other’s own sake.’1 In other words, friendships 
include a range of mutually recognized social relations, each of which 
involves the reciprocation of benevolence, beneficence, and affection. 
Utilizing the stipulated conditions he has articulated, Aristotle 
proceeds to identify three categories of friendship, each differentiated from 
the others according to the good that explains the genesis and continuation of 
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the relationship. According to Aristotle, friendships emerge and persist 
between two people because of a shared quality (or object) that is perceived 
by the participants to be in some way good, and which makes each lovable 
and attracted to the other.  Thus, to put it roughly, one’s care for one’s friend 
is explained by and contingent upon one’s friend exhibiting or providing 
occasion for the realization of some good that one has erstwhile identified as 
being worthy of pursuit and affection.  According to Aristotle the affective 
objects that explain and ground the relationships fall under three broad and 
not necessarily mutually exclusive categories: the pleasant, the useful (or 
advantageous), and the good. 
Like all components in Aristotle’s teleological scheme, the value of 
these friendships-as well as the goods around which each is formed-must be 
evaluated in terms of their relative contributions to the participants’ pursuit of 
happiness or flourishing. Therefore, while friendships of advantage and 
pleasure are endorsed by Aristotle as conducive to the good life, the value of 
these relationships is correlative to the value that their respective goods 
maintain in the total life of the happy person. Consequently, if the principal 
draw our friend has on us is relative to the pleasure or advantage we derive 
from our relationship to her, then the affections and goodwill that are 
reciprocated will be grounded in a good that represents only a limited 
dimension of each of our lives. That is, the relationship, so constituted, 
provides the friends with an amiable, but necessarily incomplete, picture of 
each other. Aristotle is claiming that while the relationships are indeed 
friendships and on that account valuable, the nature and intimacy of the 
relationship is mitigated because of the subordinate role that the good 
sustaining the relationship maintains in human life, as Aristotle understands 
it. 
As a consequence, the affection for one’s friend is based on an 
incomplete grasp of who she is. In such relationships one does indeed care 
for one’s friend, It’s just that he ‘conceives of her according to a narrow 
description of who she is relative to him, such that he is attracted to her and 
wishes good to her as someone who is of help to him or someone whose 
company brings him pleasure.’2 Because the reciprocated goodwill that 
constitutes these relationships is predicated upon each friend’s circumscribed 
vision of the other, and attached to a partial and malleable characteristic of 
the other’s total persona (including her goals, passions, character, etc.), the 
relationships are vulnerable to both change and dissolution in a way that 
friendships based upon goodness of character are not. 
According to Aristotle, in friendships based upon goodness of 
character, ‘The excellent person is related to his friend in the same way he is 
related to himself, since his friend is another himself. Therefore, just as his 
own being is choiceworthy for him; his friend’s being is choiceworthy for 
him in the same or similar way.’3 Thus, as Nancy Sherman explains, in 
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choosing a friend, one ‘chooses to make that person a part of one’s life and to 
arrange one’s life with that person’s flourishing (as well as one’s own) in 
mind.’4 Thus, character-friends model parallel patterns of deliberation, 
decision, feeling and action that express an intimately shared way of 
perceiving and reacting to reality, and which dispose them to be especially 
attuned to the relevant particulars of a given context that determine the limits 
and possibilities for virtuous action. While moral goodness, according to 
Aristotle, provides the explanation for the formation of the relationship, its 
most important contribution is the ongoing acquisition, cultivation, and 
animation of virtue. Through both shared and independent pursuits, the 
friends engage in a variety of activities and, given their investment in one 
another’s good moral character, they provide motivation and guidance in 
performing these activities in a way that accords with virtue. Accordingly, 
these relationships will advance the ongoing and intentional cultivation of the 
full range of personal, interpersonal, and more broadly social virtues, which, 
according to Aristotle, must be included in the total life of the happy person. 
To summarize, Aristotle stipulates a definition of friendship that 
embraces a broad range of our social relationships. However, he takes care to 
distinguish the deficient forms of friendship, which are indeed generally 
praiseworthy and important to the enjoyment of one’s life, from an ideal type 
of friendship that proffers more substantial contributions to the total life of 
the good person. The lesser forms of friendship, even when constructed 
around appropriate pleasures or advantages, are, when compared to this ideal, 
are found wanting in terms of the relative worth of the good that grounds 
them, the restricted vision of the other that such friendships provide, and the 
extent to which such relationships prove to be vulnerable to changes in 
subjective predilections and external influences. Accordingly, character-
friendships, Aristotle’s ideal form, derive their relational primacy and 
intimacy via the foundation of their affections and well-wishing, and the 
more comprehensive picture of one’s friend this foundation provides. As a 
result, character-friendships constitute a more substantial and necessary 
ingredient in one’s life. Moreover, given their intimacy and the intricate way 
they are woven into the fabric of one’s life, they can be counted on to be 
more constant and less vulnerable to the permutations of life. 
Aristotle’s characterization of friendships is, in many ways, parallel 
to the way these relationships are generally envisaged today. In a fashion 
similar to Aristotle’s rather generous definition, the title of friendship is today 
used colloquially to denote a wide range of social associations to which other 
descriptive categories might also be appropriately assigned (e.g. colleagues, 
classmates, neighbours, etc.). This rather broad usage is adopted freely within 
social networking sites, where generally all of one’s reciprocally accepted 
associations within the network are added to one’s list of friends.  Thus, one 
finds within these contexts individuals whose enclave of friend’s numbers in 
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the hundreds, even the thousands. Certainly Aristotle would find such claims 
not only audacious, but impossible. Consequently, there is certainly an over 
use of the term friend within these contexts, but it is hard to identify any 
serious problems or dire consequences of this liberal designation. Aside from 
these extreme examples, there remains a range of online relationships, which 
are facilitated by social networking sites, that I believe fall within the 
definitional parameters Aristotle provides. As such, these friendships have 
the potential to enhance not only our online experience or virtual lives, but 
also our total lives, of which these online experiences and interactions are but 
a part. 
Let us focus for the time being on virtual friendships cultivated 
around areas of interest commonly expressed within the profile structures 
familiar to online social networking sites. General categories of such interests 
often include: literature, movies, forms of music, athletic teams, and so on. 
Within the social networks themselves these associations may include 
participation in online groups or simply pleasant exchanges with other 
individuals who share these interests. The shared interest need not be 
anything so heady as modern art or metaphysics. It could just as well be 
Belgian beers or baseball. The question, then, is whether such online 
relationships can be accurately identified as friendships without undermining 
the significance of the designation. 
Certainly, if the principal draw our ‘virtual friend’ has for us is her 
shared appreciation for well-brewed beer or a well-turned double play, then 
the various affections and expressions of goodwill that are reciprocated will 
be grounded in a good that represents-hopefully-only a limited dimension of 
each of our lives. This, of course, does not entail that all conversations and 
activities need be organized around these interests. However, as we have 
seen, Aristotle would contend that these relationships-absent of further 
development-are predicated upon each friend’s circumscribed and limited 
vision of the other, and attached to a partial and malleable characteristic of 
the other’s total persona . This may be especially true of relationships where 
proximity, a customary ingredient of traditional friendships, is substituted 
with a space and manner of exchange that are virtual. Constituted as they are, 
these relationships are vulnerable to both change and dissolution in a way 
that our most intimate relationships are not. However, this vulnerability 
maintains no necessary connection with the ‘virtual’ context of the 
relationship, but rather the limited role that the mutual interest plays in the 
total life of each agent, their respective identities, and their more 
comprehensive and inherently hierarchical conceptions of value. 
That is, if such associations are to be designated as something less 
than friendship, then we would seemingly have to disqualify also those more 
traditional friendships that are arranged around, say, regularly sharing a pint 
and casual conversation while watching our favourite team.  The temptation 
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to discount the former while recognizing the latter is, I suspect, the product of 
a common inclination to diagnose the legitimacy of virtual relationships 
(indeed all things virtual) in accordance with a standard of an ideal criteria, 
rather than an accurate account and appraisal of the nature of our real 
relationships. Even the designation virtual, as it is used colloquially, implies 
that such relationships are not really real, not authentic, not proper. The 
potential consequences of this attitude include the quarantine and 
abandonment of these important expressions of our relationality and a neglect 
of the important insights they provide into who we are as social beings in an 
increasingly technological world. 
Time allows me to include only a few brief examples of the way 
these ‘virtual friendships’ may be mined for real insights. If it is true, as 
many contemporary theorists commend, that we must ‘unpack or deconstruct 
the enduring notion of ‘integral, originary and unified identity,’ if we accept 
the proposition that our identities are not fixed or stable, then we should 
expect from our relationships-be they virtual or real-an ebb and flow of 
cultivation and dissolution.5 Accordingly, given the malleable and protean 
nature of the virtual context of social networking, such sites and the 
relationships that arise within them, might offer constructive insights for real 
relationships, where embodied and proximate, we are more likely tempted to 
buy into essentialist conceptions of the rigid or fixed nature of identities, 
those we adopt ourselves, as well as those we assign to others. Thus, given 
their unique context, virtual relationships may prove a valuable resource 
beyond the attachment to or affection for a particular trait or characteristic. 
Incorporated into the total life of the individual, they may bare witness to 
significant deeper truths about our identities and social nature.  Situated as 
they are, these friendships, perhaps, provide a level of detachment that 
facilitates a more objective analysis. However, if these relationships are 
properly understood, the insights of such analysis demand a reflexive 
integration into the life of the subject, including her dispositions of thinking, 
acting and feeling. As such, even our most basic online relationships prove to 
have moral worth that extends beyond the pleasure or utility they may 
provide. 
The challenges concerning the proper integration and balance of 
personal and social commitments seem particularly daunting in the 
contemporary context. Modern political and ethical discourse has rightly 
compelled us to think critically about proximity, similarity, and special 
inclinations as the bases and regulating motivations for our ethical lives.  
Whatever role our most intimate bonds may play in determining our ethical 
attitudes and behavior, these bonds are understood by most modern 
philosophers to be subordinate in moral significance to the bonds we share 
with human beings as such. What is central to the moral life, for most modern 
philosophy, is the moral recognition of universal human equality, the 
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protection of human dignity; the principle of respect for persons as such, and 
deliberative practices that adopt the state or disposition of impartiality, which 
has come to be associated with the moral point of view and social justice 
more generally. 
Certainly new technologies and increased globalization have 
provided a unique (often virtual) space for testing these intuitions and 
expressing these commitments. The relative isolation and homogeneity of 
Aristotle’s polis has been infiltrated by wires, cables, and waves capable of 
carrying real-time information regarding the events and activities of people 
who reside far beyond the decaying borders of our once relatively insulated 
moral and political communities. Consequently, we find ourselves confronted 
with new questions concerning the nature of our relationship to a larger world 
community. 
However, both friendships and cyber-technology have been accused 
for different reasons of potentially isolating us from larger social 
communities and the obligations they comprise.  For example, some have 
argued that friendships can be isolating insofar as the other is perceived as-to 
use Aristotle’s description-another-myself, it may condition an insular social 
sphere seemingly cut off from the rest of community. As Kierkegaard 
suggests throughout his Works of Love, one’s most intimate relationships may 
devolve into the I’s infatuation with the Other-I.6 They may facilitate the 
construction of harmful moral boundaries that designate what is mine, what is 
my concern, what is my obligation and what is other. However, I propose that 
virtual social networks provide a potential remedy to the isolation of both 
contexts. They allow us to perceive the socially constructed nature of all 
relationships, to see them embedded in a broader social framework. 
Moreover, given the manifold nature of these interactions they provide a 
helpful and analogous reminder of the otherness of even my closest relations, 
which counters both the myopic and the paternalistic tendencies that may 
become engrained in such relationships.7 
I argue that as technology continues to be an active presence in our 
lives, we would be wise to avoid a distinction of planes conception of virtual 
relationships and communities by regarding the virtual as a shared space of 
real interaction rather than a subordinate, less than real, realm of experience.  
Considered in this way, I believe these relationships, as friendships, are 
capable of playing the various significant roles that Aristotle envisioned for 
them-they will be sources of pleasure and the development of interests, but 
also contexts within which important dispositions of thinking, feeling and 
acting will be cultivated. 
 
 
 
Jordan J. Copeland 
______________________________________________________________ 
217
Notes
 
1 D Cates, Choosing to Feel: Virtue, Friendship, and Compassion for 
Friends,  University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind., 1997, p. 50. 
2 ibid., p. 51. 
3 NE 1107b6-8. All references to the Nicomachean Ethics are from  Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, translated by T Irwin, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 
Ind., 1999. 
4 N Sherman, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 133.  
5 D Bell, An Introduction to Cybercultures, Routledge, London, 2001, p. 114. 
Please consult the bibliography for other resources on the topic of identity in 
cyberculture. 
6 See S Kierkegaard, Works of Love, translated by H Hong and E Hong, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1995. 
7 These examples will be further developed and unpacked in an extended 
version of this paper. 
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A Phenomenological Analysis of Social Networking 
 
Leighton Evans 
 
Abstract 
When someone says ‘I am online’, it is a phenomenological issue. In 
reflecting upon the later philosophy of M. Heidegger, in particular focusing 
upon The Question Concerning Technology, social networking is a classic 
modern technology. The essence of the technology of social networking is 
Enframing, the essence of all modern technology for Heidegger; the essence 
of technology is nothing technological, but instead how the technology 
orientates humans towards the world. Social networking allows the users of 
the network to be placed in ‘standing-reserve’, and so the actual essence of 
social networking is no different to other technologies. The resources in 
social networking are people; and so the technology is creating the sense that 
people can be manipulated as resources, and put in standing-reserve. 
 
Key Words: Enframing, Standing-Reserve, Social Networking, Poesis, 
Disclosure, Authenticity. 
 
***** 
 
Heidegger’s aim in The Question Concerning Technology is set out 
in the first paragraph1: to investigate technology in order to prepare us for a 
‘free relationship’ with technology. Heidegger is not concerned with the 
existence of technology, but instead how humans are orientated towards 
technology; the problem is not the technology itself, and so the problem 
cannot be resolved through improving technology. 
 
Thus we shall never experience our relationship to the 
essence of technology so long as we merely conceive and 
push forward the technological, put up with it, or evade it. 
Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, 
whether we passionately affirm or deny it.2 
 
Heidegger accepts that technology cannot be avoided or escaped, and so must 
be considered. More importantly, Heidegger asserts that the essence of 
technology is not ‘anything technological’3 either. This assertion serves the 
purpose of opening up technology for discussion free from the domain of 
technological experts, and towards the field of philosophy. The removal of 
the technological from the essence of technology also allows Heidegger to 
undertake a historical analysis of technology, including an analysis of Greek 
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philosophy, and to argue that the essence of technology precedes the 
emergence of modern technology in the 18th Century. 
Heidegger begins his analysis of technology by questioning how 
humans think about technology. Heidegger draws two conclusions: 
technology is a means to an end and technology is a human activity. 
Heidegger terms these the instrumental and anthropological definitions of 
technology.4 Heidegger assesses these definitions to be correct, but they do 
not go far enough for Heidegger; the definitions describe how technology is 
used, not how technology affects the understanding of being. The 
understanding of technology that humans have based on the definitions given 
prevents entities from understanding the relationship between being and 
technology more fully; in effect, the definitions of technology based on the 
pragmatics of technology create a ‘blind spot’ that prevents further 
understanding. Heidegger’s aim is to uncover this more fundamental insight 
into how technology affects the relationship between being and 
understanding being. Humans can control technology, but even this control is 
informed by our ‘instrumental conception’5 of what technology is; our 
thinking about technology is dominated by what the technology does and 
how humans use the technology, rather than by how the technology affects 
being and what is the relationship between humans and technology. 
To understand how being and humans stand in relationship to 
technology, Heidegger considers what is meant by the ‘instrumental’ use of 
technology as a means to an end. To do this, the assumptions that underlie 
such pragmatic considerations of technology such as ‘getting things done’ 
need to be considered. This assumption reduces to how one thing (such as a 
social networking website) has an effect on another thing (the friendships that 
a person has). The analysis of the instrumentality of technology leads 
Heidegger to consider causality; Heidegger’s aim is to return the word cause 
to a more fundamental meaning. Cause, for Heidegger when considering the 
ancient Greek etymology of the word, is closer to aitia or ‘to occasion’. 
When considering a chalice, the silversmith occasions or causes the chalice, 
bringing together the four causes, ‘to make present’ the chalice in time and 
space. Causes are redefined as the ‘ways of being responsible’ which assist 
the potential of the chalice in the silver for the chalice. Heidegger requires the 
reader to imagine the chalice that is on its way to existence, and the ways of 
‘being responsible’ help the chalice achieve this bringing into existence. 
Heidegger introduces the term poesis, which is related to being 
responsible for something in the sense that the silversmith is responsible for 
the chalice. Poesis means ‘bringing forth’, and Heidegger means two things 
by bringing forth; the first being the bringing forth into existence, such as the 
silversmith practices with the chalice, and the second being the bringing forth 
into nature, such as a tree that is brought forth from the acorn. Both kinds are 
poesis, in the way in which something was brought forth which was not 
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present. ‘Bringing-forth brings out of concealment into unconcealment’6. The 
understanding of poesis as a kind of revealing led Heidegger to conclude that 
it is related to the Greek word aletheia, which means ‘revealing’ and is also 
the Greek word for truth; at this point Heidegger links the bringing forth of 
technology with truth; hence technology is discussed with reference to truth. 
Heidegger wants to argue that technology is a kind of poesis, a way 
of bringing forth from concealment, and as such is in ‘the realm of truth’7. 
This is now a radical departure from the instrumental definition of 
technology, as Heidegger is not considering the usage of technology in his 
discussion. Instead, the focus is on how technology brings forth what is 
absent, and what effect this has on truth. Heidegger is looking for an 
alternative method to thinking about technology, away from instrumentality. 
Heidegger had a key idea; technology is a poesis that brings forth what has 
not been present - such as the windmill that harnesses the power of the wind. 
The wind was there, but the power of the wind requires the technology to be 
revealed forth. Modern technology does not act in the way of bringing forth, 
but instead extracts and exploits, such as the changing of the earth by mining 
coal into a resource, which cannot be repaired or restored to its former state. 
Heidegger also uses the Rhine river to draw the comparison between modern 
technology and the ‘revealing’ of poetry. When the river is dammed to 
provide electricity, the meaning of the river is altered; it becomes a resource 
for energy. The view of the Rhine as a source of hydroelectric power is 
contrasted with the poetry of Höderlin, whose poetry portrays the river as a 
source of artistic, philosophical and nationalistic inspiration. The source of 
revealing is the same in both cases, but the result of the revealing is clearly 
different. Modern technology reveals, but the revealing is of a different kind; 
to explain this further, Heidegger introduces the notion of the standing 
reserve. 
The standing reserve is linked to the notion of instrumentality with 
which Heidegger began. The instrumental orientation of technology brings all 
things in the world into standing reserve, and Heidegger’s fundamental 
argument is thus reached; technology transforms human beings into standing 
reserve. The forester, for example, is a resource, and therefore is at the mercy 
of, the paper industry that has developed through technology. The paper 
industry also transforms the reading public into a resource through and hence 
into standing reserve. However, humans are never just raw materials; the 
position of humans as the forefront of technological advance means that 
humans will not become purely raw material. The way we orientate ourselves 
towards the world is changed by technology though. The fundamental 
relationship between the world and humanity is changed by technology 
through an orientation that Heidegger labels Enframing (or Gestell). 
Heidegger uses Enframing to describe how humans come to relate to 
the world around them, or how they are orientated to the world around them. 
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For Heidegger, humans have a concept of Enframing that allows us to 
categorise the world in a certain way. Heidegger explains Gestell as a type of 
schematic structure; something that organises our perceptions in a manner 
that informs our understanding of the world. The forester, through 
Enframing, will view trees in a manner different from the conservationist, 
due the Enframing of the world through the technology that places the 
forester in this relationship to trees.  Thus, Enframing compels humans to 
categorise our experiences and the entities that we encounter in the world. 
This then gives humans a sense of control over the entities that are 
encountered in the world, and it is this which is the character of modern 
technology; the Enframing, or categorisation of entities in the world. 
Heidegger states that the essence of modern technology ‘is by no 
means anything technological’.8 Technology does not have its essence in 
technological creations themselves, and not in the activities that humans 
indulge in using technology, such as creating social networks such as 
Facebook. Instead, the essence of technology is realised through the ‘frame of 
mind’ that the individual constituents of technological processes are viewed; 
in social networking, the neither the software nor the users are the essence of 
the technology, but the way that the parts of this relationship as an interaction 
- the technology and the users - are viewed as raw materials for another 
product, that is the actual social networking that occurs itself, is the essence 
of modern technology. In this way, Heidegger’s argument is that the essence 
of technology is the ordering of the components of the technological process 
into specific means to the end of the technology. Users using social 
networking software and websites are ordered by the technology into a 
relationship not only with the other users but also with the technology itself. 
Social networking, by having the essence of Enframing, transforms 
users into standing reserve. This is a process of reduction; as Heidegger 
notes, humans go from being entities with deep essences to ‘functionaries of 
Enframing’.9 As functionaries of Enframing, humans are affected in two 
ways; firstly, they are transformed into resources to be exploited by other 
users, but also humans will be driven to get the most out of the possibilities 
that exist in other people. In doing this, the deep essences of other entities 
will not be recognised; other entities are simply seen in terms of their ease of 
use and maximum utility, and how flexible the entity is in being used for the 
needs of the person. Such a revealing ‘never comes to an end’10 because 
everything must be considered as a resource at all times. Hence, an entity 
would, if revealed as a resource that had no further usage, become obsolete 
and not suitable for further consideration if Enframing has committed a 
person to the view of other entities as standing reserve. Social networking 
sites have the notion of standing reserve embedded within them; the sites 
compel users to rank and stratify their relationships with other users in order 
of preference, reducing relationships with others to a hierarchy of utility - a 
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person is promoted based on their utility within the social networking 
environment. This then should be reciprocated by advancement in the 
hierarchical structure of friendships that users have on sites such as Facebook 
and MySpace. The result is that the encounters and interactions that take 
place within social networking are essentially ones designed to promote the 
utility of one user to another; the relationship is one of standing reserve, the 
more that one user can be used by another, the stronger that relationship will 
be when viewed through the structures enforced by social networking 
software. 
The notion of standing reserve also reflects other salient features of 
the affects of social networking on users. Modern technology, by having the 
essence of Enframing and reducing entities to standing reserve, changes the 
sense that humans have for the world.11 This means that modern technology 
provides the sense that all things are available to use here and now; and that 
humans can have anything immediately and on demand. In order to achieve 
this instant gratification, it is necessary to constantly rearrange and reassess 
our practices to achieve this, such as changing our modes of communication 
from face-to-face, to telephone-based, to social networking. The speed and 
relative ease of communication over social networking has been advanced as 
one of the primary reasons for the growth of the phenomenon.12 This change 
in practices inevitably alters the significance of entities with which humans 
have interactions. Heidegger uses the example of farming to illustrate this:13 
farming was a vocation, the purpose of which was to tend and care for the 
land that the farming took place on. When farming became a mechanised 
industry, with no notion of stewardship then the ability of a farmer to look 
after nature was reduced. Indeed, the Enframing of modern technology sets 
out something other than maintenance; it is now the role of the farmer to 
improve nature, not maintain it. If nature is improved by modern technology, 
then humans are no longer constrained by nature; they can change it, do with 
it what they want and extract whatever is needed from it due to its status as a 
resource. 
Social networking does for human relationships what agricultural 
mechanisation has done for farmland. As human interactions are reduced to 
emaciated and superficial conversations through computer-mediated 
platforms, their purpose is to extract as much information from as little 
communication as possible. Hence, instead of care and consideration being 
the key parts of interpersonal friendship communications, the communication 
which takes place through social networking is, for the main part, 
characterised by short, abbreviated styles with the aim of advancing as much 
information a possible with the least amount of energy or resource spent; the 
maximum gain for the minimum effort. Modern technology, in this case 
social networking software, facilitates the maximum use of it exposes, and in 
this case it is other users that are exposed. Social networking software places 
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users into the open; as a modern technology it grasps users in a manner that 
‘unlocks’ them and their potential as resources and which then allows other 
users to exploit and use the other users. More over, the structure of such 
networks implicitly requires the view of others as resources due to the 
hierarchical structuring of other users in the users pages. Other people are 
presented in a manner that makes them observable as a resource; other people 
are ranked, labelled as ‘top friends’, and users are encouraged to do this 
through the software interface that presents the user with no option but to 
rank and objectify other people. Hence, other people are enframed as a 
resource in that they are presented to the user not as people, but as a link to 
be connected to, and to be presented on their own page in a certain way. In 
looking at and using social networking sites, the user sees every other user 
that they are linked with as a resource; users are not seen indeterminately, to 
be chosen and labelled through analysis and consideration, but just as a link 
to another page that can be used in that way. Social networking, as its essence 
is Enframing, transforms users from deeper entities into standing reserve, and 
presents all users as resources. 
The danger of social networking as a tool of Enframing has been 
expressed in other, stronger ways. In the essay ‘Heidegger on the Connection 
between Nihilism, Art, Technology, and Politics’, Hubert Dreyfus pushes the 
concept of standing-reserve to the extent that objectivism and subjectivism 
are subsumed into a schema that culminates to an imminent nihilism. 
Dictated through a purely technological schema, the world described by 
Dreyfus is one in which life functions with methodical efficiency solely for 
the sake of technological advancement.14 If Dreyfus’ assumptions are correct, 
then the Enframing of social networking and being-in-cyberspace in general 
can be seen as a driving force for nihilism and the eventual rejection of all 
interpersonal communication as a meaningful enterprise; instead, it is 
considered as a perfunctory and basic tool for advancement. The idea of a 
schema is both interesting and important; it warns that social networking, as a 
modern technology, will not just enframe the user, but also affect the user at a 
fundamental psychological level. Dreyfus goes further than the pessimism of 
his original claim. ‘In this technological perspective, ultimate goals like 
serving God, society, our fellows, or even ourselves no longer make sense to 
us. Human beings on this view, become as resource to be used - but more 
important, to be enhanced - like any other’.15 Dreyfus’ ultimate conclusion 
stresses Heidegger’s fears in a global sense; when applying this to social 
networking, Dreyfus’ conclusion would mean that the technology is 
Enframing users to become a resource, as has already been stressed, but also 
to be maximally used and enhanced for use. In that way, those that can be 
used most will be the most pre-enhanced, and hence have more value from 
the perspective of standing reserve; users who cannot be maximally exploited 
as a resource will lose value. The Enframing of users as standing reserve may 
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therefore lead to a change in the criteria of evaluation of the value of close 
relationships and associations; those persons that can be used and enhanced 
have the most value, as they are providing the maximum resourcefulness. 
Traditional markers for building relationships - such as proximity, interests, 
empathy, kinship - may be rejected for online presence and the ability to 
provide resources, a fundamental change in the way beings interact and 
connect with one another. With no ultimate goal beyond treating others as a 
resource, the duration of and strength of the connection between beings 
becomes altered; there is no requirement for the goal of a long-term 
communicative relationship when there are millions of other users enframed 
as resources to be used like any other users. Hence, if social networking has 
the status of modern technology as Dreyfus would envisage, then the damage 
resulting from it would be, from a phenomenological perspective, 
catastrophic. 
The conclusions to be drawn from this discussion are stark and 
potentially alarming; social networking is a modern technology that has the 
property of Enframing, changing in this case users themselves into standing 
reserve; a resource to be used by other users of social networks, and therefore 
a degeneration of being into a resource for the use and entertainment of 
others. Whereas Heidegger allows for a realignment in the orientation 
between beings and technology through artistic response, it is unclear how 
this may be possible in social networks; there exists the possibility of such 
response, but it is at the behest of the individual user to harness and utilise 
such opportunity, and the Enframing of users as resource promotes the ease 
and maximum utility of usage of social networking, not the effort and time 
that such a response would require. A vicious circle is created; the ease of 
communication promotes superficiality and inhibited communication, but if 
this is challenged then it is the ease of use that also prevents users from 
expressing themselves, and therefore disclosing being, in a manner that 
would allow authentic disclosure. 
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Abstract  
The article concerns the problem of boundaries of cyber-freedom and cyber-
democracy. User-generated content portals, wikiprojects and virtual worlds 
depend on the will of users to re-define the meanings and - on limitations of 
economy of the Web 2.0. Social-networking may be the regarded as the 
embodiment of cyber-utopia of peaceful cooperation of humankind but social 
creation and transmission of knowledge is invisibly shaped by new economy 
- wikinomics and telecoms. Authors analyse the most important ideas of 
cyber-communities as free culture, wiki and open source. They explicit the 
fundamental elements of wiki-identity and of folksonomic order of 
knowledge. The Web 2.0 is not only the marketing trend controlling societies 
but also the tool of social pressure of bottom-to-top character. The openness 
for user demands stemming from economic reasons changes the authorities 
and companies as well. The change is culturally significant as it creates the 
new order of society and new discourse of knowledge and power. However, 
there appear new threats as privacy loss or control and electronic vandalism. 
The paper shows new areas of anthropological research as cyber-ritual 
analysis and research on online communities and their cyber mythologies. 
 
Key Words: Web Anthropology, Cyber-Rituals, Social Networking, 
Wikipedia, Web 2.0, Folksonomy, Wikinomics, Cyber Mythology. 
 
***** 
 
The freedom of culture is the main purpose consolidating the 
communities of net activists. In the 90s the idea was related to the cyberpunk 
movement, based on the cultural trend of being technically skilled at using 
new technologies, seen as rather mysterious at the time. This trend was 
undoubtedly a sort of postmodern and pro-technological gnosis.1 The 
language used for research on the subject of the Net could not keep up with 
the rapid developments of technical connections and emerging cyber-
communities. The many theories of cyber studies generated metaphors and 
terms that increased mysteriousness of the new media and demonised the Net 
as a mystic reality. The state of knowledge in those days can be described, in 
narratological terms, as a paradoxically scientific science-fiction. This 
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gnostic-cum-philosophical approach can be seen as the necessary first step in 
the process of getting accustomed to new technologies that paved the way for 
the contemporary sociological, anthropological, ethnographic and 
psychological research. According to Derrick de Kerckhove, new 
technologies can only become popular when the society is ready to accept 
them, which happens through a process of gradual rationalising of the 
communication environment.2 The knowledge of this environment plays an 
absolutely critical role in determining the cultural development. New 
communication competences and acquaintance with technology have become 
an inseparable element of social life due to, among others, the cyberpunk 
avant guard movement, members of the Open Source movement, pioneers of 
methods of alternative content distribution and privacy protection on the Net. 
The turning point in the development of the Net was undoubtedly 
September 11, 2001. That was when a certain paradigm of the Net broke 
down, the paradigm positing the Net as an anarchistic environment exerting 
further anarchistic influence on the whole of culture. The Net gained, in a 
way, the maturity. Today, the freedom on the Net is usually seen in more 
down-to-earth terms: as new licences, new copyrights and new ways to 
generate content.3 Questions of privacy, Big Brother, control over citizens, 
the dangers of Echelon or Carnivore systems have lost much of their 
popularity on the level of social Net discourse. Internet anonymisation of 
communication has been replaced by the now fashionable tendency, 
connected with Web 2.0 marketing, to reveal even deeper layers of one’s 
identity.4 It is not only the question of personal data, but rather of narrations 
directly connected with privacy, which create nowadays vast space of 
narratives on everydayness of practically all cultures. This global self-
recording of micronarration is undoubtedly an unprecedented phenomenon in 
the history of culture. The paranoid registering of everything and everywhere 
and the subsequent presentation of these records as a form of creation has led 
to the development of a new social communication paradigm, personal web 
publishing. Blogosphere has become the most important space for symbolic 
exchange characteristic for information society. Social networking portals 
and grassroots journalism enable re-definition of communication strategies 
by generating new rules of transmission of the knowledge in the society. It is 
important to notice its economic dimension.5 It is becoming more and more 
popular to use procedures of informal communication for business purposes. 
Known as wikinomics, this phenomenon largely questions the ‘informality’ 
of the Internet self-recording. 
The set of socio-cultural phenomena and processes known as Web 
2.0, although a marketing slogan appealing even to dot-com pessimists, has 
nevertheless clearly altered the contemporary understanding of the Internet as 
well as refreshed many freedom-related ideas connected with the 
cyberculture.6 These phenomena have led to the spread of the idea of 
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democratisation of the communication, but have also given a new meaning to 
such basic cultural terms as ‘knowledge,’ ‘wisdom,’ ‘authority,’ ‘trust’ and 
‘social transmission of meaning.’ What can be seen here is the process of re-
evaluation within the discourse of knowledge and power - blogosphere and 
grassroots journalism, often exposing political or media propaganda, have 
undermined traditional strategies of constructing and distributing meaning in 
the society.7 Wiki technology has given rise to decentralised social networks, 
used, for instance, in gathering knowledge on a given subject or creating 
concepts and documentation for a group of users. 
It is to be remembered, however, that these processes take place 
within the limits of social communication delineated by technical 
possibilities, economic capacity and the policy of the leading telecoms. User-
generated content portals do not operate outside the market, but within its 
framework. Personalised services are of interest not only to their users, they 
also help create their consumer profile accessible to service providers. The 
consumer may be consciously involved in the process of constructing such a 
profile, as is the case with the portals such as Hostelworld that allow users 
efficiently to search particular services, assess them based on other users’ 
opinions, and, finally, buy any items selected. However, users might not be 
aware of their involvement in the services market, as is the case with the 
communication within Second Life, where actual consumption, social 
interaction and the creation of virtual world may permeate each other. 
Web 2.0 is based first and foremost on the Net users’ desire to 
participate in a broad data exchange, information sharing and global self-
presentation. It is something more than just a fashion for generating content 
with a private or personal aspect, nor is it not only a form of global 
exhibitionism and escaping into the virtual. What matters most here is the 
social participation in activities allowing community-based creation of 
content, redefinition of meanings and exchange of knowledge. It is based on 
the belief in the possibility of positive cooperation among internauts, a form 
of social constructivism. The key example of activity based on constructivist 
consciousness is Wikipedia.8 This way of constructing knowledge might be 
frown upon by conservative-minded intellectuals. Wikipedia, however, is 
different from social networking portals where the knowledge is generated 
based on folksonomic rules. 
Wikiknowledge is a sort of compromise between folksonomy and 
taxonomy. The Encyclopaedia is built in an open, but not anarchistic, way. 
The social rules in operation here to a certain extent put an order to the space 
of freedom. It is the ‘neutral point of view’ that becomes the reference point, 
imposing some moderation in expressing one’s opinions while retaining the 
interpretative character of contributions. The rules governing the submission 
of contributions to Wikipedia concern the use of content management system 
programming code and formatting these contributions according to the 
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existing editing principles. First and foremost, however, these rules rely on 
the Wikipedia social order, a peculiar libertarian social stratification 
imposing a hierarchical responsibility for content. And so lines of 
responsibility go from administrators of particular language versions, to 
editors of particular sections who are in charge of any changes introduced, 
regular editors, authors of codification solutions to ambassadors of wikiorder. 
An average user does not have to be aware of this hierarchy. Intellectuals 
cannot accept the wikiorder, seeing it as an infringement of the traditional 
authority of the knowledge distributed in the educational and publishing 
systems. Wikipedia, however, is not the everyday, nor is it unprofessional 
knowledge. Although it appears to be unstable and chaotic, wikiknowledge is 
nevertheless referential. 
This is achieved through strategies such as community-based setting 
of rules for entry creation, dialog-based process of content creation, open 
voting over the form of definitions and social monitoring of any latest 
changes to the content of entries. Thanks to constant social control any 
breaches of the referential rule, called vandalism, are in most cases detected. 
Thus the system characterised by the fluency of creative process bears some 
features of stability of the knowledge corpus. This feature is often overlooked 
by the critics of the new approach to encyclopaedia. 
It is to be noticed as well that the wiki technology has come into its 
own in corporate environments where there is a need to create knowledge 
bases for complex procedures whose administering touches ‘frontiers of 
complexity.’9 These applications show the full potential of wiki to generate 
knowledge, created solely by a closed team of specialists. They also show the 
hierarchical character of this method of knowledge creation, a direct 
consequence of corporate culture and its ideological assumptions. Wiki is 
first and foremost about the technology, while at the same time forming an 
element of social order. Connective content generation and open character of 
modification, while retaining the control of the group of controllers-
administrators, allows nevertheless to stop the movement of meaning on the 
level acceptable by the rules of reference, coherence and communicativeness. 
The complexity of opinions expressed within wiki and multifacetedness are 
only appearances. The organism of Wikipedia as a connective intelligence 
seeks to reach simplicity. Here is the right place to quote John Maeda, the 
greatest theoretician of simplicity: 
 
Simplicity and complexity need each other. The more 
complexity there is in the market, the more that something 
simpler stands out. And because technology will only 
continue to grow in complexity, there is a clear economic 
benefit to adopting a strategy of simplicity that will help 
your product apart. That said establishing a feeling of 
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simplicity in design requires making complexity 
consciously available in some explicit form. This 
relationship can be manifest in either the same object or 
experience or in contrast with other offerings in the same 
category [...]10 
 
The experience of Wikipedia is precedence in human history and in the 
history of human effort to construct knowledge. The free encyclopaedia is the 
fastest source of information about the digital environment as an extension of 
the human being. It reacts instantly to any emerging technological change, 
which is way beyond the scope of any traditionally constructed knowledge 
base. It is to be noted as well that the source of this knowledge are often the 
authors of technological solutions themselves including members of the Open 
Source movement. This is a sort of feedback, whereby solutions described 
and theorised upon are the ones making up the space of contemporary 
ecology of the digital environment, where, in turn, new media-based 
cognitive procedures are being developed. 
It is worth noticing that Wikipedia revitalises the traditional notion 
of studying as an independent research on a given subject.11 Such re-
evaluation of amateur efforts to compile knowledge is undoubtedly connected 
with MacDonaldisation and commercialisation of higher education 
institutions as well as the decline of traditional authorities. In the digital 
world the adequacy of knowledge is related more to its instantness and its 
social transmission (popularity) than to it being a priori acknowledged as 
valuable by the Academy. And so Wikipedia is a space of knowledge that 
goes beyond the everydayness as defined by sociology or the anthropological 
local knowledge. 
The folksonomic knowledge, produced in user-generated content 
websites is of a slightly different character. Social tagging, social 
bookmarking and social networking are all strategies of ordering information, 
strategies at the same time subjective and public in their character. They 
allow each user to create their own media profile, their private self-
presentation environments or their own area of interest (e.g. my little world, a 
personal vision of the world implemented in the processes of social web 
browsing). Folksonomy is about imparting information with a subjective 
order of meaning (tagging), multi-dimensional categorisation of concepts.12 
Dispersion and voluntaristic character of folksonomy constructs a highly 
attractive model of knowledge compared to the traditional model of 
taxonomy. Folksonomy is undoubtedly a picture of the everydayness 
mediated through the Net. 
What can be seen here is a change of paradigm in the area of 
gathering knowledge: objectivising procedures being questioned as a result of 
human knowledge getting entangled in all the competing discourses, an 
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increasingly important role is now played by the subjective factor. The 
subjective factor, emphasising the pluralism of categorising is now being 
more and more appreciated. Folksonomy can also be seen as a ‘social 
monitoring’ phenomenon, where, for instance, digital traces of friends 
activity are searched with the use of personalised information channels that 
are conducive to personality leaks. This is a slow and fragmentary process, 
yet it allows the identity profile of users to be compiled in a great detail 
without them knowing. 
Identity 2.0 is an entity emerging from the limited choices designed 
by programmers. This is a ‘choice from the menu,’ according to the 
interpretation of the interface user’s activities presented by Lev Manovich.13 
Consequently, the user’s identity is designed as an element of the interface 
and the data base. The Internet being a part of our culture for almost two 
decades now, technical skills have become commonplace in whole societies 
and complicated user interfaces requiring specialist knowledge on the part of 
the user have been replaced by user-friendly graphic interfaces and the 
universal networking of information. This has been possible thanks to the 
humanisation of the computer and computerisation of the user’s identity. 
What once was ‘secret knowledge’ has now become common knowledge. 
And thus cyberspace mythology has evolved: the mythology of the 
programmer creating freed tools, characterising Web 1.0, in Web 2.0 has 
been replaced by the mythology of the user who creates, or releases, 
symbolic content.14 Also, Web 2.0 brings a re-definition of communication 
applications of the Internet. The medium leads to the emergence of online 
communities as well as social networks of different types. Web 2.0 involves a 
communication mode characterised by two main features: rituality and 
pragmaticism. Wikipedia and other wiki implementations as well as social 
networks respond to the needs for information and cooperation, e.g. social 
creation of knowledge base (Wikipedia, Wikitravel) or business networks 
(LinkedIn, GoldenLine). 
The ritual goal of communication is extremely important. True, the 
ritual has often been seen as valueless ‘communication without information’ 
by communication theorists (proponents of the transmission model).15 
However, anthropological research proves that the ritual performs an 
important function of supporting social relations and consolidating culture. 
The social space of Web 2.0 has developed rituals that allow users to get 
accustomed to new technologies as well as re-define the place of human 
being in culture. They offer a possibility to participate in social games and to 
create the patterns of culture. Social networking websites are centres around 
which New rituals are constructed. Building the profile or avatar (e.g. in 
Second Life) can be regarded as a self-presenting and self-defining ritual, 
selecting a particular skin for the avatar or a photo for blog may be seen as an 
element of ritual whereby the user adjusts to social norms and aesthetic 
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models. In this perspective, collecting friends in social networking portals 
such as FaceBook, Classmates or in the Polish cultural phenomenon of ‘Our-
class’ (Nasza-klasa.pl) is a sort of ritual of confirming one’s social status 
through artificially increasing the size of one’s social network. Running a 
blog, photoblog, microblog, moblog, audioblog or videoblog is also a ritual 
confirmation of one’s value as well as an expression of willingness to be part 
of the space of modernity and technological skill. Many rites connected with 
embellishing one’s virtual body or its destruction are to be seen here, too, 
including the ritual murder of avatars (Second Life). Another important ritual 
linking the online and offline reality is the ritual of digital mourning, most 
typically accompanying offline event and manifesting itself in blogs. It is 
possible to find more phenomena of ritual type on the Net, the ones 
mentioned above being some of the most prominent examples for Web 2.0. 
Concluding, it is worth noticing what is - from the anthropological 
point of view - a puzzling shift in the understanding of the Net that has taken 
place over the last two decades. It can be observed that metaphors used to 
think about the Net and to describe it have been changed. The metaphor of 
the Net as a rhizome has been replaced by the metaphor of the Net as a map 
of the underground. It can be regarded as the progressive rationalising of 
operational metaphors used to describe crucial cultural terms, in this case 
both the medium, the technology and the communication environment. 
Thinking about the Internet is linked to thinking about cognitive space. The 
metaphor of rhizome referred to the tradition of understanding unimaginable 
notions such as Cosmos, Chaos or God. As it turned out, however, the 
practice of communication led to the simplification of the cognitive model 
and metaphors of closed systems proved more functional. It is not possible to 
describe an infinite environment while at the same time experiencing it on a 
daily basis as finite in the form of search results or a definite number of acts 
of communication. It gives a framework to the universe. The communication 
aspect has taken precedence over the metaphysics of the Net. It is this 
communication aspect that sets the rules of the new economy (wikinomics), 
new taxonomy (folksonomy) and social re-stratification. It is communication, 
both in its pragmatic and ritual aspect, that generates the deepest cultural 
meanings of Web 2.0 and delineates the future of the networked society. 
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Character as Virtual Reality Experiment in Identity 
 
Lynda Williams 
 
Abstract 
The character of Amel, in the science fiction novel The Courtesan Prince, is 
an enactment of the author’s struggle to understand identity as it relates to 
gender, human nature and medically-induced changes in personality. As the 
author of the novel, I draw on my life experience as a primary source, with 
reference to the works which influenced me, in order to establish the targets 
of my interest and show why identity is crucial to my motivation as a writer. 
How Amel embodies both my hopes and fears for humanity is captured by 
the concept of ‘naked virtuality’, which I use to translate my real life 
concerns into the virtual world of science fiction narrative. This technique is 
explored in the greatest detail with regard to isolating the concept of sexual 
abuse from assumptions about gender, but also touches on questions about 
human nature and constancy of identity despite a traumatic personality 
adjustment through medical intervention. In conclusion, I suggest future 
applications of naked virtuality in other contexts. 
 
Key Words: Identity, Characterization, Science Fiction, Fantasy, Gender, 
Virtualization, Authorship. 
 
***** 
 
1.  Introduction  
This is the story of how one novelist used a beloved character to run 
a thought experiment about identity. I am the author, Lynda Williams, and 
the character is Amel, in The Courtesan Prince, book number one in the 
science fiction series called the Okal Rel Saga.1 
Arising out of my discoveries as a novelist, is an idea about the form 
and function of virtualization in all media which I summarize with the label 
of ‘naked virtuality’: a process which may have the power to transcend its 
literary origins to do work in other spheres such as instructional design. 
 
2.  Identity as the Arena of Meaning 
I grew up in a small city in the northern interior of British Columbia. 
My father’s family moved to Prince George around 1905, at a time when 
hitching posts for horses were still in use in the downtown area. I did not 
understand the distinction, in my childhood, between aristocracy and the 
professional class my mother came from, in Britian, who were able to afford 
servants, so I viewed myself as a natural cut above neighborhood friends, 
Character as Virtual Reality Experiment in Identity 
______________________________________________________________ 
238
referred to by my grandmother as ‘common children’. My mother stocked 
our home with riches like the Great Books of the Western World and the 
complete works of Shakespeare on LPs. Of the Great Books, the Meditations 
of Marcus Aurelius and bits of Plato’s Republic stood out for me as 
foundations for my preoccupation with how to balance power, great or small, 
with sound moral judgment, while from Shakespeare I gained a lively 
appreciation for how to dramatize large issues through the escapades of 
single individuals. 
As an adolescent, steeped in the feminist doctrine promoted by 
‘Why Not?’ posters in my school, I felt inspired by the mission of the 
Starship Enterprise, imbibed from television.2  Waiting for Godot, by Samuel 
Beckett, rocked my world when I first experienced it at the Prince George 
Playhouse, but I quickly identified it as an enemy.3 Literature, for me, was 
about making meaning not undermining it. 
Perhaps I knew too much about negativity already, due my father’s 
lifelong battle with depression and my well-loved grandmother’s slide into 
senility. Clearly people could, and did, change. My mother, on the other 
hand, was a relentless optimist. Her unconditional love set the benchmark, for 
me, of incorruptible constancy of identity. Wanting to emulate my mother, as 
a caregiver, I completed a thousand hours as a volunteer counselor with the 
Prince George Crisis Centre in my teenage years. I followed up by reading 
books on mental illness, war crimes, poverty and other extremes of human 
experience, including books about the historical Dracula, Vlad Tepes, and the 
Marquis de Sade.4 
The more I learned the greater my craving became to ground my 
moral instincts in a way that made more sense to me than my father’s literal 
belief in the bible. I flirted with atheism until rejecting it as a negation rather 
than a positive statement about anything. I was prepared to believe God was 
nothing but a byproduct of our mental confusion, an idea first encountered in 
Janus: a Summing Up by Arthur Koestler, but not to deny whatever instinct 
in me rebelled at violations of basic decency.5 But my own sense of logic 
made it hard to find intellectual support to defend me from the sort of amoral 
approach to goal seeking I first encountered in The Prince by Nicolò 
Machiavelli and continue to reject in its modern reality TV incarnations 
exemplified by shows like The Apprentice starring Donald Trump.6 The Star 
Trek Universe became my de facto comfort zone, which appeared to be based 
on the notion advances in science would empower mankind civilize the 
universe. But this hope was never entirely satisfying given the ample 
evidence of the destructive potential of science symbolized for me, as a child 
of the Cold War, by the movie Dr. Strangelove.7 
My quest for moral comfort led to identity via the unlikely vehicle 
of evolutionary psychology, and other secular explanations for why humans 
are what we are. Two books I remember, particularly, are Jared Diamond’s 
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Guns, Germs and Steel, and Barbara Ehrenreich’s Blood Rites.8 9 But he the 
idea that our behavior has been shaped by the game of life confronted my 
moral sense with the unpalatable facts laid out by Robin Baker in Sperm 
Wars, juxtaposing rape and responsible parenting as nothing more or less 
than two competing strategies for success in the breeding game.10 
Of course, moral instincts themselves are products of the survival 
game and as Francis Fukuyama argues so convincingly in his book Trust: 
The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, amoral behavior is 
parasitic on society. Morality is the weapon of the good majority against the 
parasitic cheaters who impair everyone’s chance for the good life.11 
How identity is key to morality came to me during a performance of 
the musical play Jacques Brel is Alive and Well and Living in Paris. 
Contemplating the great unknown of death, a boy and girl sing to each other: 
‘But whatever is behind that door, there is nothing much to do. Angel or 
devil, I don’t care, for in front of that door there is you.’12 
Morality lies in our ability to need and value others. And our well 
being as a species depends on those with a moral sense controlling amoral 
individuals. 
How then, dare identity be changeable and fragile? This is the 
problem I created Amel to explore by imbuing him, as a virtual reality 
experiment.. If I could get Amel through all I inflicted on him, and still 
believe in him as a character, it would mean something to me and also to my 
readers: a detail I find all important since one of the strongest motives for my 
art is the hope it will support other people of good character in the same war 
of ideology I waded through to reach my conclusions. 
 
3. Amel and Identity in The Courtesan Prince 
Amel, in The Courtesan Prince, is the archetypal character of high 
rank raised as a commoner with a couple identity-challenging variations. 
First, in keeping with my early belief in science as the means to improve 
mankind, his high status stems from being a product of genetic engineering, 
know as a Sevolite in the Okal Rel Universe. His identity as a human being is 
therefore challenged because he possesses traits that did not evolve through 
natural selection. Second, although a male lead in an adventure story, he is 
encumbered by typically female traits of character such as beauty, goodness, 
and his role as a sex abuse victim. Finally, despite a more than normally 
robust sense of identity and purpose, referred to as ‘grip’ in the Okal Rel 
Universe, Amel is mentally re-programmed more than once in ways which 
alter his behavior. The challenge here is whether he remains the same person 
in his interaction with others, despite the constraints imposed on him. 
The odd nature of Amel’s psychological profile is exposed to 
scrutiny by the advanced brain science of his captors, the Reetions. In the 
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following revealing quote, it is being explained to his lover, Ann, who has 
rejected him for the wrong reasons. 
 
Her hand shifted, altering the image. ‘The emotional 
integration, here, is more typically female than male, but 
that’s shading into general personality.’13 
 
In her book A New Species: Gender and Science in Science Fiction, Robin 
Roberts points out how female authors of speculative fiction, from Mary 
Shelly in Frankenstein, to Ursula Le Guin, exploit the plasticity of the genre 
to allow male (or alien) characters to represent the female condition. She 
calls such non-female characters codedly-female.14 
I made Amel male because I wanted to focus on the rights and 
wrongs of his experiences as a ‘naked virtuality’, by which I mean a topic 
separated from its usual associations and presented in circumstances designed 
to refocus attention on what really matters. Amel is victimized by both male 
and female characters at different points in the series to also defamiliarize the 
other side of the moral equation. I discovered an odd reluctance to condemn 
amoral women best described by Patricia Pearson in her book When She was 
Bad: Violent Women and the Myth of Innocence.15  The gender of the victim 
shouldn’t matter, but it always seemed to, hence the need to destabilize 
assumptions. I have written, elsewhere, about my reciprocal treatment of 
female Sevolites of the Vrellish variety, who are based on male-only 
progenitors.16 
Medical interventions in Amel’s identity are many but I will deal, 
here, only with the visitor probe incident in which a scientist named Lurol 
alters his psychology through advanced brain science. Her intent is to 
rebalance his psychology in his own interest, but she winds up heightening 
his potential for self-sacrifice, instead. She is able to do this, despite cultural 
safeguards, because Amel isn’t recognized as human, as illustrated in the 
following quote: 
 
‘Interrogation!’ exclaimed Lurol, dismayed. 
‘Our definition of humanity is based on the human 
genome,’ said Milap. And Von’s DNA isn’t human. It isn’t 
in our catalog!17 
 
Success for Amel, as a character, lies in the many ways in which he remains 
consistent across all transitions, allowing him to sustain relationships with 
others. 
His sweet nature, coupled with his history of bad experiences, keeps 
him courteous but wary in negotiations with people who have power over 
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him. Here he is, conniving to obtain the book he wants from an ailing patron, 
when he is Von, the courtesan: 
 
‘Such cynicism,’ she said, ‘in one so young! I think I will 
give you the book, just to prove that nice things can 
happen.’ She paused, studying her attractive bookcase of 
doggerel. Although it would break up the set to make it that 
one. 
 
He pounced. ‘Perhaps something less valuable?’18 
 
And this is Amel in the process of having his new, exalted status thrust upon 
him: 
 
‘Nobody said,’ she muttered under her breath, ‘that 
babysitting Souls of Light set loose in a nasty universe was 
going to be easy work.’ 
 
He trotted to keep up with her brisk pace. ‘You’re angry 
with me,’ he fretted, forgetting to speak down to her in his 
contriteness. He didn’t know what he had done, but he was 
sure it was a mistake.19 
 
With respect to Amel’s essential maleness despite some codedly-female 
aspects to his character, I appeal to the book’s female characters. The 
following passage, in which Ann refers to him as Beauty, shows him bristling 
over a male-male conflict, and his instinctively sexual interest in women at a 
physical level. 
 
One of the guards made some gruff remark in Gelack. 
Beauty’s gentle intelligence turned peeved and sullen in 
mild measures, telling her that he had been insulted, which 
seemed incongruous. Wasn’t he the one in power? 
 
Beauty shook it off the minute the door closed on the 
source of irritation, leaving them alone. His gray eyes 
spoke a universal language - he liked her. 
 
Well, he likes my body, Ann forced herself to be 
objective.20 
 
And here is Amel dealing with mixed feelings about the robustly sexual 
Vretla Vrel, one of his clients while he is still a commoner, which illustrates 
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how the conflict between his romantic sensibilities and sex drive work to help 
define him. 
 
‘What do Demish women do with you, Von?’ Vretla asked 
him. ‘Dress you up like one of their dolls?’ She stopped 
and turned him around, giving him a look that 
communicated directly with his groin, without checking 
with his brain on the way down. 
 
Von swallowed. ‘Demish women ask me about Vrellish 
women, too, you know,’ he told her a bit huskily. ‘Would 
you want me to answer their questions?’ 
 
‘I wouldn’t care,’ she said. Three hard fingers snagged 
firmly under the top band of his jock strap. 
 
Not good, he thought. 
She pushed him up against a wall. 
Oh come on Vretla! he thought, cursing his body for its 
indiscretions. Not in the hall! 
 
She jerked down his strap, proving what she knew, and 
grinned at him. ‘Lie down!’ 
 
I am going to give up Vrellish women, he promised himself, 
with the good intentions of all thrill seekers at the crest of 
the next dangerous plunge. Before I turn twenty.21 
 
Even when half-mad due to Lurol’s meddling, Amel consistently 
demonstrates a whole complex of established personality traits such as 
compassion even for the enemy; a sensualist’s love of luxury and aversion to 
discomfort; an idealized passion for literature; propensity for hero-worship 
towards abstract entities; and a knack for living in the moment. His identity, 
and therefore his ability to maintain relationships, is sustained through many 
small consistencies in the face of major disruptions. 
 
4. Naked Virtuality 
As author John Barth puts it, in his essay ‘Virtuality’: 
 
The virtual worlds of literature are unencumbered by 
literality. It is both their great limitation and their 
indispensable virtue that their virtuality is virtual; that they 
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exist not in our nerve-endings but in the pure hyperspace of 
our imaginations.22 
 
From the point of view of an expert reader, in other words, there is nothing 
new about the plethora of options for virtualization in the world today except 
their greater accessibility to the imaginatively disabled. No shame attaches, 
therefore, to learning new tricks from old art forms. 
Both my graduate degrees relate to information technology, and 
even my fictional endeavors include digital manifestations on the web. The 
critical tone of my observation arises solely from frustration with the mania 
for all things digital in modern culture where it appears to have dethroned 
complexity of thought. But as someone who has long spanned both worlds, it 
seems to me that the medium is no longer the message despite the influential 
proselytizing of this point of view by Marshall McLuhan.23 
Instead, stories arising in one media play out in a plethora of others 
retaining their identity to a greater or lesser extent depending on which 
elements in the original are extracted as the naked virtuality around which the 
new work is rebuilt. 
The concept of naked virtuality, as it arises from Amel’s story, is a 
tool for getting at what to carry forward into any kind of virtualization, and 
what to purposefully obfuscate or leave behind. I evolved the idea as a mental 
trick for shedding light on old problem in new ways as a novelist, but 
because a novel is a kind of virtuality, I plan to explore its potential as a kind 
of Occam’s razor for simplifying complex challenges in other fields: such as 
eliminating distracters that hinder absorption of concepts in instructional 
situations. And, of course, I plan to keep translating my real life concerns into 
the Okal Rel Universe by passing them through a stage of naked virtuality. 
 
Notes 
 
1 L Williams, The Courtesan Prince, Edge Science Fiction and Fantasy 
Publishing, Calgary, AB, 2005. 
2 G Roddenberry, (creator/producer), Start Trek, Aired from September 8, 
1966 through September 2, 1969 [Television series], NBC. 
3 S Beckett, Waiting for Godot, 1953. 
4 R Burton, Book of Thousand and One Nights. I cannot be certain of the 
edition I possessed in my late teens or possibly early twenties, but I 
remember it was an uncut version with nothing but a preamble and footnotes 
to help me with the steamy, matter-of-fact misogyny I found in it, rolled up 
into powerful old stories. 
5 A Koestler, Janus: A Summing Up, Random House, 1978, p. 96. 
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6 N Machiavelli, The Prince, Scholar Press, 1969. Once again, I cannot be 
certain which edition of this book I found lying around the house, and do not 
claim to have read it thoroughly in my youth, only to have grasped the key 
idea that the ends were supposed to justify the means when seeking power. 
7 S Kubrick, Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 
the Bomb, 1964. Based on a novel by Peter George. 
8 J M Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel, W. W. Norton & Company, 1997. 
9 B Ehrenreich, Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War, 
Virago, 1998. 
10 R Baker, Sperm Wars: The Science of Sex, 2005 reprint of 1996 edition. 
11 F Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, 
Simon & Schuster, 1995. 
12 J Brel, Jacques Brel is Alive and Well and Living in Paris. I saw this play 
while still living at home, in my teens or early twenties, but the impression 
made by the song about death and companionship stuck with me as a 
keystone of my thinking. 
13 Williams, op. cit., p. 170. 
14 R Roberts, A New Species: Gender and Science in Science Fiction, 
University of Illinois Press, 1993. 
15 P Pearson, When She was Bad: Violent Women and the Myth of Innocence, 
Random House of Canada, 1997. 
16 L Williams, ‘Vrellish Evolutionary Biology’, presented on the web to 
Science Fiction and Organization Conference, 15 Sept 1999, viewed 6 June 
2008, <http://www.okalrel.org/saga/reference/essays/vrellish.html>. 
17 Williams, op. cit., The Courtesan Prince, p. 234. 
18 ibid., p. 46. 
19 ibid., p. 390. 
20 ibid., p. 81. 
21 ibid., p. 36. 
22 J Barth, ‘Virtuality’. Johns Hopkins Magazine Electronic Edition, Special 
Issue: Straws in the Wind, Sept 1994, viewed 9 June 2008, 
<http://www.jhu.edu/~jhumag/994web/culture1.html>. 
23M McLuhan <http://www.marshallmcluhan.com/main.html>. 
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